The 3rd Conference on Contemporary Philosophy in East Asia

**CCPEA 2016**

**BOOK OF ABSTRACTS**

Seoul National University
Seoul, Korea
August 19-20, 2016

**ORGANIZED BY**
SNU Institute of Philosophy

**SUPPORTED BY**
Seoul National University
National Research Foundation of Korea
Moha Fund for Analytic Philosophy
The 3rd Conference on Contemporary Philosophy in East Asia

CCPEA 2016

BOOK OF ABSTRACTS

Seoul National University
Seoul, Korea
August 19-20, 2016

ORGANIZED BY
SNU Institute of Philosophy

SUPPORTED BY
Seoul National University
National Research Foundation of Korea
Moha Fund for Analytic Philosophy
The 3rd Conference on
Contemporary Philosophy in East Asia

**CCPEA 2016**
Seoul National University
Seoul, Korea
August 19-20, 2016

ORGANIZED BY
SNU Institute of Philosophy

SUPPORTED BY
Seoul National University
National Research Foundation of Korea
Moha Fund for Analytic Philosophy

Website: www.ccpea2016.kr
E-mail: ccpea2016@snu.ac.kr

This work was supported by the NRF(National Research Foundation of Korea) Grant funded by the MOE(Ministry of Education).

This work was supported by a generous grant from the Moha Fund for Analytic Philosophy.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Conference Description and Objectives 4

List of Speakers 5

Program at a Glance 10

Program 12
- Friday, August 19 12
- Saturday, August 20 19

Instructions for Speakers and Moderators 27

Practical Information 28
- Accommodation 28
  How to Get from the Airport to the Hoam Faculty House 28
  Direction to the Hoam Faculty House in Korean 29
  Check-In and Check-Out 30
  Dining at the Hoam Faculty House 30
- Conference Venue 31
  How to Get from the Hoam Faculty House to the Conference Venue 31
  Lunch 32
- Welcome Reception 32
- SNU Campus Map 33
- Traveling around Seoul 34
- Seoul Metro/Subway Map 35

ABSTRACTS 37

Plenary Lectures 38

Contributed Symposia 42

Contributed Papers 67
CONFERENCE DESCRIPTION AND OBJECTIVES

The Conference on Contemporary Philosophy in East Asia (CCPEA) was first established in 2012 in order to promote academic exchanges and international research collaborations among East Asian philosophers. Analytic approaches are preferred, but continental and other approaches are also welcomed at the CCPEA. The CCPEA takes place biennially, the first one held in Taipei in September 2012 and the second one in Kyoto in August 2014. In both conferences the participants had productive times by sharing research results and deepening mutual understandings. We hope that CCPEA 2016 will serve as another great platform for academically exciting and inspiring exchanges of ideas among East Asian philosophers.

In recent decades, the East Asian countries have been remarkably successful in their economic achievements, and they now play a crucial role in the global economy. We believe that it is time for East Asian academics, including philosophers, to play a more central role in the global academic community as well. It is our sincere hope that the East Asian philosophical community will grow up to be an important center in the international academy of philosophy through the academic exchanges and research collaborations encouraged by the CCPEAs.

The CCPEA 2016 program includes three plenary lectures by distinguished speakers, seventeen talks for six contributed symposia, and over one hundred and forty talks for contributed paper sessions. We are deeply grateful to the members of the CCPEA 2016 Organizing Committee and all participants for their enthusiasm and support for the conference.

CCPEA 2016 Local Organizing Committee

AHN, Sungdoo (Director, Institute of Philosophy)     CHO, In-Rae
KANG, Jinho (Secretary-General)       KIM, Ki hyeon
LEE, Namin                             LEE, Sukjae

SECRETARIAT
KIM, Daehyun                          KIM, Jun Young
KIM, Soohyun                          LEE, Joohan (chief assistant)

CCPEA 2016 Organizing Committee

AHN, Sungdoo                          CHEN, Bo
CHEN, Szu-Ting                        CHENG, Kai-Yuan
CHUNG, Dauthyun                       CHUNG, Inkyo
GELFERT, Axel                         HO, Chien-Hsing
JEONG, Sang Bong                      KANG, Jinho
KIM, Kihyeon                          KIM, Seon-Wook
LEE, Byeong-Deok                      LEE, Namin Lee
LIM, Cecilia                          NAKAYAMA, Yasuo
PARK, Woosuk                          PEDERSEN, Nikolaj
TODAYAMA, Kazuhisa                    WANG, Ellie Hua
YOON, Bosuk                           WU, Shiu-Ching May

CHAN, Jonathan K.L.                   CHO, In-Rae
DEGUCHI, Yasuo                        ICHINOSE, Masaki
KANG, Young Ahn                       KONO, Tetsuya
LEE, Sukjae                           LEE, Kihyeon
NOTOMI, Noburu                        RHEE, Young E.
WU, Shiu-Ching May
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Talk Schedule</th>
<th>Session No.</th>
<th>Abstract Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AHN, Geonhoon</td>
<td>Kangwon National University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20 18:00 - 18:30</td>
<td>Session 4</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHN, Hwanki</td>
<td>Joong-Ang Sangha University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20 14:15 - 14:45</td>
<td>Session 3</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHN, Sungdoo</td>
<td>Seoul National University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 19 15:30 - 16:00</td>
<td>Session 7</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMITANI, Yuichi</td>
<td>Tokyo University of Agriculture</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 19 11:15 - 11:45</td>
<td>Session 4</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOKI, Shigeyuki</td>
<td>University of Aizu</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 20 13:45 - 14:15</td>
<td>Session 3</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AYOYAGI, Masafumi</td>
<td>Ritsumeikan University</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 20 10:45 - 11:15</td>
<td>Session 8</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AURELIO, Michael G.</td>
<td>Ateneo de Manila University</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Aug 20 18:00 - 18:30</td>
<td>Session 5</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAE, Nina</td>
<td>Kyung Hee University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 19 17:30 - 18:00</td>
<td>Session 3</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRADLEY, Joff</td>
<td>Teikyo University</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 19 17:30 - 18:00</td>
<td>Session 8</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRUNER, Justin</td>
<td>University National University</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Aug 19 17:00 - 17:30</td>
<td>Session 6</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CABRERA Jr., Manuel Mandel</td>
<td>Yonsei University Underwood International College</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20 15:00 - 15:30</td>
<td>Session 2</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARET, R. Colin</td>
<td>Yonsei University Underwood International College</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 19 18:00 - 18:30</td>
<td>Session 1</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASATI, Filippo</td>
<td>University of St. Andrews</td>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>Aug 20 16:00 - 16:30</td>
<td>Session 7</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASLIB, Bernardo</td>
<td>University of the Philippines Diliman</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Aug 19 18:00 - 18:30</td>
<td>Session 3</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAN, Benedict S. B.</td>
<td>Hong Kong Baptist University</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Aug 19 10:45 - 11:15</td>
<td>Session 6</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAN, Jonathan K. L.</td>
<td>Hong Kong Baptist University</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Aug 20 10:45 - 11:15</td>
<td>Session 5</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHANG, Chung An</td>
<td>National Taiwan Normal University</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Aug 20 11:45 - 12:15</td>
<td>Session 7</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHEN, Bo</td>
<td>Peking University</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Aug 19 10:45 - 11:15</td>
<td>Session 1</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHEN, Hsiang-Yun</td>
<td>Institute of European and American Studies, Sinica Academia</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Aug 19 17:00 - 17:30</td>
<td>Session 2</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHEN, Hsun-Mei</td>
<td>National Taiwan University</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Aug 19 16:00 - 16:30</td>
<td>Session 7</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHEN, Szu-Ting</td>
<td>National Tsing Hua University</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Aug 19 10:45 - 11:15</td>
<td>Session 4</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHENG, Kai-Yuan</td>
<td>National Yang-Ming University</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Aug 20 18:00 - 18:30</td>
<td>Session 8</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHEON, Hyundeuk</td>
<td>Ewha Womans University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 19 11:45 - 12:15</td>
<td>Session 4</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHEONG, Eunhae</td>
<td>Sungkyunkwan University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 19 10:45 - 11:15</td>
<td>Session 8</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHO, In-Rae</td>
<td>Seoul National University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20 11:45 - 12:15</td>
<td>Session 4</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHOI, Kunhong</td>
<td>Seoul National University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 19 17:00 - 17:30</td>
<td>Session 3</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHOI, Sungho</td>
<td>Kyung Hee University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 19 11:45 - 12:15</td>
<td>Session 2</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHUNG, Daihyun</td>
<td>Ewha Womans University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 19 09:30 - 10:30</td>
<td>Plenary</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHUNG, Hun</td>
<td>University of Arizona</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Aug 19 17:30 - 18:00</td>
<td>Session 6</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHUNG, Inkyo</td>
<td>Korea University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 19 15:00 - 15:30</td>
<td>Session 1</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHUNG, So-Yi</td>
<td>Sogang University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20 18:00 - 18:30</td>
<td>Session 7</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLEOFAS, Jacklyn A.</td>
<td>Ateneo de Manila University</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Aug 19 11:45 - 12:15</td>
<td>Session 6</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Affiliation</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEGUCCI, Yasuo</td>
<td>Kyoto University</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>15:00 - 15:30</td>
<td>Session 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DENG, Natalja</td>
<td>University of Cambridge</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>17:00 - 17:30</td>
<td>Session 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIETZ, Richard</td>
<td>University of Tokyo</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>13:45 - 14:15</td>
<td>Session 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOGAN, Nejat</td>
<td>Anadolu University</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>11:15 - 11:45</td>
<td>Session 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUH, Bau-ruei</td>
<td>National Taiwan University</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>13:45 - 14:15</td>
<td>Session 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FISHER, Grant</td>
<td>Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>11:15 - 11:45</td>
<td>Session 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUJIKAWA, Naoya</td>
<td>Tokyo Metropolitan University</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>16:00 - 16:30</td>
<td>Session 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUJITA, Sho</td>
<td>Osaka University</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>17:30 - 18:00</td>
<td>Session 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GELFERT, Axel</td>
<td>National University of Singapore</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>10:45 - 11:15</td>
<td>Session 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUIANG, Francisco</td>
<td>University of the Philippines Diliman</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>14:15 - 14:45</td>
<td>Session 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA, Eugene</td>
<td>Sogang University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>11:45 - 12:15</td>
<td>Session 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA, Sangyong</td>
<td>Seoul National University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>11:15 - 11:45</td>
<td>Session 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAN, Sungil</td>
<td>Seoul National University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>11:45 - 12:15</td>
<td>Session 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAN, Woojin</td>
<td>Duksumg Women’s University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>17:30 - 18:00</td>
<td>Session 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAIQUE, Ehsanul</td>
<td>University of Dhaka</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>16:00 - 16:30</td>
<td>Session 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HO, Chien-hsing</td>
<td>Nanhua University</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>10:45 - 11:15</td>
<td>Session 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOLMAN, Bennett</td>
<td>Yonsei University Underwood International College</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>18:00 - 18:30</td>
<td>Session 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HONG, Jing-Li</td>
<td>Chang Jung Christian University</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>15:30 - 16:00</td>
<td>Session 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICHINOSE, Masaki</td>
<td>University of Tokyo</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>13:45 - 14:45</td>
<td>Plenary 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGARASHI, Ryosuke</td>
<td>Kyoto University</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>18:00 - 18:30</td>
<td>Session 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISE, Toshihiko</td>
<td>Ritsumeikan University</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>14:15 - 14:45</td>
<td>Session 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IZUMI, Yu</td>
<td>Kyoto University</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>15:30 - 16:00</td>
<td>Session 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEONG, Sang Bong</td>
<td>Konkuk University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>10:45 - 11:15</td>
<td>Session 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIN, Yuqiong</td>
<td>Kyung Hee University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>11:45 - 12:15</td>
<td>Session 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUNG, Jaemin</td>
<td>Arizona State University</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>16:00 - 16:30</td>
<td>Session 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANG, Cheul</td>
<td>Yonsei University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>11:45 - 12:15</td>
<td>Session 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANG, Jinho</td>
<td>Seoul National University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>14:15 - 14:45</td>
<td>Session 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANG, Sun Ah</td>
<td>Seoul National University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>11:45 - 12:15</td>
<td>Session 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANG, Sung-Hoon</td>
<td>Seoul National University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>15:00 - 15:30</td>
<td>Session 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANO, Hiroyuki</td>
<td>Osaka University</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>16:00 - 16:30</td>
<td>Session 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KASAKI, Masashi</td>
<td>Kyoto University</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>15:00 - 15:30</td>
<td>Session 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KATSUMORI, Makoto</td>
<td>Akita University</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>17:00 - 17:30</td>
<td>Session 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIM, Hanna</td>
<td>Seoul National University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>11:15 - 11:45</td>
<td>Session 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIM, Hyunseop</td>
<td>Seoul National University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>11:15 - 11:45</td>
<td>Session 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIM, Jiwon</td>
<td>Korea University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>17:00 - 17:30</td>
<td>Session 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIM, Shin</td>
<td>Hankuk University of Foreign Studies</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>11:45 - 12:15</td>
<td>Session 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Institution</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIM, Tae-Hee</td>
<td>Konkuk University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>11:15 - 11:45</td>
<td>Session 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLUZ, Christopher</td>
<td>Catholic University of Daegu</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>13:45 - 14:15</td>
<td>Session 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOKURYO, Yoshiki</td>
<td>Rikkyo University</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>15:00 - 15:30</td>
<td>Session 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KONDO, Kazunori</td>
<td>Kagoshima University</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>15:30 - 16:00</td>
<td>Session 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOO, Ickhee</td>
<td>Sogang University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>17:30 - 18:00</td>
<td>Session 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOTEGAWA, Shojiro</td>
<td>Kokugakuin University</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>16:00 - 16:30</td>
<td>Session 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOYAMA, Tora</td>
<td>Osaka University</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>11:15 - 11:45</td>
<td>Session 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAASIK, Kristjan</td>
<td>Shandong University</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>13:45 - 14:15</td>
<td>Session 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAM, Wing Kwan</td>
<td>Hang Seng Management College</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>13:45 - 14:15</td>
<td>Session 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANE, Timothy</td>
<td>Taipei Medical University</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>09:30 - 10:30</td>
<td>Plenary 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAU, Kwok-ying</td>
<td>Chinese University of Hong Kong</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>15:00 - 15:30</td>
<td>Session 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEDERMAN, Zohar</td>
<td>National University of Singapore</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>15:00 - 15:30</td>
<td>Session 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEE, Byeong Deok</td>
<td>Sungkyunkwan University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>15:00 - 15:30</td>
<td>Session 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEE, Chunghyoung</td>
<td>Pohang University of Science and Technology</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>15:30 - 16:00</td>
<td>Session 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEE, Haewan</td>
<td>Seoul National University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>10:45 - 11:15</td>
<td>Session 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEE, Jeonggyu</td>
<td>University of California, Santa Barbara</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>17:30 - 18:00</td>
<td>Session 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEE, Jong Kwan</td>
<td>Sungkyunkwan University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>11:45 - 12:15</td>
<td>Session 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEE, Nam-In</td>
<td>Seoul National University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>14:15 - 14:45</td>
<td>Session 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEE, Sukjae</td>
<td>Seoul National University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>17:30 - 18:00</td>
<td>Session 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEE, Yungwhan</td>
<td>Ewha Womans University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>16:00 - 16:30</td>
<td>Session 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEMOINE, Philippe</td>
<td>Cornell University</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>17:30 - 18:00</td>
<td>Session 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIN, Chen-kuo</td>
<td>National Chengchi University</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>15:00 - 15:30</td>
<td>Session 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIN, Ya-Ping</td>
<td>Chang Gung University</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>15:30 - 16:00</td>
<td>Session 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIU, Chunlin</td>
<td>Chang Jung Christian University</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>16:00 - 16:30</td>
<td>Session 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA, Wei-Fen</td>
<td>China Medical University</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>15:30 - 16:00</td>
<td>Session 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARSH, Steven</td>
<td>Chang Jung University</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>13:45 - 14:15</td>
<td>Session 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARSHALL, Dan</td>
<td>Lingnan University</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>10:45 - 11:15</td>
<td>Session 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATARESE, Vera</td>
<td>University of Hong Kong</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>18:00 - 18:30</td>
<td>Session 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MATSUDA, Tsuyoshi</td>
<td>Kobe University</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>17:00 - 17:30</td>
<td>Session 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIYAZONO, Kengo</td>
<td>Hiroshima University</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>18:00 - 18:30</td>
<td>Session 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAKAYAMA, Yasuo</td>
<td>Osaka University</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>16:00 - 16:30</td>
<td>Session 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NARUSE, Sho</td>
<td>Nagoya University</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>17:00 - 17:30</td>
<td>Session 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHOFF, Georg</td>
<td>The Royal’s Institute of Mental Health</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>10:45 - 11:15</td>
<td>Session 4, 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTOMI, Noburu</td>
<td>University of Tokyo</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>15:30 - 16:00</td>
<td>Session 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Institution</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Dates</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMORI, Hitoshi</td>
<td>Kyoto University</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>17:30 - 18:00</td>
<td>1, 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>15:00 - 15:30</td>
<td>61, 159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONISHI, Takuro</td>
<td>National University of Singapore</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>15:30 - 16:00</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARK, Seungbae</td>
<td>Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>15:00 - 15:30</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARK, Su-hyun</td>
<td>Seoul National University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>16:00 - 16:30</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEDERSEN, Nikolaj</td>
<td>Yonsei University Underwood International College</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>17:00 - 17:45</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERUZZO Jr., Léo</td>
<td>Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>18:00 - 18:30</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PETTERSSON, Mikael</td>
<td>Lingnan University</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>11:15 - 11:45</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PURINO, Maria</td>
<td>University of San Carlos</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>14:15 - 14:45</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RHEE, Young E.</td>
<td>Kangwon National University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>10:45 - 11:15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROSENKRANZ, Sven</td>
<td>University of Barcelona</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>17:45 - 18:30</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RYU, Eui Geun</td>
<td>Silla University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>16:00 - 16:30</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAKURAGI, Shin</td>
<td>Shibaura Institute of Technology</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>10:45 - 11:15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SATO, Kumi masa</td>
<td>Keio University</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>16:00 - 16:30</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCRIPTER, Lucas</td>
<td>Hong Kong Baptist University</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>18:00 - 18:30</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEKULOVSKI, Jordanco</td>
<td>Kobe University</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>15:30 - 16:00</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEO, Kwang Yul</td>
<td>Kyung Hee University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>17:30 - 18:00</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHIM, Ji Won</td>
<td>Inje University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>11:45 - 12:15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHIMIZU, Ukyo</td>
<td>Nagoya University</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>15:30 - 16:00</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SONG, Fei</td>
<td>University of Hong Kong</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>11:15 - 11:45</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STA. MARIA, Joseph</td>
<td>Ateneo De Manila University</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>11:15 - 11:45</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STEIN, Tao</td>
<td>University of Hong Kong</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>16:00 - 16:30</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUAZO, Ruby</td>
<td>University of San Carlos</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>18:00 - 18:30</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUGIMOTO, Shunsuke</td>
<td>Osaka University of Economics</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>15:30 - 16:00</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUZUKI, Makoto</td>
<td>Kansai University of Welfare Sciences</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>17:00 - 17:30</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYMONS, Xavier</td>
<td>Australian Catholic University</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>17:00 - 17:30</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAKAYA, Ryuhei</td>
<td>Keio University</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>15:00 - 15:30</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THRASHER, John</td>
<td>Monash University</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>18:00 - 18:30</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TING, Angel O.K.</td>
<td>Hong Kong Baptist University</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>17:30 - 18:00</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TODAYAMA, Kazuhisa</td>
<td>Nagoya University</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>15:00 - 15:30</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU, Chialin</td>
<td>Chang Jung Christian University</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>10:45 - 11:15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URBANO, Ryan</td>
<td>University of San Carlos</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>16:00 - 16:30</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VERVILLE, Jacob</td>
<td>Kyung Hee University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>13:45 - 14:15</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WANG, Ellin Hua</td>
<td>National Chenchi University</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>17:00 - 17:30</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WANG, Hongguang</td>
<td>Huaqiao University</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>16:00 - 16:30</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WANG, Linton</td>
<td>National Chung Chen University</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>15:30 - 16:00</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WANG, Qingjie James</td>
<td>The Chinese University of Hong Kong</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>14:15 - 14:45</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WANG, Wen-fang</td>
<td>National Yang Ming University</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>11:15 - 11:45</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WON, Haeyoung</td>
<td>Dongguk University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>14:15 - 14:45</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WON, Yuna</td>
<td>Cornell University</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>16:00 - 16:30</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WU, Feng-Wei</td>
<td>Chinese Culture University</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>17:00 - 17:30</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WU, Shiu-Ching May</td>
<td>National Chung-Cheng University</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>10:45 - 11:15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WYATT, Jeremy</td>
<td>Yonsei University Underwood International College</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>11:45 - 12:15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XU, Zhaoqing</td>
<td>Sichuan University</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>11:45 - 12:15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YAMAMORI, Maiko</td>
<td>Kyoto University</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>18:00 - 18:30</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YANG, Eunsuk</td>
<td>Chonbuk National University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>17:00 - 17:30</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YANG, Sunny</td>
<td>Inje University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>11:15 - 11:45</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YEN, Chun-Ping</td>
<td>The Graduate Center, City University of New York</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>15:00 - 15:30</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YEUNG, Ka Chung</td>
<td>Hong Kong Baptist University</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>15:30 - 16:00</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YEUNG, Tak-lap</td>
<td>Free University of Berlin</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>17:00 - 17:30</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YI, Huiyuhl</td>
<td>Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>15:30 - 16:00</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YI, Kyoowon</td>
<td>Seoul National University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>11:15 - 11:45</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YOO, Kwon Jong</td>
<td>Chung-Ang University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>11:45 - 12:15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YOON, Bosuk</td>
<td>Ewha Woman’s University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>15:30 - 16:00</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YOON, Juhan</td>
<td>Seoul National University</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>15:00 - 15:30</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YUKIMOTO, Taishi</td>
<td>Osaka University</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>16:00 - 16:30</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZHANG, Ellen Y.</td>
<td>Hong Kong Baptist University</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>15:00 - 15:30</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZHANG, Yan-jing</td>
<td>Hebei University</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>10:45 - 11:15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZHAO, Xian</td>
<td>Hebei University</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>10:45 - 11:15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZHU, Min</td>
<td>Macau University of Technology and Science</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>15:30 - 16:00</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# PROGRAM AT A GLANCE

**Friday, August 19**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>08:45 - 09:15</td>
<td>Registration</td>
<td>1st Floor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09:15 - 09:30</td>
<td>Opening Remarks</td>
<td>Room B101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AHN, Sungdoo (Director, SNU Institute of Philosophy)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Welcome Address</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RHI, Juhyung (Dean of the College of Humanities, Seoul National University)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09:30 - 10:30</td>
<td>Plenary Lecture 1</td>
<td>Room B101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHUNG, Dalhyun</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Moderator: CHO, In-Rae)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:30-10:45</td>
<td>Break</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:45 - 11:15</td>
<td>Symposium 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHEN, Bo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WANG, Wen-fang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>XU, Zhaoqing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:15 - 11:45</td>
<td>Plenary Lecture 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ICHINOSE, Masaki</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Moderator: KIM, Kihyeon)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:15 - 13:45</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:45 - 14:45</td>
<td>Plenary Lecture 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ICHINOSE, Masaki</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Moderator: KIM, Kihyeon)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:45 - 15:00</td>
<td>Break</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:00 - 15:30</td>
<td>Symposium 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHUNG, Inkyo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TAKAYA, Ryohesi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WANG, Linton</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MA, Wei-Fen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:30 - 16:00</td>
<td>Plenary Lecture 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BRUNER, Justin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHUNG, Hun</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>THRASHER, John</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:00 - 16:30</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:30 - 17:00</td>
<td>Plenary Lecture 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BRUNER, Justin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHUNG, Hun</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>THRASHER, John</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>YU, Ehsan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SUAZO, Ruby</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:00 - 19:00</td>
<td>Welcome Reception</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Magnolia Hall, Hoam Faculty House)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Moderators**

- DIETZ, Richard
- MARSHALL, Dan
- HAN, Sungil
- DENG, Natalja
- CHUN, Jonathan-K.L.
- AHN, Sungdoo
- CHEN, Hsun-Mei
- CHANG, Richard
- MARSHALL, Dan
- HAN, Sungil
- DENG, Natalja
- CHU, Jonathan-K.L.
- AHN, Sungdoo
- CHEN, Hsun-Mei
- DIETZ, Richard
- MARSHALL, Dan
- HAN, Sungil
- DENG, Natalja
- CHU, Jonathan-K.L.
- AHN, Sungdoo
- CHEN, Hsun-Mei
- DIETZ, Richard
- MARSHALL, Dan
- HAN, Sungil
- DENG, Natalja
- CHU, Jonathan-K.L.
- AHN, Sungdoo
- CHEN, Hsun-Mei
- DIETZ, Richard
- MARSHALL, Dan
- HAN, Sungil
- DENG, Natalja
- CHU, Jonathan-K.L.
- AHN, Sungdoo
- CHEN, Hsun-Mei
- DIETZ, Richard
- MARSHALL, Dan
- HAN, Sungil
- DENG, Natalja
- CHU, Jonathan-K.L.
- AHN, Sungdoo
- CHEN, Hsun-Mei
- DIETZ, Richard
- MARSHALL, Dan
- HAN, Sungil
- DENG, Natalja
- CHU, Jonathan-K.L.
- AHN, Sungdoo
- CHEN, Hsun-Mei
- DIETZ, Richard
- MARSHALL, Dan
- HAN, Sungil
- DENG, Natalja
- CHU, Jonathan-K.L.
- AHN, Sungdoo
- CHEN, Hsun-Mei
- DIETZ, Richard
- MARSHALL, Dan
- HAN, Sungil
- DENG, Natalja
- CHU, Jonathan-K.L.
- AHN, Sungdoo
- CHEN, Hsun-Mei
- DIETZ, Richard
- MARSHALL, Dan
- HAN, Sungil
- DENG, Natalja
- CHU, Jonathan-K.L.
- AHN, Sungdoo
- CHEN, Hsun-Mei
- DIETZ, Richard
- MARSHALL, Dan
- HAN, Sungil
- DENG, Natalja
- CHU, Jonathan-K.L.
- AHN, Sungdoo
- CHEN, Hsun-Mei
- DIETZ, Richard
- MARSHALL, Dan
- HAN, Sungil
- DENG, Natalja
- CHU, Jonathan-K.L.
- AHN, Sungdoo
- CHEN, Hsun-Mei
- DIETZ, Richard
- MARSHALL, Dan
- HAN, Sungil
- DENG, Natalja
- CHU, Jonathan-K.L.
- AHN, Sungdoo
- CHEN, Hsun-Mei
- DIETZ, Richard
- MARSHALL, Dan
- HAN, Sungil
- DENG, Natalja
- CHU, Jonathan-K.L.
- AHN, Sungdoo
- CHEN, Hsun-Mei
- DIETZ, Richard
- MARSHALL, Dan
- HAN, Sungil
- DENG, Natalja
- CHU, Jonathan-K.L.
- AHN, Sungdoo
- CHEN, Hsun-Mei
- DIETZ, Richard
- MARSHALL, Dan
- HAN, Sungil
- DENG, Natalja
- CHU, Jonathan-K.L.
- AHN, Sungdoo
- CHEN, Hsun-Mei
- DIETZ, Richard
- MARSHALL, Dan
- HAN, Sungil
- DENG, Natalja
- CHU, Jonathan-K.L.
- AHN, Sungdoo
- CHEN, Hsun-Mei
- DIETZ, Richard
- MARSHALL, Dan
- HAN, Sungil
- DENG, Natalja
- CHU, Jonathan-K.L.
- AHN, Sungdoo
- CHEN, Hsun-Mei
- DIETZ, Richard
- MARSHALL, Dan
- HAN, Sungil
- DENG, Natalja
- CHU, Jonathan-K.L.
- AHN, Sungdoo
- CHEN, Hsun-Mei
- DIETZ, Richard
- MARSHALL, Dan
- HAN, Sungil
- DENG, Natalja
- CHU, Jonathan-K.L.
- AHN, Sungdoo
- CHEN, Hsun-Mei
- DIETZ, Richard
- MARSHALL, Dan
- HAN, Sungil
- DENG, Natalja
- CHU, Jonathan-K.L.
- AHN, Sungdoo
- CHEN, Hsun-Mei
- DIETZ, Richard
- MARSHALL, Dan
- HAN, Sungil
- DENG, Natalja
- CHU, Jonathan-K.L.
- AHN, Sungdoo
- CHEN, Hsun-Mei
- DIETZ, Richard
- MARSHALL, Dan
- HAN, Sungil
- DENG, Natalja
- CHU, Jonathan-K.L.
- AHN, Sungdoo
- CHEN, Hsun-Mei
- DIETZ, Richard
- MARSHALL, Dan
- HAN, Sungil
- DENG, Natalja
- CHU, Jonathan-K.L.
- AHN, Sungdoo
- CHEN, Hsun-Mei
- DIETZ, Richard
- MARSHALL, Dan
- HAN, Sungil
- DENG, Natalja
- CHU, Jonathan-K.L.
- AHN, Sungdoo
- CHEN, Hsun-Mei
- DIETZ, Richard
- MARSHALL, Dan
- HAN, Sungil
- DENG, Natalja
- CHU, Jonathan-K.L.
- AHN, Sungdoo
- CHEN, Hsun-Mei
- DIETZ, Richard
- MARSHALL, Dan
- HAN, Sungil
- DENG, Natalja
- CHU, Jonathan-K.L.
- AHN, Sungdoo
- CHEN, Hsun-Mei
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session 1 (Room 202)</th>
<th>Session 2 (Room 207)</th>
<th>Session 3 (Room 208)</th>
<th>Session 4 (Room 203)</th>
<th>Session 5 (Room 204)</th>
<th>Session 6 (Room 102)</th>
<th>Session 7 (Room 103)</th>
<th>Session 8 (Room 104)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10:00-10:15</td>
<td>WON, Yuna</td>
<td>NAKAYAMA, Yasuo</td>
<td>MIYAZONO, Kengo</td>
<td>AMITANI, Yuiich</td>
<td>HAOUE, Ehsanul</td>
<td>CASLIB, Bernardo</td>
<td>AOKI, Shigeyuki</td>
<td>LEE, Namin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:45-11:15</td>
<td>ZHANG, Yan-jing &amp; ZHAO, Xian</td>
<td>MARSHALL, Dan</td>
<td>SYMPOSIUM 4</td>
<td>GELFERT, Axel</td>
<td>CHAN, Jonathan K. L.</td>
<td>LEE, Haewan</td>
<td>JEONG, Sang Bong</td>
<td>AOYAGI, Masafumi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:15-11:45</td>
<td>WYATT, Jeremy</td>
<td>KOYAMA, Tora</td>
<td>RHEE, Young E.</td>
<td>FISHER, Grant</td>
<td>KIM, Hyunseop</td>
<td>PETTERSSON, Mikael</td>
<td>KIM, Hanna</td>
<td>LEE, Jong Kwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:45-12:15</td>
<td>HAN, Sungil</td>
<td></td>
<td>SHIM, Ji Won</td>
<td>CHO, In-Rae</td>
<td>KANG, Cheul</td>
<td>KANG, San Ah</td>
<td>CHANG, Chungho</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:00-13:30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:45-14:15</td>
<td>DIETZ, Richard</td>
<td>KLUZ, Christopher</td>
<td>AOKI, Shigeyuki</td>
<td>MARSH, Steven</td>
<td>LAM, Wing Kwan</td>
<td>VERVILLE, Jacob Michael</td>
<td>DUH, Bau-ruei</td>
<td>LAASIK, Kristjan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:15-14:45</td>
<td>KANG, Jinho</td>
<td>ISE, Toshihiko</td>
<td>AHN, Hwanki</td>
<td>PURINO, Maria Majorie</td>
<td>GUIANG, Francisco</td>
<td>WON, Haeyoung</td>
<td>WANG, Qingjie James</td>
<td>LEE, Namin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:45-15:00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:00-15:30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SYMPOSIUM 5</td>
<td>KANG, Sung-Hoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:30-16:00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NOTOMI, Noburu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:00-16:30</td>
<td>WANG, Hongguang</td>
<td>STEIN, Tao</td>
<td>SATO, Kunimasa</td>
<td>JUNG, Jaemin</td>
<td>LII, Chulin</td>
<td>PARK, Suh-hyun</td>
<td></td>
<td>LEE, Youngwhan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:30-17:00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:00-17:30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>KANG, Sung-Hoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:30-18:00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NOTOMI, Noburu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18:00-18:30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18:30-18:45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Closing Remarks**

CHD, In-Rae

---

**Saturday, August 20**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session 1 (Room 202)</th>
<th>Session 2 (Room 207)</th>
<th>Session 3 (Room 208)</th>
<th>Session 4 (Room 203)</th>
<th>Session 5 (Room 204)</th>
<th>Session 6 (Room 102)</th>
<th>Session 7 (Room 103)</th>
<th>Session 8 (Room 104)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>09:00-09:30</td>
<td>Registration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09:30-10:00</td>
<td>Plenary Lecture 3</td>
<td>LANE, Timothy</td>
<td>(Moderator: LEE, Sukjae)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:00-10:30</td>
<td>Break</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:00-11:30</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
<td>(Dongwon Dining Hall, Building 113)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:00-12:30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:00-13:30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:45-14:15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:15-14:45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:45-15:00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:00-15:30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:30-16:00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:00-16:30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:30-17:00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:00-17:30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:30-18:00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18:00-18:30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18:30-18:45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PROGRAM

Friday, August 19

08:45-09:15 Registration  
1st Floor

09:15-09:30 Opening Remarks  
Room B101  
AHN, Sungdoo (Director, SNU Institute of Philosophy)

Welcome Address  
RHI, Juhyung (Dean of the College of Humanities, Seoul National University)

09:30-10:30 Plenary Lecture 1  
Room B101  
Moderator: CHO, In-Rae (Seoul National University, Korea)  
CHUNG, Daihyun (Ewha Womans University, Korea)  
“Indexical Realism by Inter-Agentic Reference”

10:30-10:45 Break

10:45-12:15 Sessions for Contributed Papers and Symposia

SESSION 1  
Symposium 1  
Philosophy of Language: Kripke and Others  
Moderator: DIETZ, Richard (University of Tokyo, Japan)

CHEN, Bo (Peking University, China)  
“Designative and Predicative Use of Terms: Against the Distinction between Non-Rigidity”

WANG, Wen-fang (National Yang Ming University, Taiwan)  
“A, qua an S, is F”

XU, Zhaoqing (Sichuan University, China)  
“On the Nesting Argument and Two Notions of Necessity”

SESSION 2  
Metaphysics  
Moderator: MARSHALL, Dan (Lingnan University, Hong Kong)

TU, Chialin (Chang Jung Christian University, Taiwan)  
“Does Emergence Transform Traditional Metaphysics?”

HA, Sangyong (Seoul National University, Korea)  
“Can Bennett-Style Nonreductive Physicalists Solve the Causal Exclusion Problem?”

CHOI, Sungho (Kyung Hee University, Korea)  
“The Metaphysics of Superheroes”
SESSION 3  
*Philosophy of Mind and Comparative Philosophy*

Moderator: HAN, Sungil (Seoul National University, Korea)

SAKURAGI, Shin (Shibaura Institute of Technolgoy, Japan)  
“Our Different Concepts of Experiential Memory”

KIM, Tae-Hee (Konkuk University, Korea)  
“Asymmetries of Perceptual Span: A Philosophical Contribution to Cognitive Sciences”

YOO, Kwon Jong (Chung-Ang University, Korea)  
“Our Methodological Approach to Comparison of Different Understandings of Mind”

SESSION 4  
*Philosophy of Science*

Moderator: DENG, Natalja (University of Cambridge, England)

CHEN, Szu-Ting (National Tsing Hua University, Taiwan)  
“How Can We Explain Operation of the Brain? Capacity-Based versus Law-Driven Models of the Brain”

AMITANI, Yuichi (Tokyo University of Agriculture, Japan)  
“What Biologists Talk about When They Talk about Species”

CHEON, Hyundeuk (Ewha Womans University, Korea)  
“The Structural Heterogeneity of Scientific Concepts”

SESSION 5  
*Ethics*

Moderator: KIM, Hyunseop (Seoul National University, Korea)

WU, Shiu-Ching May (National Chung-Cheng University, Taiwan)  
“Zen and Care: A Debate between Compatibilism and Incompatibilism”

SONG, Fei (University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong)  
“The Failure of the Bottom-Up Approach of Doing and Allowing”

KIM, Shin (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)  
“The Moral Standing of Robots and Humanoids”

SESSION 6  
*Political Philosophy*

Moderator: CHAN, Jonathan K. L. (Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong)

CHAN, Benedict S. B. (Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong)  
“Developing a Minimal Account for East-West Debates on Human Rights”

DOGAN, Nejat (Anadolu University, Turkey)  
“Yusuf Has Hacib’s Kutadgu Bilig and Plato’s Republic: A Tale of Two Political Approaches”

CLEOFAS, Jacklyn A. (Ateneo de Manila University, Philippines)  
“How to Improve the Response to Situationism from Early Confucian Thought”

SESSION 7  
*Asian Philosophy*

Moderator: AHN, Sungdoo (Seoul National University, Korea)

HO, Chien-hsing (Nanhua University, Taiwan)  
“Causation and Ontic Indeterminacy: A Chinese Madhyamaka Perspective”

YI, Kyooowan (Seoul National University, Korea)
“The Theories of Buddhist Atomism and the Debates on Realism, Representationalism, and Phenomenalism in the Buddhist Philosophers”
HA, Eugene (Sogang University, Korea)
“The Influence of the Daeseung-saron-hyeonui-gi(大乘四論玄義記) on Wonhyo’s thought of Buddha-Nature”

SESSION 8  Asian Philosophy
Room 104
Moderator: CHEN, Hsun-Mei (National Taiwan University, Taiwan)

CHEONG, Eunhae (Sungkyunkwan University, Korea)
“The Differentiability between ‘the Re-self-attesting Part of Mind’ of Mere Consciousness Buddhism and ‘Reflection’ of Phenomenology”
STA. MARIA, Joseph (Ateneo De Manila University, Philippines)
“The Paradox of Behavior-Regulating Language According to Daoist Philosophy”
JIN, Yuqiong (Kyung Hee University, Korea)
“A Review of Yin Hai-Guang’s Philosophical Works”

12:15-13:45  Lunch

13:45-14:45  Plenary Lecture 2
Room B101
Moderator: KIM, Kihyeon (Seoul National University, Korea)

ICHINOSE, Masaki (University of Tokyo, Japan)
“A Degree-Theoretic Approach to Causation by Absence”

14:45-15:00  Break

15:00-16:30  Sessions for Contributed Papers and Symposia

SESSION 1  Logic and Metaphysics
Room 202
Moderator: CARET, R. Colin (Yonsei University Underwood International College, Korea)

CHUNG, Inkyo (Korea University, Korea)
“A Constructive Iterative Conception of Set”
ZHU, Min (Macau University of Technology and Science, China)
“On Correlation Between the Universe of Sets and ‘the Universe of Sets’”
NAKAYAMA, Yasuo & YUKIMOTO, Taishi (Osaka University, Japan)
“Truth-Maker Maximalism and a Boolean Algebra of States of Affairs”

SESSION 2  Philosophy of Language
Room 207
Moderator: CHEN, Bo (Peking University, China)

TAKAYA, Ryohei (Keio University, Japan)
“Two Notions of ‘Content’ in Our Semantic Theorizing”
WANG, Linton (National Chung Chen University, Taiwan) & MA, Wei-Fen (China Medical University, Taiwan)
“Backtracking and Dependency”
SESSION 3  Symposium 2
Deconstruction of Philosophy of Mind
Moderator: KONO, Tetsuya (Rikkyo University, Japan)

KOKURYO, Yoshiki (Rikkyo University, Japan)
“Emotion, Bodily Feeling, and Sense of Reality”

KONDO, Kazunori (Kagoshima University, Japan)
“Desire and Other: Deleuze, Lacan, Cavaillès, Spinoza”

KOTEGAWA, Shojiro (Kokugakuin University, Japan)
“Rethinking Gendered Corporeality from the Perspective of Feminist Phenomenology”

SESSION 4  Philosophy of Science
Moderator: CHEN, Szu-Ting (National Tsing Hua University, Taiwan)

TODAYAMA, Kazuhsa (Nagoya University, Japan)
“Singularity’ as a Philosophical Problem”

LEE, Chunghyoung (Pohang University of Science and Technology, Korea)
“The Two Children Problem and Failures of Reference”

KANO, Hiroyuki (Osaka University, Japan)
“Philosophical Issues in Risk Analysis: Evaluating Definition of Risk and its Implication for Decision-Making”

SESSION 5  Ethics
Moderator: SONG, Fei (University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong)

LEE, Byeong Deok (Sungkyunkwan University, Korea)
“A Kantian Defense of the Moral End as a Fact of Reason”

SUGIMOTO, Shunsuke (Osaka University of Economics, Japan)
“Philippa Foot’s Theory of Practical Rationality without Natural Goodness”

URBANO, Ryan (University of San Carlos, Philippines)
“Environmental Virtue Ethics and the Preeminence of the Good”

SESSION 6  Political Philosophy
Moderator: DOGAN, Nejat (Anadolu University, Turkey)

ZHANG, Ellen Y. (Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong)
“The ‘Feminine’ Supplement to the Just War Theory Today”

SEKULOVSKI, Jordanco (Kobe University, Japan)
“Freedom, Irony and Truth: Rorty’s Pragmatist Conception of a Liberal Utopia”

HAQUE, Ehsanul (University of Dhaka, Bangladesh)
“Rethinking Ethical Foreign Policy in Global Politics: Urges, Dilemmas, and Prospects”
SESSION 7  Asian Philosophy
Room 103
Moderator: DEGUCHI, Yasuo (Kyoto University, Japan)
LIN, Chen-kuo (National Chengchi University, Taiwan)
“Vasubandhu’s Theory of Memory”
AHN, Sungdo (Seoul National University, Korea)
“Meaning of the 'Idea Only' of Yogacara Buddhism and Phenomenology”
CHEN, Hsun-Mei (National Taiwan University, Taiwan)
“The Principle of Non-Contradiction as an Ultimate Truth in Madhyamakālāmākāra”

SESSION 8  European Philosophy
Room 104
Moderator: LAASIK, Kristjan (Shandong University, China)
LAU, Kwok-ying (Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong)
“Primacy of the Other: Levinas’s Destabilization of the Western Philosophical Tradition”
HONG, Jing-Li (Chang Jung Christian University, Taiwan)
“The Problem of Auto-Reference in Epistemology: a Critical Thinking by Foucault”
RYU, Eui Geun (Silla University, Korea)
“Rereading Derrida’s La Voix et le phenomene”

16:30-17:00  Break

17:00-18:30  Sessions for Contributed Papers and Symposia

SESSION 1  Logic
Room 202
Moderator: CHUNG, Inkyo (Korea University, Korea)
YANG, Eunsuk (Chonbuk National University, Korea)
“Kripke-Style Semantics for Basic Substructural Logics with Closure Formula”
OMORI, Hitoshi (Kyoto University, Japan)
“Towards a Unification of Paraconsistent Logics”
CARET, R. Colin (Yonsei University Underwood International College, Korea)
“Pluralism and Contextualism”

SESSION 2  Philosophy of Language
Room 207
Moderator: WANG, Wen-fang (National Yang Ming University, Taiwan)
CHEN, Hsiang-Yun (Institute of European and American Studies, Sinica Academia, Taiwan)
“Intentional Identity Revisited”
LEE, Jeonggyu (University of California, Santa Barbara, USA)
“In Defense of Skepticism about Knowing Contingent Truths A Priori”
PERUZZO Jr., Léo (Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná, Brazil)
“Why Is Wittgenstein Not a Quasi-Realist Non-Cognitivist?”
SESSION 3  
Aesthetics  
Room 208  
Moderator: PETTERSSON, Mikael (Lingnan University, Hong Kong)

CHOI, Kunhong (Seoul National University, Korea)  
“How to Be a Sibleyan Particularist: A Defense of Radical Aesthetic Particularism”

BAE, Nina (Kyung Hee University, Korea)  
“Legitimacy of Aesthetic Pluralism”

CASLIB, Bernardo (University of the Philippines Diliman, Philippines)  
“Beauty, Disinterestedness, and Philosophy”

SESSION 4  
Philosophy of Science  
Room 203  
Moderator: CHEON, Hyundeuk (Ewha Womans University, Korea)

DENG, Natalja (University of Cambridge, England)  
“Does Time Seem to Pass?”

FUJITA, Sho (Osaka University, Japan)  
“The Beginning of Spacetime and Vacuum”

MATARESE, Vera (University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong)  
“For an Approximate Continuity of Structure Between Newtonian and Bohmian Mechanics”

SESSION 5  
Ethics  
Room 204  
Moderator: LEE, Byeong Deok (Sungkyunkwan University, Korea)

SUZUKI, Makoto (Kansai University of Welfare Sciences, Japan)  
“Moral Realism and the Wide-Spread Directed Change in Moral Judgments”

SCRIPTER, Lucas (Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong)  
“Meaning in Life and Narrative”

SESSION 6  
Symposium 3  
PPE (Philosophy, Politics, & Economics): Formal Approaches to Political Philosophy  
Room 102  
Moderator: ELLEN, Zhang Y. (Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong)

BRUNER, Justin (Australian National University, Australia)  
“Bargaining, Meta-Bargaining and the Evolution of Fairness Norms”

CHUNG, Hun (University of Arizona, USA)  
“How the Utilitarian Dog Bit the Rawlsian Hand that Fed It”

THRASHER, John (Monash University, Australia)  
“Constructivism, Representation, and Stability”

SESSION 7  
Comparative Philosophy  
Room 103  
Moderator: CHUNG, So-Yi (Sogang University, Korea)

WANG, Lei (Tongji University, China)  
“The Existential Confucianism of Post Neo-Confucianism”

SEO, Kwang Yul (Kyung Hee University, Korea)  
“A Study of the ‘Self’ in Nietzsche and Zen Buddhism”
SESSION 8  European Philosoph
Room 104
Moderator: LAU, Kwok-ying (Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong)

YEUNG, Tak-lap (Free University of Berlin, Germany)
“The Priority of Power of Imagination in Aesthetics and Politics: By Arendt’s Interpretation of Kant’s Political Philosophy”

BRADLEY, Joff (Teikyo University, Japan)
“On Spinoza’s Weapons”

SUAZO, Ruby (University of San Carlos, Philippines)
“Paul Ricoeur’s Practical Solution to the Antinomy of Values: A Way to Reflect on the Solution to Problems that the Philippines’ Contradictory Dual-Value System Created”

19:00-21:00  Welcome Reception (Magnolia Hall, Hoam Faculty House)
Saturday, August 20

09:00-09:30  Registration
   1st Floor

09:30-10:30  Plenary Lecture 3
   Room B101  Moderator: LEE, Sukjae (Seoul National University, Korea)
             LANE, Timothy (Taipei Medical University, Taiwan)
             “The Trajectory of Self”

10:30-10:45  Break

10:45-12:15  Sessions for Contributed Papers and Symposia

SESSION 1  Logic and Philosophy of Language
           Room 202  Moderator: WON, Yuna (Cornell University, USA)
           ZHANG, Yan-jing & ZHAO, Xian (Hebei University, China)
           “The Thoughts of Dummett on the Justification of Deduction”
           WYATT, Jeremy (Yonsei University Underwood International College, Korea)
           “Logical Pluralism’s Conceptions of Truth”

SESSION 2  Metaphysics
           Room 207  Moderator: NAKAYAMA, Yasuo (Osaka University, Japan)
           MARSHALL, Dan (Lingnan University, Hong Kong)
           “Nominalism and Ideological Parsimony”
           KOYAMA, Tora (Osaka University, Japan)
           “The Domain of Quantification as Truthmakers”
           HAN, Sungil (Seoul National University, Korea)
           “Kripke’s Proof for the Necessity of Origin”

SESSION 3  Symposium 4
           Room 208  Moderator: MIYAZONO, Kengo (Hiroshima University, Japan)
           RHEE, Young E. (Kangwon National University, Korea)
           “The Enactive-Narrative Self and Madhyamaka”
           YANG, Sunny (Inje University, Korea)
           “Embodied Emotion and Cultivating Embodied Virtues”
           SHIM, Ji Won (Inje University, Korea)
           “A Study on the Ethical-Legal Framework for the Disabilities with Prosthesis”
SESSION 4  Philosophy of Science
Room 203
Moderator: AMITANI, Yuichi (Tokyo University of Agriculture, Japan)

GELFERT, Axel (National University of Singapore, Singapore)
“Exploratory Models and the Limits of Representation”
FISHER, Grant (Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Korea)
“Computational Diagnostics and Scientific Modeling in an Exploratory Mode”
CHO, In-Rae (Seoul National University, Korea)
“Kuhnian Paradigms Revisited”

SESSION 5  Ethics
Room 204
Moderator: HAQUE, Ehsanul (University of Dhaka, Bangladesh)

CHAN, Jonathan K. L. (Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong)
“Moral Reasoning and Obligations to the Elderly”
KIM, Hyunseop (Seoul National University, Korea)
“Happiness as Emotions that Reflect the Prudential Value of One's Life”
KANG, Cheul (Yonsei University, Korea)
“Happiness and Dignity”

SESSION 6  Aesthetics
Room 102
Moderator: CASLIB Jr., Bernado N. (University of the Philippines Diliman, Philippines)

LEE, Haewan (Seoul National University, Korea)
“Art and the Possibility of Propositional Knowledge – A Reconsideration”
PETTERSSON, Mikael (Lingnan University, Hong Kong)
“Doing Aesthetics with Eyes Shut: On Thought Experiments in Aesthetics, Acquaintance, and Quasi-observation”
KANG, Sun Ah (Seoul National University, Korea)
“Is Metaphor Machine Possible?”

SESSION 7  Asian Philosophy
Room 103
Moderator: AOKI, Shigeyuki (University of Aizu, Japan)

JEONG, Sang Bong (Konkuk University, Korea)
“Zhu-Xi’s Metaphysics of Tai-ji”
KIM, Hanna (Seoul National University, Korea)
“Two Interpretations of Three Virtues in Zhongyong: In the Case of Zhuxi and Dai Zhen”
CHANG, Chung An (National Taiwan Normal University, Taiwan)
“Qian Zhongshu’s Translation Concept-Huajung: Its Philosophical and Aesthetic Implications”

SESSION 8  European Philosophy
Room 104
Moderator: LEE, Namin (Seoul National University, Korea)

AOYAGI, Masafumi (Ritsumeikan University, Japan)
“Enlightenment and Interculturality”
LEE, Jong Kwan (Sungkyunkwan University, Korea)
“Phenomenological Reflection on the Current Future Visions – Future of the Human Being: Artificial Intelligence or Artificial Life or Dasein?”

12:15-13:45 Lunch (Dongwon Dining Hall, Building 113)

13:45-14:45 Sessions for Contributed Papers

SESSION 1 Philosophy of Language
Room 202
Moderator: IZUMI, Yu (Kyoto University, Japan)
DIETZ, Richard (University of Tokyo, Japan)
“A Note on Delineationism”
KANG, Jinho (Seoul National University, Korea)
“Propositions as Complex Acts and the Force-Content Distinction”

SESSION 2 Metaphysics and History of Philosophy
Room 207
Moderator: LEE, Sukjae (Seoul National University, Korea)
KLUZ, Christopher (Catholic University of Daegu, Korea)
“The Problem with the Compatibility Problem: A Spinozistic Solution”
ISE, Toshihiko (Ritsumeikan University, Japan)
“Causation and Dependence in Hume’s Account of Property”

SESSION 3 Comparative Philosophy
Room 208
Moderator: SEKULOVSKI, Jordanco (Kobe University, Japan)
AOKI, Shigeyuki (University of Aizu, Japan)
“Cosmic Dimension on the Meaning of Life”
AHN, Hwanki (Joong-Ang Sangha University, Korea)
“The Role of Language in Making the World: Focus on ‘Reality’ in Jacques Lacan and ‘the Dependent Origination’ in Dharmapala(護法)”

SESSION 4 Comparative Philosophy
Room 203
Moderator: WU, Feng-Wei (Chinese Culture University, China)
MARSH, Steven (Chang Jung University, Taiwan)
“Wisdom Reconsidered”
PURINO, Maria Majorie (University of San Carlos, Philippines)
“On Wisdom: Revisiting Chandogya Upanishad, Cusanus’ Visio Intellectualis, and Heidegger’s Aletheia”

SESSION 5 Political Philosophy and Philosophy of Religion
Room 204
Moderator: KIM, Hyunseop (Seoul National University, Korea)
LAM, Wing Kwan (Hang Seng Management College, Hong Kong)
“Rethinking the Source of Evil: Sinful Self or Socially Corrupted Self?”
GUIANG, Francisco Jayme Paolo A. (University of the Philippines Diliman, Philippines)
“The Augustinian Province: Structure and Roots of Saint Augustine’s Philosophy of History”

SESSION 6  Buddhist Philosophy in Contemporary Perspective
Room 102  Moderator: FUJIKAWA, Naoya (Tokyo Metropolitan University, Japan)

VERVILLE, Jacob Michael (Kyung Hee University, Korea)
WON, Haeyoung (Dongguk University, Korea)
“Tale on the Buddhist Temple Integrated with City and Nature: Discussion on Temple Management Based on a Philosophical Perspective”

SESSION 7  Asian Philosophy
Room 103  Moderator: JEONG, Sang Bong (Konkuk University, Korea)

DUH, Bau-ruei (National Taiwan University, Taiwan)
“Epistemology in Traditional Asian Philosophy”
WANG, Qingjie James (The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong)
“Did the Jesuit Fathers ‘Manufacture’ Kong Fuzi?”

SESSION 8  European Philosophy
Room 104  Moderator: SUAZO, Ruby (University of San Carlos, Philippines)

LAASIK, Kristjan (Shandong University, China)
“Instinct and Affection in Husserl”
LEE, Nam-In (Seoul National University, Korea)
“Phenomenological Clarification of the Concept of Instinct through a Criticism of A. Gehlen's Theory of Instinct-Reduction”

14:45-15:00  Break

15:00-16:30  Sessions for Contributed Papers and Symposia

SESSION 1  Philosophy of Language
Room 202  Moderator: WYATT, Jeremy (Yonsei University Underwood International College, Korea)

YEN, Chun-Ping (The Graduate Center, City University of New York, USA)
“Non-Holistic Anatomism and the No-Principled-Basis Consideration”
IZUMI, Yu (Kyoto University, Japan)
“Minimal Predicativism”
WANG, Hongguang (Huaqiao University, China)
“An Analysis on Truth”
SESSION 2  *Metaphysics*
Room 207
Moderator: HAN, Sungil (Seoul National University, Korea)
CABRERA Jr., Manuel Mandel (Yonsei University Underwood International College, Korea)
“Care, Self-Interest, and Sacrifice”
YI, Huiyuhl (Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology, Korea)
“Personal Identity and Egoistic Concern”
STEIN, Tao (University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong)
“Free Will for Humans and Automata”

SESSION 3  *Epistemology*
Room 208
Moderator: PEDERSEN, Nikolaj Jang Lee Lingding (Yonsei University Underwood International College, Korea)
KASAKI, Masashi (Kyoto University, Japan)
“How Many Cartesian Skepticisms?”
YOON, Bosuk (Ewha Woman’s University, Korea)
“What’s Wrong with the Subjective Constraint on Empirical Rationality?”
SATO, Kunimasa (Keiai University, Japan)
“A Social-Epistemic Approach to Creativity”

SESSION 4  *Philosophy of Science*
Room 203
Moderator: GELFERT, Axel (National University of Singapore, Singapore)
PARK, Seungbae (Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology, Korea)
“The Grand Pessimistic Induction”
SHIMIZU, Ukyo (Nagoya University, Japan)
“Refining the Arguments for Precautionary Principle as a Decision Approach”
JUNG, Jaemin (Arizona State University, USA)
“Cognitive Decision Theory and Permissive Rationality”

SESSION 5  *Ethics*
Room 204
Moderator: CHAN, Jonathan K.L. (Hong Kong Baptist University, China)
LEDERMAN, Zohar (National University of Singapore, Singapore)
“One Health and the Will-to-Live”
LIN, Ya-Ping (Chang Gung University, Taiwan)
“Are There ’Two Incommensurable Principles of Autonomy’? – Family Involvement in Medical Decision Making and Relational Autonomy”
LIU, Chunlin (Chang Jung Christian University, Taiwan)
“Informed Consent? The Independent Role at Research Ethics”

SESSION 6  *Aesthetics*
Room 102
Moderator: LEE, Haewan (Seoul National University, Korea)
YOON, Juhan (Seoul National University, Korea)
“Learning from Fiction: Cognitive Value and Artistic Value of Fictional Narrative Art”
SESSION 7  
**Symposium 5**  
*A Frontier of Analytic Asian Philosophy*  
Moderator: CHENG, Kai-Yuan (National Yang-Ming University, Taiwan)

DEGUCCI, Yasuo & OMORI, Hitoshi (Kyoto University, Japan)  
“Bhāviveka’s Negations Viewed from a Contemporary Viewpoint”

ONISHI, Takuro (National University of Singapore, Singapore)  
“A Formalization of the Jaina Theory of Sevenfold Predication”

CASATI, Filippo (University of St. Andrews, Scotland) & FUJIKAWA, Naoya (Tokyo Metropolitan University, Japan)  
“Inconsistent Grounding: Cases from the Kyoto School”

SESSION 8  
**History of Philosophy in Contemporary Perspective**  
Moderator: KLUZ, Christopher (Catholic University of Daegu, Korea)

KANG, Sung-Hoon (Seoul National University, Korea)  
“Parmenides and Categorical Being”

NOTOMI, Noburu (University of Tokyo, Japan)  
“The Role of Plato in Modern Japanese Philosophy”

LEE, Yungwhan (Ewha Womans University, Korea)  
“Reasonableness and Freedom in Aristotle”

16:30-17:00  
Break

17:00-18:30  
**Sessions for Contributed Papers and Symposia**  

SESSION 1  
**Philosophy of Language and Metaphysics**  
Moderator: XU, Zhaoqing (Sichuan University, China)

NARUSE, Sho (Nagoya University, Japan)  
“Mental File Framework and Pretense Theory”

YAMAMORI, Maiko & IGARASHI, Ryosuke (Kyoto University, Japan)  
“Ineffability Paradox and Maximalism”

SESSION 2  
**Philosophy of Mind**  
Moderator: YI, Huiyuhl (Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology, Korea)

SYMONS, Xavier (Australian Catholic University, Australia)  
“The Unity of Consciousness in Perceptual Experience”

HAN, Woojin (Duksung Women’s University, Korea)  
“The Müller-Lyer Illusion and Nonceptual Content”

MIYAZONO, Kengo (Hiroshima University, Japan)  
“Implicit Biases and Pushmi-Pullyu Representations”
SESSION 3
Symposium 6
Room 208
Épistemic Pluralism
Moderator: YOON, Bosuk (Ewha Womans University, Korea)

PEDERSEN, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding (Yonsei University Underwood International College, Korea)
“Fundamental Epistemic Pluralism”
ROSENKRANZ, Sven (University of Barcelona, Spain)
“The Structure of Justification”

SESSION 4
Philosophy of Science
Room 203
Moderator: FISHER, Grant (Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Korea)

KATSUMORI, Makoto (Akita University, Japan)
“Barad’s Agential Realism and Bohr’s Complementarity”
LEMOINE, Philippe (Cornell University, USA)
“Scientific Realism, Approximate Truth and the Argument from Underdetermination”
AHN, Geonhoon (Kangwon National University, Korea)
“Two Ambiguities of Hempel’s I-S Explanation”

SESSION 5
Ethics
Room 204
Moderator: LEDERMAN, Zohar (National University of Singapore, Singapore)

KIM, Jiwon (Korea University, Korea)
“The Axiological Significance of Phenomenon of Blame: Blame as an Indicator of Values”
KOO, Ickhee (Sogang University, Korea)
“Happiness and Phronimos”
AURELIO, Michael G. (Ateneo de Manila University, Philippines)
“The Duty of Charity Determined as Sharing”

SESSION 6
Political Philosophy and Philosophy of Science
Room 102
Moderator: LIU, Chunlin (Chang Jung Christian University, Taiwan)

WU, Feng-Wei (Chinese Culture University, Taiwan)
“Frankfurt and the Normativity of Equality”
LEE, Ji-Young (University of Bristol, England)
“Self-Respect, Autonomy, and the Obligation to Resist Oppression”
HOLMAN, Bennett (Yonsei University Underwood International College, Korea)
“Measure and Countermeasures: How to Evaluate Attempts to Address Funding Bias”

SESSION 7
Asian Philosophy
Room 103
Moderator: WU, Shiu-Ching May (National Chung-Cheng University, Taiwan)

WANG, Ellie Hua (National Chenchi University, Taiwan)
“Crafting the Self Through Losing the Self: Exploring Xunzi’s Ideal Self”
TING, Angel O.K. (Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong)  
“Xunzi on Desiring to be Good – Desire as the Necessary Condition for the Transformation of Nature”  
CHUNG, So-Yi (Sogang University, Korea)  
“The Origina, Nature and Role of Four Sprouts? Present Questions and Past Answers”

SESSION 8  
History of Philosophy and Comparative Philosophy  
Room 104  
Moderator: KANG, Sung-Hoon (Seoul National University, Korea)

MATSUDA, Tsuyoshi (Kobe University, Japan)  
“Leibnizian Naturalism Seen from his Reception of Anaxagoras’s perikôresis”  
LEE, Sukjae (Seoul National University, Korea)  
“Conservation as Continuous Creation: Just Like Creation but Not Necessarily Recreation”  
CHENG, Kai-Yuan (National Yang-Ming University, Taiwan)  
“Levels of Time in Leibniz and Zhunagzi”

18:30-18:45 Closing Remarks  
Room B101  
CHO, In-Rae (Seoul National University, Korea)
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SPEAKERS AND MODERATORS

Instructions for Speakers

1. The duration of talks at CCPEA 2016 is as follows:

   - Plenary Lecture: 60 minutes (40 minute presentation, 20 minute discussion)
   - Contributed Symposium with 2 Talks: 45 minutes (30 minute presentation, 15 minute discussion)
   - Contributed Symposium with 3 Talks: 30 minutes (20 minute presentation, 10 minute discussion)
   - Contributed Paper: 30 minutes (20 minute presentation, 10 minute discussion)

2. If you wish to give your talk with a power point presentation, please bring your file on a USB drive. All session rooms are equipped with computers and projectors for power point presentations.

3. For a power point presentation, you are advised to upload your file onto the session room computer during the break time prior to your session. The conference assistants will be present in all session rooms and help you with the uploading.

4. If you wish to use your own computer for the power point presentation, please bring a necessary device, for example an Apple MiniDisplay Port to VGA adapter for Mac users.

5. You are also welcome to give your talk with a handout if you wish to do so. Whiteboards are available in all session rooms. But please note that we will not be able to provide a copying service at the conference site, and accordingly that you need to prepare and bring copies of your handout for distribution. We are sorry for the inconvenience.

Instructions for Moderators

1. Since the conference schedule is tight, you are kindly advised to strictly enforce the timing for presentation and discussion.

2. Most sessions for contributed papers consist of three talks. But there are a few sessions that consist of two talks and thus have open slots. Even for these sessions, however, please strictly enforce the rule of 20 minute presentation and 10 minute discussion so that the audiences who change between sessions do not miss the talks they wish to hear.

3. For the same reason, please strictly enforce the rule of 20 minute presentation and 10 minute discussion even if an unnotified cancellation of a talk happens on site.

4. The conference assistants will be present in all session rooms and help you with moderation. If you encounter any problems during the session, please inform the assistant in the session room.
PRACTICAL INFORMATION

Accommodation

Unless otherwise noted, conference speakers are arranged to stay at the Hoam Faculty House which is conveniently located just outside the main campus of Seoul National University.

- Address: 239-1 Nakseongdae-Dong, Gwanak-Gu, Seoul, Korea 151-057
- Tel: +82-2-871-4053
- Fax: +82-2-871-4056
- E-mail: front@hoam.ac.kr
- Website: www.hoam.ac.kr/eng

How to Get from the Airport to the Hoam Faculty House

FROM INCHEON INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT TO HOAM

1. After you arrive at the Incheon International Airport (ICN), take the #6017 airport limousine bus at Gate 6B or 13B. (Check the #6017 bus time table below).

2. There are ticket booths around the gates 6B and 13B. You can buy a limousine bus ticket by credit card at one of these booths, or you can pay the bus fare by cash directly to the bus driver. The fare is KRW 15,000.

3. After you take the bus #6017, get off at the last stop that is the Hoam Faculty House. It will take approximately 90 minutes.

#6017 Airport Limousine Bus Timetable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Range</th>
<th>ICN - Hoam</th>
<th>Hoam - ICN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MON–FRI</td>
<td>SAT &amp; SUN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04:00 – 05:00</td>
<td>04:00</td>
<td>04:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05:00 – 06:00</td>
<td>05:40</td>
<td>05:40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06:00 – 07:00</td>
<td>06:25</td>
<td>06:25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07:00 – 08:00</td>
<td>07:19</td>
<td>07:19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08:00 – 09:00</td>
<td>08:25</td>
<td>08:25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09:00 – 10:00</td>
<td>09:07</td>
<td>09:07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:00 – 11:00</td>
<td>10:17</td>
<td>10:17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:00 – 12:00</td>
<td>11:37</td>
<td>11:40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:00 – 13:00</td>
<td>12:14</td>
<td>12:14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:00 – 14:00</td>
<td>13:14</td>
<td>13:14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:00 – 15:00</td>
<td>14:15</td>
<td>14:15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:00 – 16:00</td>
<td>15:34</td>
<td>15:34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:00 – 17:00</td>
<td>16:10</td>
<td>16:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:00 – 18:00</td>
<td>17:25</td>
<td>17:25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18:00 – 19:00</td>
<td>18:00</td>
<td>18:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19:00 – 20:00</td>
<td>19:12</td>
<td>19:12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20:00 – 21:00</td>
<td>20:38</td>
<td>20:38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21:00 – 22:00</td>
<td>21:22</td>
<td>21:22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22:00 – 23:00</td>
<td>22:45</td>
<td>22:02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FROM GIMPO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT TO HOAM

1. After you arrive at the Gimpo Airport, take the #6003 airport limousine bus at Bus Terminal #6. The #6003 bus departs every 20 minutes. The fare is KRW 4,000 by cash.
2. Get off at the last stop that is the **main gate** of Seoul National University. It will take approximately one hour.

3. Take a taxi or a Hoam Faculty House shuttle from the main gate of Seoul National University.

   * Shuttle service is available upon reservation only.
   * Running hour for the shuttle service: 08:00-19:00 Mon-Fri
   * Please contact at +82-2-880-0311 for reservation.

4. Get off at Hoam Faculty House. It will take approximately 5 minutes from the SNU main gate to Hoam by taxi.

**FROM INCHEON/GIMPO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT TO HOAM BY TAXI**

1. After you arrive at Incheon/Gimpo Airport, take a taxi to the Hoam Faculty House.

2. The fare from Incheon Airport to Hoam will be approximately KRW 70,000. The fare from Gimpo Airport to Hoam will be approximately KRW 30,000.

**Direction to the Hoam Faculty House in Korean**

If you take a taxi at the airport or in Seoul, it may be convenient to show the taxi driver the following direction to the Hoam Faculty House in Korean.

안녕하세요 기사님.

이 분을 서울대학교 후문 쪽 호암교수회관으로 모셔 주시면 고맙겠습니다. (아래 지도 참조)

- 주소 : 서울시 관악구 낙성대동 239-1
- 전화 : 02-880-0311 (호암교수회관 안내데스크)

남부순환도로에서 낙성대(이정표: 서울대후문) 방면으로 좌회전 또는 우회전 후 1.5km 직진. 좌측에 호암교수회관 위치.
Check-In and Check-Out

When you arrive at the Hoam Faculty House, you will find a building shown below. This is the main building of the Hoam Faculty House where the front desk and the Shangri-La restaurant are located. The check-in time is after 14:00, and the check-out time is before 12:00.

![Building Image]

We have assigned a room to each speaker for the requested number of nights, and we will pay for the room charge up to three nights. If you stay longer than three nights, you are asked to pay for the extra nights when you check-out.

Dining at the Hoam Faculty House

The Shangri-La restaurant, which is located on the 1st floor of the Hoam Faculty House and right across the front desk, serves breakfast, lunch, and dinner with a variety of dishes. The restaurant is open at 07:00-09:30, 11:30-14:00, and 17:30-21:00.
Conference Venue

All conference sessions take place in **Building 14** (as is shown below) of the College of Humanities at Seoul National University. The location of Building 14 is indicated on the **SNU campus map** on page 33 of this book.

How to Get from the Hoam Faculty House to the Conference Venue

The main campus of Seoul National University is within a 20 minute walking distance from the Hoam Faculty House, so you may take a walk to Building 14.

But the most convenient way to get to Building 14 from the Hoam Faculty House is to take a small green **village bus #02** that runs every 10-15 minutes between SNU and the Nakseongdae subway station (the nearest subway station to the Hoam Faculty House).

1. Take the village bus #02 (as is shown below) at the bus stop near the Hoam Faculty House. The fare is KRW 1,000 by cash.
2. Get off at the bus stop in front of the newly built Amphitheater (as is shown below). It will take approximately 5 minutes from Hoam to Amphitheater.

3. After you get off at the Amphitheater bus stop, take a walk downhill, turn right at Building 9, and then turn left. You will arrive at Building 14.

**Lunch**

Since the main campus of Seoul National University is big, it will be difficult to have lunch outside the campus during the conference. There are a number of places for lunch in the SNU campus, among which the following cafeterias/restaurants are particularly close to the conference venue. Please refer to the SNU campus on the next page for their location.

- Cafeteria/Restaurant Jahayon (Building 109)
- 4th Cafeteria/Restaurant (“Doo-rae Midam”, Building 76)
- Asia Center (“Gam-gol Sikdang”, Building 101. *Vegetarian buffets are served.*)
- Dongwon Dining Hall (“Sodam Maru”, Building 113)

**Welcome Reception**

There will be a welcome reception to be held in the Magnolia Hall, located at the Convention Center of the Hoam Faculty House, from 19:00 to 21:00 on August 19.

The buffet style dinner will be served. All conference speakers are cordially invited to attend the reception.
SNU Campus Map
Traveling around Seoul

For detailed information about traveling around Seoul, please visit

http://english.visitseoul.net/index (the website of the Official Travel Guide to Seoul), or

http://english.visitkorea.or.kr (the website of Korea Tourism Organization)

Weather in Korea

During the period of CCPEA 2016, August 19-20, the forecast predicts that the highest temperature would be about 31°C and that the lowest temperature would be about 24°C. Please check out the following websites for weather in Korea before your departure.

http://www.accuweather.com/en/kr/south-korea-weather, or

http://www.weather.com/weather/tenday/KSXX0037

Subway

The most convenient way to get around Seoul is to take the subway. The nearest subway station to the Hoam Faculty House is the Nakseongdae subway station on Subway Line 2. (Please refer to the Seoul Metro/Subway Map on the next page). You can reach the Nakseongdae station by taking the village bus #02 at the bus stop in front of the Hoam Faculty House.

Transportation Card

It will be a good idea to purchase a transportation card that can be used on subways and public buses, including the village bus #02, in Seoul and other major cities and locations such as Gyeonggi-do, Daejeon, Incheon, Daegu and Busan.

With a transportation card, you will save the hassle of purchasing single journey subway tickets for every ride. You will also have the benefit of discounts on rides during transfers from one subway line to another, one bus to another, or from subway to bus or vice versa (with a transfer time limit).

For more detailed information about the transportation card and how to purchase it, please visit http://english.visitkorea.or.kr/enu/TRP/TP_ENG_8_1_1.jsp.
Seoul Metro/Subway Map
ABSTRACTS
Plenary Lectures
I happen to believe that though human experiences are to be characterized as pluralistic they are all rooted in the one reality. I would assume the thesis of pluralism but how could I maintain my belief in the realism? There are various discussions in favor of realism but they appear to stay within a particular paradigm so to be called “internal realism”. In this paper I would try to justify my belief in the reality by discussing a special use of indexicals. I will argue for my indexical realism by advancing the thesis that indexicals can be used as an inter-agentic referential term.

Three arguments for the thesis will be presented. The first argument derives from a revision of Kaplan-Kvart’s notion of exportation. Their notions of exportation of singular terms can be analyzed as intra-agentic exportation in the context of a single speaker and theirs may be revised so as to be an inter-agentic exportation in the context of two speakers who use the same indexicals. The second is an argument from the notion of causation which is specifically characterized in the context of inter-theoretic reference. I will argue that any two theories may each say “this” in order to refer what is beyond its own theory. Two theories address themselves to ‘this’ same thing though what ‘this’ represents in each theory turn out to be different objects all together. The third argument is an argument which is based on a possibility of natural reference. Reference is used to be taken mostly as a 3-place predicate: Abe refers an object o_1 with an expression e_j. The traditional notion of reference is constructive and anthropocentric. But I would argue that natural reference is a reference that we humans come to recognize among denumerably many objects in natural states: at a moment m_i in a natural state there is a referential relation among objects o_1, o_2, o_3, ..., o_j, o_{j+1}, ... which interact to each other as agents of information processors. Natural reference is an original reference which is naturally given and to which humans are passive as we derivatively refer it by using ‘this’.
A Degree-Theoretic Approach to Causation by Absence

ICHINOSE, Masaki
University of Tokyo (Japan)

This presentation aims at providing a provisional framework to elucidate one of controversial issues in the philosophy of causation, namely, causation by absence. I will propose a kind of degree-theoretic approach, where I will adopt a realistic perspective by considering the problem of extraordinary increase in deaths in Fukushima after the 2011 quakes.

First of all, I raise a question, ‘What caused the extraordinary increase in deaths in Fukushima after the 2011 quakes?’, and then suggest possible answers in the form of counterfactual conditionals. That is to say, the quake and tsunami, the severe accident of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (1F hereafter), or the forcible and quick evacuation caused extraordinary increase in deaths. This line of argument is based upon my understanding concerning the intrinsic and empirical connection between counterfactuals and causation. However, all of those three candidates of cause of the tragedy seem to be equally qualified to be a cause of the extraordinary increase in deaths so that it is difficult to single one causal relation out as the very causation. To this difficulty I react by introducing the notion of “degrees of manipulability” by raising my second question, ‘Was the extraordinary increase in deaths in Fukushima after the 2011 quakes unavoidable and inevitable?’ This question naturally leads to the problem of causation by absence or failure as well as the issue of manipulability. As a result, the forcible and quick evacuation comes up as the cause of the extraordinary deaths, as its degree of manipulability is comparatively higher. More precisely speaking, if we had immediately dispatched radioactivity experts to Fukushima to measure radiation levels and give appropriate advice about whether they should be quickly evacuated or stay for some days, then there would not have been the extraordinary increase in deaths. Thus, it is theoretically and retrospectively judged that the failure caused the tragedy. However, still there is a serious problem. Whose failure should be picked up? This is nothing but the problem of so-called profligate causation. I try to solve this problem by finally introducing another degree-theoretic notion, namely, the notion of “degrees of normativity”.
The Trajectory of Self

LANE, Timothy
Taipei Medical University (Taiwan)

In *Consciousness Explained*, when describing self, Dennett observed: “…streams of narrative issue forth as if from a single source…their effect on any audience is to encourage them to…posit a unified agent…a center of narrative gravity…selves…are artifacts of the social processes that create us…the only ‘momentum’ that accrues to the trajectory of a self…is the stability that is imparted to it by the web of beliefs that constitute it, and when those beliefs lapse, it lapses…” Recent investigations of the brain’s intrinsic, spontaneous activity suggest that Dennett’s “center of narrative gravity” analogy is misleading. Self has momentum and trajectory of its own: there is an important respect in which it is independent of—not mere artifact of—social process. Indeed, to a great extent, it is this intrinsic activity that helps constitute the web of beliefs. In my talk I will describe some aspects of the brain’s intrinsic activity, and show how these “issue forth” in a way that can be uniquely revealing about self. In developing these ideas, I will make special reference to their application in studies of Major Depressive Disorder and Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome.
Contributed Symposia
SYMPOSIUM 1

Philosophy of Language - Kripke and Others

GENERAL DESCRIPTION

This symposia will discuss some questions engendered by Kripke’s *Naming and Necessity*, for examples, whether names and natural kind terms are rigid designators or not? Whether identity relation is necessary or not? Is there the distinction of metaphysical necessity and epistemic necessity? This symposia will have three speakers: Professor CHEN Bo (Peking University, China), the title of his paper is “Designative and Predicative Uses of Terms: Against the Distinction of Rigidity and Non-Rigidity”; Professor WANG Wenfang (Yang Ming University, Taiwan), the title of his paper is “A, qua an S, Is F”; Dr. XU Zhaoqing (Sichuan University, China), the title of his paper is “On the Nesting Argument and Two Notions of Necessity: Two Cases against Strong Two-dimensionalism”. Professor Chen and Professor Wang are well-recognized scholars, and they published quite many English papers in international journals of logic and philosophy indexed by A&HCI. Dr. Xu is a promising young scholar. Three speakers will not just introduce and comment other philosophers’ viewpoints and arguments, instead they will present their own original viewpoints and arguments to challenge or defend Kripke’s philosophy of language. This event is important, because it shows that East-Asian philosophers begin to participate into the contemporary construction of philosophy by means of directly facing up to philosophical issues, independently investigating them, and developing their original standpoints and arguments.
This article argues for six claims about how a term is used in natural language: (1) most terms, whether they occur as the subject or predicate of a sentence, could have designative use and predicative use in different contexts of utterance. A term is used designatively in a context of utterance if and only if it is used to refer to an object or a class of objects in that context; it is used predicatively in a context of utterance if and only if it is used to describe the property, status or role which an object or a class of objects has in that context. (2) For proper names and natural kind terms, their designative uses are primary, and their predicative uses are parasitic to their designative uses. (3) For definite descriptions, their predicative uses are primary, and their designative uses are parasitic to their predicative uses. (4) The distinction of designative use and predicative use is semantic, not pragmatic. (5) The designative/predicative distinction is a new addition to philosophy of language, for it differs from other already-made distinctions, such as referential/attributive use, semantic/speaker’s reference, de dicto/de re modality, wide/narrow scope, ambiguous reference, and predicativism about proper names. (6) According to the designative/predicative distinction, there are both a true reading and a false reading of two sentences ‘Aristotle might not have been Aristotle’ and ‘Aristotle might not have been the teacher of Alexander’ respectively. From this fact and other reasons it follows that Kripke’s distinction of rigidity and non-rigidity collapses.
Kripke (1971, 1980) argues that identity relation is a necessary relation, i.e., things that are identical are necessarily identical. Lewis (1971) and Gibbard (1975), however, give several examples and contend that, on the basis of our intuitions about these examples, there are things whose identity between them is only contingent. The author argues in this paper that there are insurmountable difficulties of the contingent identity view, and eventually wants to defend the Kripkean view that every identity relation is necessary by appealing to what he calls “Abelardian* predicates”. In order to do so, however, the author finds himself being forced to give an analysis of what he calls “qua-sentences”, i.e., sentences of the form “A, qua an S, is F” or more generally of the form “A₁, …, Aₙ, qua S’s, are R-related”, where A, A₁, …, Aₙ are singular terms, S a sortal term, and F a predicate. In short, the author gives arguments against the contingent identity view, appeals to the notion of an Abelardian* predicate to defend the necessary identity view in a new way, and provides a new, though sketchy and provocative, analysis of the so-called “qua-sentences” in the present paper.
On the Nesting Argument and Two Notions of Necessity:
Two Cases against Strong Two-dimensionalism

XU, Zhaoqing
Sichuan University (China)

Two-dimensional semantics (2D) is probably the most significant development in philosophy of language post Kripke. This paper gives some critical examination of a famous version of 2D called strong two-dimensionalism (S2D), which aims to revive the golden triangle among meaning, reason and modality. Along the way, I will mainly concern with two cases to argue against S2D, and propose my new version of 2D. First, I will propose a variation of Scott Soames’s “Nesting Argument”, and defend it against some recent reactions. Second, I will propose a thoroughly new argument against S2D, which is essentially based on various cases of contingency *a priori*. Third, I propose a new version of 2D, which accommodates intuitive cases more properly, and thus avoids the above two objections.
SYMPOSIUM 2

Deconstruction of Philosophy of Mind: Philosophy of Mind is Dead!

GENERAL DESCRIPTION

Psýchē is not anima; anima is not mind; mind is not consciousness; mind is neither esprit nor Geist nor Seele. Of course, they are neither Kokoro nor Tamshii. Each word contains a different concept of the mind-body relationship. Theoretical psychology and critical history of psychology such as Kurt Danziger (1990, 1997), Nicholas Rose (1990, 1996) and Ian Parker (1990) have been questioning if the basic category of psychology is socially constructed. According to Ian Hacking (1999), psychological categories are human kind not natural kind. If so, psychology is a branch of anthropology that is interested in how indigene people (English speakers) classify and treat certain kinds of their behaviors. We have to question deeply philosophical terminology in philosophy of mind, too. We need to ask whether we are discussing on the same phenomena or behavior when we are talking of “mind”. We might talk of different things referring to different things. Some might be talking of Moyo while others might be talking of katsina, neglecting the fact that our concepts are socially constructed.

In this symposium, we will deconstruct the concept of mind in announcing that the philosophy of mind that does not take comparative cultural study into consideration is dead. We will argue how to stabilize the referents of philosophical terminology concerning the behaviors of primates including homo sapiens and how to categorize their so-called “higher” order behaviors. We will begin a new bo-mind-dy philosophy.
In recent years, as the concern over emotions has risen, many philosophers have shown interest in bodily feelings. Most discussions on bodily feelings have focused on how these feelings are associated with or integrated into emotions. As Ratcliff (2008) points out, “The emphasis on emotional feelings has led to the neglect of other kinds of feeling.” Among them, the feelings called “a sense of reality” or “existential feeling” must be discussed in relation to the philosophy of mind because it seems that these kinds of feelings can be shared in various experiences, such as veridical perceptions, illusions, hallucinations, religious experiences, aesthetic experiences, and so on. For all that, a sense of reality has been hardly investigated in contemporary philosophy of mind, except for some works, such as those of Ratcliff (2008) and Farkas (2013).

I am going to give a presentation with the title "Emotion, Bodily Feeling, and Sense of Reality." My presentation puts its focus on a sense of reality from the perspective of a theory of emotions. The main question is whether a sense of reality can be reduced to emotional feelings. What I would like to show you here is that emotion constitutes, in part, a sense of reality.
Desire and Other: Deleuze, Lacan, Cavaillès, Spinoza

KONDO, Kazunori
Kagoshima University (Japan)

The thinkers once called “structuralists”, Althusser, Lacan, Lévi-Straus, Foucault, pointed out that a modernistic mind-body relationship, especially the concept of the self-reflective mind as a subject of responsibility and free will is structured; in other words it is constructed socially, historically, and linguistically.

This claim is critically overcome by the argument concerning the historical and geographical plurality of constructed structures and the ante-structuration prior to the structuring of the modern subject, for example, in the *Anti-Oedipus* of Deleuze and Guattari, or in the Foucault's discussion about “subjectivation”, or in the later philosophy of Lacan, or also in the *Mythologiques* of later Lévi-Straus.

In this presentation, we will discuss the plurality of the mind-body relationships constructed socially, historically and linguistically focusing on the higher-order conceptual relation between the “desire” and the “Other” (truth) as an ante-structuration prior to plural constructed structures. This concept of the “Other” is discussed on the basis of anthropological experience that is deployed in the *Cannibal Metaphysics* of Eduardo Viveiros de Castro that inherits *Anti-Oedipus* with capturing the issue of the later Levi-Strauss, while the concept of the “desire” is discussed with reference to the Spinoza’s proposition that “the desire is the very essence of man” that is also the basic proposition of the *Anti-Oedipus* and the later Lacan’s discussion. Finally, to grasp the plural constructed mind-body relationships, the higher-order conceptual relation between the “Other” and the “desire” is discussed with reference to the “philosophy of the concept” of Jean Cavaillès that is the unknown theoretical origin of structuralism.
Rethinking Gendered Corporeality from the Perspective of Feminist Phenomenology

KOTEGAWA, Shojiro
Kokugakuin University (Japan)

In philosophy of mind, the mind-body problem, especially problem of gendered body, has been discussed in many ways. Ian Hacking, in his *Historical Ontology* (2002), put into question the methodological framework of philosophy of mind, by pointing out the fact that the concepts of philosophy of mind are historically constructed. Along this line of reasoning, I shall try to elaborate a new way to understand our gendered corporeality from the perspective of feminist phenomenology. On the one hand, feminist phenomenology does not underestimate the fact that gender norms or customs precede our consciousness or bodily experience (therefore it does not assume our body to be completely free from these norms). On the other hand, it denies that our bodily experience is totally determined by these norms and so it shows that it is possible for our body to “resist or refigure” them. In this way, feminist phenomenology reconsiders our corporeality not as transparent medium nor as social construction but as, so to speak, “negotiating forum” where one becomes a subject in responding to social constraints. It gives us thereby an appropriate way to examine our gendered experience, including several sexualities which cannot be reduced to “male and female”.
SYMPOSIUM 3

PPE(Philosophy, Politics, & Economics): Formal Approaches to Political Philosophy

GENERAL DESCRIPTION

Recently, there has been a rapid increase in the number of political philosophers/theorists who apply formal models – employing the formal techniques of decision/game/social choice theory and welfare economics – to traditional as well as contemporary questions in political philosophy. This particular approach to political philosophy now goes by the name “PPE”, which is short for Philosophy, Politics, & Economics, and is now developing itself as a major force in contemporary political philosophy.

This proposed symposium is intended to introduce the field of PPE to contemporary philosophers in East Asia. Specifically, the symposium will introduce and explain how the construction and application of formal models can be used as a powerful methodological tool to contribute to debates in contemporary political philosophy.

What is a formal model and how can a formal model be used in political philosophy? Traditionally, the two standard methodological tools that contemporary analytic political philosophers have relied on are ‘conceptual analysis’ and ‘thought experiments.’ We may think of formal modeling as a methodological tool that extends and reinforces these two methodological tools. Let me explain.

A model is a representation of a situation. Hence, a thought experiment, as representing a given situation, can be seen as a type of a model. However, there are differences between a formal model and an informal model like a thought experiment. Whereas thought experiments rely on ordinary language and one’s informal intuitions for their very construction and subsequent analyses, a formal model relies on formal logic and mathematics for their very construction and subsequent analyses.

The results of a formal model follow deductively, in the logical sense, from the formally stated assumptions. Hence, when one constructs a formal model and tries to derive its results, one is forced to formally state one’s assumptions clearly and unambiguously. Many assumptions are simply formal/logical statements of well-known normative concepts or properties. Hence, the process of constructing a formal model can also be seen as a type of conceptual analysis. Once the basic assumptions are formally stated, one, then, has to rely on formal logic and well-known mathematical techniques to derive the results of the model.

A major benefit of applying formal models to political philosophy is that they make conceptual analysis and thought experiments more precise and rigorous. In many cases, a formal model can generate results that are counterintuitive or were totally unexpected. Hence, a formal model can serve as a “test” and its results may illuminate important new insights that would have been unnoticed if one were to exclusively rely on traditional methods of conceptual analysis and thought experiments. The results of a formal model may be used to adjudicate different positions in polemic debates in contemporary political philosophy.

Of course, the cost you pay for this is that some important philosophical details can sometimes be lost through the process of constructing a formal model, which inevitably involves some simplifications in order to make it logically and mathematically tractable. Hence, one might think that formal models are good way to complement, rather than replace, traditional methods of conceptual analysis and thought experiments.

In this symposium, I have summoned three young scholars who are now working in the area of PPE to present their current research. The three papers presented in this symposium are
intended to showcase how formal models can be constructed and applied to well-known debates in contemporary political philosophy and serve as a test to adjudicate different philosophical positions. The titles of the papers that each participant is going to present are as follows.

1. Bargaining, meta-bargaining and the evolution of fairness norms
2. Constructivism, Representation, and Stability
3. How the Utilitarian Dog Bit the Rawlsian Hand that Fed it

The following are brief abstracts for these three papers.
Bargaining, Meta-Bargaining and the Evolution of Fairness Norms

BRUNER, Justin
Australian National University (Australia)

Individuals are routinely confronted by situations in which they must jointly determine how to allocate resources or costs across a number of parties. A plethora of distinct distributive norms address how these benefits and burdens should be equitably disbursed. I consider some classic ‘solutions’ to the problem of fair division (John Nash’s famous bargaining solution, David Gauthier’s minimax relative concession, etc.) in a cultural-evolutionary context. I show that if so-called meta-bargaining is permitted, the utilitarian bargaining solution has a privileged status. Namely, the utilitarian bargaining solution has certain stability properties alternative norms of fair division lack. My analysis thus provides us with some reason to think utilitarian norms of division are the likely outcome of a cultural-evolutionary process.
This paper joins the well-known debate between Rawls’s two principles of justice versus utilitarianism. The paper tries to show that Rawls’ argument against utilitarianism is actually self-defeating by its own internal standards.

It is well-known that one of the major aims of John Rawls, when he wrote *A Theory of Justice*, was to present a superior alternative to what he deemed to be the predominant moral philosophy of his time: utilitarianism. The resulting theory is what Rawls calls, and, what is now widely known as *justice as fairness*. Justice as fairness consists of the following three principles,

1. *The Principle of Maximum Equal Basic Liberties*. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.
2. *The Principle of Fair Equal Opportunity*. Social economic inequalities should be attached to positions and offices opened to all under conditions of fair equal opportunity.
3. *The Difference Principle*. Social and economic inequalities should be arranged in a way that is the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society.

Rawls’s justification for these three principles comes from the purported fact that these three principles would be chosen as regulative for the basic structure of society by the representative parties of the original position, who are imagined to be behind the ‘veil of ignorance’ which blocks them from knowing morally arbitrary information about themselves that would bias their judgments. In short, Rawls’s argument against utilitarianism was that rational individuals situated fairly under conditions of impartiality would choose his three principles of justice over utilitarianism.

The main reason why Rawls thought that the representative parties of the original position would choose justice as fairness over utilitarianism was that, according to Rawls, utilitarianism can always sacrifice the basic rights and liberties of certain individuals for the sake of maximizing aggregate or average social welfare. The claim was that, since these fundamental rights and liberties are firmly secured by the very first principle of justice as fairness, the representative parties will choose justice as fairness over utilitarianism.

In this paper, I will argue that, contrary to what Rawls had thought, his own reasons, assumptions as well as the many theoretical devices he employs demonstrably imply that the representative parties in the original position will choose utilitarianism instead of justice as fairness. I show this through a simple formal model of two representative individuals – Able and Disable – by exploring the distributional consequences of both utilitarianism as well as Rawls’s difference principle.
Constructivist theories of justice are characterized by three conditions: constructivism, representation, and stability. Constructivism holds that justification does not rely on any antecedent moral or political values outside of the procedure of construction. Representation holds that the reasons for the choice of agents in the constructivist model must be rationally explicable to real agents outside the model in order for the principles to have normative force. Their reasons need to be, in some sense, our reasons otherwise the constructivist procedure will lack normative force. Stability holds that the principles chosen in the procedure should be stable upon reflection once we see ourselves as having reasons to endorse them. I argue that these conditions are jointly inconsistent with the segmented choice procedure in Rawls’s original position and other, similar procedures. Any choice procedure that segments choice into at least two-stages with different information, as Rawls’s theory does, will be path-dependent and not meet the condition of representation since it will not be globally coherent. Attempts to solve this problem without eliminating the segmentation of choice in the procedure will run afoul of constructivism or stability.
SYMPOSIUM 4

Embodied Mind: Enactive Self, Embodied Emotion, and Enhancement

GENERAL DESCRIPTION

In this symposium, we suggest the embodied theory around the self, emotion, and human enhancement. The embodied theory is a new band for understanding not only the philosophical themes such as cognition, emotion, and consciousness, but also the issues of social science such as culture and law, and engineering issues such as robot and body enhancement.

The first subject of the symposium is the Enactive-narrative Self and Madhyamaka. Dr. Rhee argue that the self is a construction as the outcome of its narrative process. First, he examines the physicalist challenge that the self is nothing but neurophysiological process and there is no reality called as the self. He criticizes some theoretical and methodological limits of physicalism and then proceeds to the enactive approach to the self, especially the theory of F. Varela and E. Thompson. Finally, Dr. Rhee shows how the self is constructed through examining the Madhyamaka School and the tetralemma of Nagarjuna.

The second subject considers the problem of understanding the emotion. Dr. Yang argues that appropriate theory of emotion is neither the pure cognitive theories, nor pure somatic, bodily feeling theories. It is the radical enactivism suggested by the D, Hutto. First, she points out an objection to J. Prinz’s embodied appraisal theory for the reason that the theory cannot explain cultivating embodied virtues. And then, Dr. Yang recommends Hutto’s enactivism that emotional responsiveness is not representational, but embodied in ways that go beyond the head. Finally, she argues for taking the holistic stance that considers fully embodied processes, which can be accomplished within the context of a social practice.

The third subject is about the ethical-legal framework for the disabilities with Prosthesis. Dr. Shim examines the meaning of the body implant for people with disabilities. The subject has been overlooked in researches of human enhancement and she provides a positive ethical value criterion that is based on the extension of the body with respect to persons with disabilities. Dr. Shim considers various issues related to the criterion: new classification criteria for physical implant, new legal judgment based on claims of necessity of body implants, ethical discussion centered on physical disabilities with Implants, a new notion of disability or people with disabilities. Finally, Dr. Shim suggests a new standards for human rights of persons with people with implant body.
What is the self? There are a lot of theories of philosophy on the subject from realism through constructivism to antirealism. Recently, mainly due to the development of cognitive neuroscience, a new brand of theory of the self is emerging in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience. It is the theory of embodied self. The primary feature of the present theory of embodied self is physicalism. There is no necessary for us to be surprised to hear the news, for we have heard it already in philosophy for a long time. F. Crick contends the astonishing hypothesis: “‘You’ are nothing but a pack of neurons.” (1994, p. 3)” Our question is: Is physicalism only one option in the game?

In this paper, I try to the question and show that there is another appropriate candidate for understating the self, philosophical as well as scientific. It is embodied theory of the self, and, especially, I examine enactive approach that is mainly found in F. Varela, E. Thompson, and E. Rosch (1991) and E. Thompson (2007, 2015). The basic tenets of the enactivism is (i) organisms are autonomous agents that actively generate and maintain their identities (Autopoiesis), (ii) the nervous systems are autonomous system, (iii) cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor couplings of body, nervous system, and environment, and (iv) cognition is embodied action.

My understanding of the self is that the self is our construct and the construction is the outcome of its narrative process. In a word, we are Homo Narrans. Here are two important questions: How is it constructed? Which is the relation between the narrative self and the world? They are intertwined each other, so we have to consider one of them in order to understand the other.

This idea was suggested by philosophers such as A. MacIntyre (1981), P. Ricoeur (1984), D. Dennett (1986), and C. Taylor (1992), cognitive scientists such as S. Gallagher (2000), J. Brunner (2002) and A. Damasio (1999, 2010). The idea combines the philosophical insights and the empirical data such that it give us a naturalized theory of the self, a theory of what can solve the explanatory gap of consciousness. A main version of enactivism is the theory of Varela and Thompson, which has two theoretical foundations; phenomenology and Buddhism. Enactivism phenomenology has been developed into neurophenomenology and the latter examined Madhyamaka school of Mahayana Buddhism. Though both are great attempts to give a unified theory of the mind, the former has received attention from academia but the latter has been ignored except few scholars such as Thompson.

I am on the same side with Thompson in that we see self-projection as autobiographical-narrative self and we focus on Madhyamaka School. However, I examined a new realm, the tetralemma of Nagarjuna, and examine what the enactive self is and it is constructed by using the notion.
A Study on the Ethical-legal Framework for the Disabilities with Prosthesis

SHIM, Ji Won
Inje University (Korea)

This paper examines what is the meaning of the body implant for people with disabilities explores. The subject has been overlooked in researches of human enhancement. I provide a positive ethical value criterion that is based on the extension of the body with respect to persons with disabilities.

(a) New classification criteria for physical implant: The human body is the most basic media between the self and the world. Technological development has rearranged the relation between the self and the world by intervention of the body. Body implants raises the subject, an ethical position between the object and the body.
(b) New legal judgment based on claims of necessity of body implants. We need a new ethical basis for the universalization of the body by the implant implants. There is legal judgments due to the development of implant technology.
(c) Ethical discussion centered on physical disabilities with Implants.
(d) The change of the notion of disability due to medical technology leads to a new notion of disability or people with disabilities: from lack to cultural identity and from lack to super-ability. The new prosthetic fabrication procedure has made it possible congenital or acquired disease as a biological bridge to people who lost a leg due to an accident that things are impossible.
(e) Positive stance on the implant body.
(f) New standards for human rights of persons with people with implant body. I suggest a new value judgment on the human rights of people with disabilities around the implant body. I argue that there should be the basis for ethical-legal judgment. Proponents of enhancement assume that human life is precious and its value is in no way diminished by disability. Some contend that though medical technology can remove disability, disability itself is very valuable, so we should not eliminate disability. However this view is never respect for disability. The view has the same logic as following argument: Though we already have glasses, we think of bad sight as valuable, so we should not use glasses and protect bad sight, for taking glasses itself depreciates bad sight. I show that medical intervene can give a chance that think of various bodies from various viewpoints.
In this paper, I show that cognition and bodily feeling are not distinct in emotion. I argue that the pure cognitive theory of emotion, which identifies emotion with evaluative judgment or belief, is inadequate. The main objection to standard pure cognitive theory is that it cannot explain the non-cognitive aspects of emotion. I argue that if we have to take an adequate account of what is essential to being an emotion, we must resist the false choice between pure cognitive theories and pure somatic, bodily feeling theories. In order to do this, I suggest that we should take an account of “how emotions can be sophisticated cognitive states and, at the same time, have bodily feelings as a major component” (Ratcliffe 2008, 17).

I first of all consider Prinz’s ‘embodied appraisal theory’. The theory, on the one hand, agrees with pure somatic, bodily feeling theory in the sense that emotions are embodied, and disagrees with the feeling theory in the sense that judgments are needed for emotion elicitation. (Prinz 2003:81) According to Prinz, emotions are “structurally simple embodied states, but they carry the kind of information that full-blown cognitions can carry.” (Prinz 2003: 82)

I raise an objection to this embodied appraisal theory. I argue that Prinz cannot explain cultivating embodied virtues: how we might educate our emotions and cultivate virtues. Prinz explains how and where emotions can get in on the act by utilizing notion of ‘valence markers’, which are reward and punishment markers. It is an unconscious mechanism that exerts influence on behaviour. The advantage of taking this model is that it could be tested by seeking biological evidence that emotional valence is systematically related to brain systems associated with reinforcement and punishment, which have been independently investigated.

Finally, I present an alternative account of Prinz’s embodied appraisal theory in order to explain educating our emotions and cultivating virtues. D. Hutto’s radical enactive account of emotions conceives of them in terms of dynamically unfolding interactions with, rather than representations of, the world (Hutto 2008; Hutto 2012; Hutto & Myin 2013). Following Hutto’s lead, I attempt to apply this conception of the emotions to explain how we might educate our emotions and cultivate virtues (Hutto & Sánchez-García 2015).

I suggests taking a holistic stance where skills, cognition, and emotion are not decoupled and isolatable but rather, fully embodied processes meant to work together. I argue that a holistic integration is something to be accomplished within the context of a social practice.
SYMPOSIUM 5

A Frontier of Analytic Asian Philosophy

GENERAL DESCRIPTION

This symposium is on *Analytic Asian Philosophy*, an emerging field, in which Asian Philosophy, traditional or modern, is reinterpreted in the light of contemporary *Analytic Philosophy* and classical or non-classical logic. Such topic is quite appropriate, we believe, to CCPEA 2016, whose key words include *Analytic Philosophy* and *Asia*. Though varying in their nationality and disciplinary backgrounds, symposiasts have been corroborated with each other in one way or another for years, so can jointly draw a well-integrated portrait of the status quo of the new intellectual milieu.

This symposium consists of three papers; the first one on an Indian scholar of Madhyamaka Buddhism, Bhāviveka, the second one on a traditional Indian logic, Jain logic, and the third one on two prominent figures of the Kyoto School, Kitarō Nishida and Keiji Nishitani. Despite of the diversity of their subjects, all of them will mobilize one or another system of non-classical logic so as to demonstrate its efficacy as a tool to make apparently enigmatic doctrines of the Asian thinkers sense, rational and even viable options for the contemporary philosophical and logical debates.
Bhāviveka’s Negations Viewed from a Contemporary Viewpoint

DEGUCHI, Yasuo
Kyoto University (Japan)

OMORI, Hitoshi
Kyoto University (Japan)

Bhāviveka (500-570) is famous for his attempts to argue for, or even to prove the main theses of Mādhyamaka Buddhism. His argumentation crucially depends on the peculiar characters of his own variants of two negations in the traditional Indian grammar studies; by negating a thesis, the first one establishes its antithesis whereas the second one doesn’t assert any antithesis.

Kajiyama (1952-3) interpreted, rightly in our opinion, such assertion-freeness of the second negation as a violation of the law of excluded middle or LEM; \( \vdash \alpha \lor \neg \alpha \). But Kajiyama’s interpretation is insufficient, in our view. In the contemporary non-classical logic, there are many available and possible non-classical negations that violate LEM. So we have to specify which one is the best or a better simulation of the second negation, in order to provide a more articulated interpretation.

Then how to specify? Here is a clue. While applying the second negation, Bhāviveka endorsed, at least at a place of his texts, the indirect proof that presupposes elimination of double negation; \( \neg \neg \alpha \vdash \alpha \) or EDN. In classical & intuitionistic logics, EDN and LEM are equivalent. So we need to explore a candidate of the second negation that violates LEM but endorses EDN, and therefore neither classical nor intuitionistic.

Being inspired by G. Wagner’s strong and weak negations (Wagner 2003), we are going to construct a para-consistent logical system that has two distinct negations that are different in their para-consistent behaviors, and one of which violates LEM but endorses EDN. By those two negations of this para-consistent system, we can well simulate Bhāviveka’s two negations and shed the lights on his overall philosophical stance. Also this interpretation has a consequence that Bhāviveka implicitly commits dialetheism, according to which some contradictions are true.
A Formalization of the Jaina Theory of Sevenfold Predication

ONISHI, Takuro
National University of Singapore (Singapore)

In this paper, I give a new formalization of the Jaina theory of sevenfold predication (JSP). In classical logic, a proposition is bivalent. It is either true or false, and not both. In the Jaina logic, there are seven possibilities or truth-values. Three of them are basic: true, false, and indescribable (or non-assertable). The other four are obtained by combining the basic ones: true-and-false, true-and-indescribable, false-and-indescribable, and true-and-false-and indescribable. How can we make sense of this sevenfold structure from modern and formal perspectives?

Graham Priest examined two types of formalization of JSP, using tools and concepts from non-classical logics [3]. Type-1 formalization uses a three-valued modal logic. The use of modality reflects the doctrine of anekānta-vāda (many-sided nature of reality) that underlies the logic of Jains. Although its semantics is three-valued, not seven-valued, the Type-1 logic allows us to express JSP in the language itself, thanks to the presence of a modal operator: there is a formula that can be interpreted as saying that every formula takes just one of the seven truth-values. The other formalization, the Type-2 logic, is a seven-valued logic, which directly reflects JSP in the level of semantics. However, unlike the Type-1, it seems impossible for the Type-2 logic to express JSP within the language.

I propose yet another logic for JSP, employing the notion of logical bilattice [1]. Its semantics is seven-valued and its language has an expressive power that is strong enough to formulate JSP within itself. Thus, this formalization embodies JSP both in the semantics and in the language. I also argue that the structure of bilattice sheds a new light on unusual elements in JSP: the third basic value indescribable and combinations of truth-values. Further, I compare JSP with Catuskoti (tetralemma or four-corners), another important principle in the Indian logic that also allows for formalization in terms of bilattice [2].
Many things have whatever form of being or existence they have because they depend on other things. Interpreting this dependence relation as a grounding relation, we can also say that many things have whatever form of being or existence they have because they are grounded in other things. In the contemporary literature, such a grounding relation has been both understood and spelled out in many different ways. Nevertheless, as it is shown by Bliss and Priest (forthcoming), if we abstract from the many different ways to understand metaphysical dependence relation, it is still possible to produce a taxonomy which covers all the possible understandings of grounding. Such a taxonomy makes use of four structural properties: (i) Anti-Reflexivity, [AR]: nothing depends on itself; (ii) Anti-Symmetry, [AS]: no things depend on each other; (iii) Transitivity, [T]: everything depends on whatever a dependent depends on; (iv) Extendability, [E]: everything depends on something else. These four structural properties give rise to 10 different possible grounding theories. It is interesting to remark that, even though all these theories have different features because they make use of different combination of structural properties, they also share one important characteristic: according to Bliss and Priest (forthcoming), all grounding theories are consistent. However, is it really true?

In this paper, we explore two different versions of inconsistent grounding theories, focusing on the Kyoto School philosophy: in particular, Nishida Kitaro’s logic of place and Nishitani Keiji’s philosophy of emptiness.

First, Nishida proposes an inconsistent version of foundationalism (we will label this position ‘para-foundationalism’). In his logic of place, a place grounds an object which is within it, but not vice versa. Moreover, a place, which grounds an object, must be different from an object which is grounded. Thus, he endorses [AS] and [AR]. However, according to Nishida, absolute nothingness, the foundation which grounds everything, has self-reflexive nature and, from this, it follows that absolute nothingness is grounded by itself and nothing else. This means that he endorses the negation of [AS], the negation of [AR] (and [E]).

Secondly, Nishitani proposes an inconsistent version of coherentism (we will label this position ‘para-coherentism’). According to him, everything depends on everything else, and this is why everything is empty or, better, this is why everything is full of emptiness. Emptiness itself is no exception, because it depends on everything else. This means that he holds that everything depends on something else, that is, [E]. However, according to Nishitani, emptiness does not depend on anything as well. This means that Nishitani believes that something does not depend on anything, and this entails the negation of [E].

In the present paper, we will present these two positions and we will show that, even though they are inconsistent, they do not fall into logical triviality, by giving some formal models of them.
SYMPOSIUM 6

Epistemic Pluralism

GENERAL DESCRIPTION

Among epistemologists there are extensive differences and far-reaching disagreements concerning the nature of justification, knowledge, normativity, and value. However, despite these differences and disagreements, most epistemologists share a fundamental assumption: epistemic monism. Advocates of different accounts of justification, knowledge, normativity, and value take themselves to disagree with one another. They take their own favoured account to be uniquely correct and alternative accounts to be wrong because they implicitly assume that there is one—and only one—correct account.

The proposed symposium on epistemic pluralism features three papers that explore different ways in which the assumption of monism might be challenged—or at the very least not be taken for granted.

The first paper (“The Structure of Justification”) presents a structural account of propositional justification. The proposed account does not assume monism about justification. It is compatible with internalism as well as externalism, whether these doctrines are understood in terms of supervenience on mental states or accessibility.

The second paper (“Norm-Pluralism”) explores the nature and prospects of pluralism about epistemic norms for assertion and belief. Having discussed the idea that there are several norms relating to the aim of belief, the paper introduces and articulates a multi-norm view according to which the standards for belief are variable but “knows” is an invariant relation.

The third paper (“Fundamental Epistemic Pluralism”) discusses how pluralism about epistemic value relates to other forms of epistemic pluralism. It is argued that most prominent versions of pluralism about justification, warrant, and rationality are underwritten by a kind of monism at a very fundamental level—namely, at the level of epistemic value. The paper then explores the nature and prospects of pluralism about epistemic value.

A full abstract is provided for each paper in the next section.
Sect. 1 offers some stage-setting by addressing the question how to draw the distinction between monism and pluralism. Let monism about X be the thesis that there is exactly one way of being X. Let pluralism about X be the thesis that there are several ways of being X. Pluralist views have recently attracted considerable attention in different areas of philosophy. Truth and logic are cases in hand. According to the alethic pluralist, there are several ways of being true. According to the logical pluralist, there are several ways of being valid. How about epistemology? Sect. 2 looks to the work of Tyler Burge, Alvin Goldman, William Alston, and Michael Bergmann for examples of different forms of epistemic pluralism. In the work of these authors, we find pluralism about respectively epistemic warrant (Burge), justification (Goldman), desiderata (Alston), and rationality (Bergmann). Sect. 3 investigates what rationale can be given for epistemic pluralism. Drawing on the literature on truth pluralism, I suggest that one rationale for adopting pluralist views is that they put one in a position to accommodate a wider range of cases involving epistemic assessments. In Sect. 4, I do two things. First, I explain why the distinction between epistemic monism and epistemic pluralism is most interestingly drawn at the level of non-derivative epistemic goods or values. Second, I make the observation that, at a very fundamental level, the varieties of epistemic pluralism presented in Sect. 2 are all monist in nature. This is because they all naturally combine with veritic monism, i.e. the view that truth is the only non-derivative epistemic good. What, other than truth, might qualify as goods of this kind? Sect. 5 considers various candidates. In Sect. 6 I present what I call the "Collapse Argument". This argument seems to pose a challenge to pluralism of any kind, epistemic or otherwise. The basic idea is this: consider pluralism about X, i.e. the view that there are several ways of being X. Let these ways be X1, ..., Xn. Now consider the question: what makes X1, ..., Xn ways of being X rather than something else? Answers to this question will point to unifying features of ways of being X. However, this seems to be unfortunate for the pluralist. For, by identifying a set of unifying features of ways of being X, pluralism about X collapses into monism about X. In Sect. 7 I consider three specific versions of the Collapse Argument, targeted at pluralism about respectively truth, epistemic justification, and non-derivative epistemic value. Sect. 8 offers some general considerations concerning pluralist strategies for addressing the Collapse Argument. Finally, in Sect. 9, I address the epistemic versions of the Collapse Argument.
This paper explores a structural account of propositional justification in terms of the notion of being in a position to know and negation. Combined with a non-normal logic for being in a position to know, the account allows for the derivation of plausible principles of justification. The account is neutral on whether justification supervenes upon internally individuated mental states and likewise on whether it supervenes upon facts that are already accessible by introspection or reflection alone. It is thus compatible both with internalism and with externalism. Yet, the account also allows for the proof of principles of justification that are commonly conceived to depend on an internalist conception of justification. The account likewise coheres both with epistemic contextualism and with its rejection and is compatible both with the knowledge-first approach and with its rejection. Despite its neutrality on these issues, the account makes propositional justification luminous. However, it proves quite resilient in the light of recent anti-luminosity arguments, including Williamson’s case of the unmarked clock.
Contributed Papers
Two Ambiguities of Hempel’s I-S Explanation

AHN, Geonhoon
Kangwon National University (Korea)

I-S(inductive-statistical) explanation involves the subsumption, in a peculiar non-deductive sense, of a particular occurrence under statistical laws. The general form of the inductive character of probabilistic explanation is stated as ‘\( p(Gx/Fx) = r, Fa // Ga \)’. The statement ‘\( p(Gx/Fx) = r \)’ means that in a long series of performances of random experiment \( F \), the proportion of cases with outcome \( G \) is almost certain to be close to \( r \)(constant). In his I-S model, the double line separating the premises from the conclusion is to signify that the relation of the former to the latter is not that of deductive implication, but that of inductive support. In the schema, the double line reflects the phrasing of probabilistic arguments.

In the I-S explanation, there can exist more than one reference class to which an individual may belong. The explanandum(description of the empirical phenomenon to be explained) can belong to another kind of reference class. There are many different reference classes for same objects in the world. An ontological ambiguity is related to the fact that a given event has very different statistical probabilities. There are different proper subsets of statements which can confer high probabilities on logically contradictory conclusion. In sum, the ambiguity arises from the existence of different reference classes, with different relative frequencies of the attribute in question, to which a given single case may be referred.

On the other hand, there is also an epistemic(epistemological) ambiguity. The epistemic one arises from the accepted scientific knowledge which lead us to refer the given single case to different reference classes. Ontological ambiguity is a kind of predicate ambiguity resulting from the facts in the world, while the epistemic one is the subject ambiguity resulting from my(our) knowledge about the world. The latter ambiguity sometimes comes from the former one, but not always. For these reasons, this paper will be investigated more clearly for the eliminations of ambiguities as mentioned above. The paper will be focused on the scopes and limits of the ambiguities in I-S explanation as well.
The Role of Language in Making the World:  
Focus on ‘Reality’ in Jacques Lacan and ‘the dependent Origination’  
in Dharmapāla(護法)

AHN, Hwanki  
Joong-Ang Sangha University (Korea) / Seoul National University (Korea)

Jacques Lacan(1901-1981) is a western psychoanalyst and psychiatrist. It is well known that he inherited Freud’s psychoanalysis in critical viewpoint. He organized his theory based on the results of treating patients. He explained human unconsciousness in terms of language and desire. Especially the language is the key role in making the world in his theory. Interestingly the desire and language are also important concepts in Yogācāra Buddhism, one of the oriental religions. As is well known, Yogācāra Buddhism was formed by monks observing their mind. Despite the difference in geography and the age between the theory of Lacan and Yogācāra Buddhism, it is very impressive that they all explained the mind in view of language and desire.

In this article I would like to compare them in terms of the role of language. Lacan claimed that the language is the condition of unconsciousness. According to his theory the language and its structure exist ahead of the subject of language. When we accept the system of language, ‘Symbolic,’ the subject is formed. On the other hand the subject is active one formed from the division of mind[vijñāna] arising from the bīja related with the language in Yogācāra Buddhism.

In the theory of Lacan, man comes to live in the ‘Symbolic’ as he learns the language. It is impossible for him to contact the object of the language directly. But the object in ‘Reality’ is always with him. The ‘Reality’ is the perfection where man eager to reach. It shows itself through the language and image indirectly. It is over the Symbolic.

Meanwhile the world is explained in view of ‘Imagined or contrived points of view [遍計所執性], ‘Dependent origination [依他起性], ‘The complete and perfect real nature [圓成實性]’ in Yogācāra Buddhism. Dharmapāla(護法), one of the learned monks in India, interpreted the three views as follows. When we see the ‘Imagined or contrived points of view’ with the delusion, it exists. But seeing it with the truth it doesn’t. ‘Dependent origination’ exists owing to the principle, cause and effect. When we see ‘The complete and perfect real nature’ with the truth, it exists and it is not nothing. According to the view of Dharmapāla, the relation between ‘Dependent origination’ and ‘The complete and perfect real nature’ is compared to two sides of the same coin.

Two theories show that we are live in the world of language, ‘Symbolic’ and ‘Imagined or contrived points of view.’ And now we are not able to reach the Reality in Lacan even if we want to. While it is possible to reach ‘The complete and perfect real nature’ by the transformation of mind on the basis of meditation in Yogācāra Buddhism. In this context, I tried to show the Reality in Lacan in terms of ‘Dependent origination’ in Yogācāra Buddhism.
Meaning of the ‘Idea Only (vijñaptimātra)’ of Yogācāra Buddhism and Phenomenology

AHN, Sungdoo
Seoul National University (Korea)

In this paper I like to investigate the concept of ‘Idea Only (vijñaptimātra)’ of the Yogācāra Buddhism from the viewpoint of phenomenology. It has been sometimes suggested that the ‘Idea Only’ is the Buddhist form of idealism. But, parallel with some recent comparative studies in USA and East Asian countries, I am rather following the suggestion that the concept in question could be well understood when it is compared to the phenomenological ideas and thought structure. In order to demonstrate this viewpoint, I will deal with two points connected with each other: the first point is how to understand the meaning of the dependence of consciousness on the object. This point will clarify why the Yogācāra position is different from the idealistic interpretations.

The second point is related with the problem of ‘out there’. If the consciousness is identical with the world, which would be the result from the idea of vijñaptimātra and phenomenological concept of intentionality, how we can arrive at the state of ‘Urbewusstsein’ or ‘inneres Bewusstsein’ which seem to be free from the subject-object dichotomy. The Yogācāra Buddhists seem to be confronted with the same dilemma when they speak of the ‘Suchness (tathatā)’. Suchness is traditionally described as ‘unutterable’, i.e., it transcends the conceptual designation and consciousness, but it must be connected with the consciousness because the existence of its unutterability must be known in and by the consciousness itself.
What Biologists Talk About When They Talk About Species

AMITANI, Yuichi
Tokyo University of Agriculture (Japan)

The species problem in evolutionary biology ------the problem on what the nature and the proper definition of species is------ has been described in terms of the abundance of conflicting definitions of *species*, such as the biological species concept and the phylogenetic species concepts. But there is more to the species problem than those definitions. For example, one can observe that biologists often use the term 'species' without having any particular definition in mind (Amitani, 2015). This suggests that many biologists have the "general," or umbrella concept of species besides individual definitions. This paper describes this "general" concept and its relationship with the definitions of species. I will point out two features of the general concept: a placeholder for causal mechanisms for discontinuities, and *good species* as a prototype of *species*. I then argue that particular definitions are ways of precisifying the general notion of species. This leaves biologists a room for *semantic indecision*: when biologists use the term species, they could leave its exact reference open until they precisify it. Then I will address epistemic roles the general concept plays in biologists' research. It sets a research domain on species for biologists and thus provides naturalists with epistemological goal. If this picture is on the right track, then several extant attempts to solve the species problem have problems, because they do not pay due attention to the general concept of species and its epistemic roles, such as agenda-setting and a reference point.
Questions on the “meaning of life” (henceforth ML) have attracted attentions from both western and eastern philosophers throughout the long history of philosophy (in a very broad sense of the word, including the non-western traditions), but it is relatively recently that intensive discussions started within the analytic tradition. This is rather surprising in light of the initial popularity among the scholars – many of them confess that they started their philosophical studies first being guided by the questions over ML (Britton 1969). In other words, once they started their professional philosophical careers, they somehow abandoned such “naive” questions since they are not worth “serious” philosophical inquiries. However, as several philosophers (Cottingham 2003; Baggini 2005; Seachris 2012; Metz 2002, 2013) point out, ML has long been among the most important questions of philosophy, as explicitly or implicitly stated by many philosophical figures. It is also notable that ML has long been the question in religion, literature, and in some branches of psychology. On the contrary, philosophers (who are generally thought to be most talented for such a “philosophical” question) have often been silent on the topic. A serious philosopher cannot complete the job, I guess, without saying anything on ML (cf. Metz 2002).

What I would like to discuss in this presentation is threefold.

(1) Clarification of the question. The question on ML is often dismissed as too vague, or literally “meaningless”, pseudo-question. Against this kind of charge, one promising direction is to re-formulate the “meaning of life” question into another, less-problematic question using more familiar concepts such as “value”, “purpose”, “aim”, “end”, or “worth” of life. Although this approach has its merits, it also has the drawback of losing the original import of the question.

(2) Two dimensions of ML. So, in this presentation I would like to pursue the literal interpretation on ML. Normative framework raises the following question: what, if anything, makes a life meaningful rather than meaningless? This stance is deeply connected with local, as opposed to cosmic, dimension on ML (Seachris 2012). However, using the concept “meaningful” (or “meaningless”) follows the paraphrasing strategy as mentioned above, and somehow misses the original import again.

(3) Cosmic dimension of ML. Therefore, I would like to turn to the descriptive dimension of the question. On this model of the question, ML is to be discovered rather than invented. To follow this line, we should wonder about the following question: what meaning does a/your life have in the world/universe in which you live? Obviously, the full answer to this question leans on contemporary cosmology and other factual knowledge, while it also strongly requires the interpretation or location of your place within the universe. Thus, as a conclusion, I would like to point out that the adequate answer to ML requires systematic treatment both from factual knowledge (in light of contemporary cosmology, earth-planetary or life sciences, etc.) and philosophical interpretation of your life in the world.
Enlightenment and Interculturality
-Dialectical Culture and Inter-cultural Experience-

AOYAGI, Masafumi
Ritsumeikan University (Japan)

In my presentation, I discuss that culture has a self-contradictory character based on the "Dialectic of Enlightenment" by Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno. Then I show a perspective of the interculturality or inter-cultural experience.

1. The character of culture
   We have our original culture in our community. And our culture has uniqueness and particularity that are different from other cultures. In this sense, culture always intends localization. At the same time, we share our own culture. Then the culture has identity and universality in our community. In this respect, culture also intends globalization. Therefore, culture has both particularity and universality, that is, localism and globalism. These are contradictory in our culture. So culture includes a self-contradictory character.

2. Culture as a means of Enlightenment
   We try to get freedom and independence through Enlightenment. We dominate outer-nature and human to realize it. And we also dominate inner-nature which is our emotion and desire by cultural activities. So culture is one of means to realize our freedom and independence. We dominate not only our inner-nature but also outer-nature by cultural activities. Then they connect industry and result in Cultural Industry.

3. The administered culture
   Horkheimer and Adorno discussed the connection between the universality of culture and the industry as problem of the Cultural Industry. In our cultural activities, we use industry as a means for the universality and globalization. At the same time, in the industry we rationally manage culture as a commodity. As a result, the Cultural Industry brings us a uniform culture and realizes its globalization. Originally culture brings us ways for freedom and independence, but it shifts to a means for domination. As a result, we are dominated by culture as Cultural Industry. And we lose freedom and independence by Cultural Industry. In this sense, culture as Cultural Industry includes a self-contradictory character.

4. The possibilities of culture
   However, even if culture shifts to Cultural Industry, it still holds a critical function. This function could destroy Cultural Industry and its domination. In other words, culture could destroy itself. At the same time, this function creates a unique and particular products. So cultural activities have a power of self-destroy and self-creation. Meanwhile, the self-contradictory character of culture does not mean a simple opposite between particularity and universality. We can consider the relationship between various cultures as interculturality. Interculturality is not the cultural relativism. We cannot think every culture apart from our own cultural experiences. We must think about our culture or other cultures based on our cultural experiences. So Interculturality preserves the differences among various cultures, and at the same time, we experiences both the universality and particularity in the cultures.
The Duty of Charity Determined as Sharing

AURELIO, Michael G.
Ateneo de Manila University (Philippines)

In a country like the Philippines where its people are vulnerable to natural calamities such as strong typhoons and cyclones—the worst of which in recent memory was typhoon Haiyan which ravaged the eastern Visayas and other countries in Southeast Asia in 2013—the question of the duties of its citizens in helping their fellowmen who suffer from such crises may carry more weight than in other countries. In the face of suffering and upon hearing calls for help, what are one’s duties, who are obliged to answer those calls, and in what manner and capacity are these duties to be performed?

I propose that one way to understand our duty to help those in need is by defining it as the duty to share what he have. Now, the phenomenon of sharing presents itself as an everyday and seemingly straightforward concept. On the one hand, it may seem that sharing something may be simply tantamount to giving something away as one disowns that which is shared in order to be possessed wholly by another and without remainder. It seems then that we simply give away something we do not completely need then, what is already a surplus for us, when we donate to others in need.

Yet on the other hand, what is shared is by definition not something which is whole by itself; something is not surrendered or given, and so he who shares something nevertheless keeps something for himself, in turn distinguishing the act of sharing from the act of giving. To share what we have, in this sense, is then not simply giving away what we do not need, but of partaking with others what is still essential to us. And by viewing charity in this way, not only those who have more than enough become obliged to help those in need.

It is this ambiguity in the experience of sharing which my paper would wish to address in the hope that it can offer an alternative view of charity as usually seen in practice as giving donations, sending relief goods, etc. to those in need, where it may seem that only those who have more than enough are obliged to help those in distress. Starting with a phenomenological description of Jean Fouquet’s painting *St. Martin Sharing his Cloak with a Beggar* (1452–60), I propose a definition of charity as a duty to share what we have in the hope that we can imagine coming to the aid of others as in principle a duty for each man and woman, and not only for those who are better situated.
This essay starts on the remark that even though the aesthetic pluralism avails to explain the phenomenon of the contemporary art, discussion on its legitimacy is scant. Because there is no common style grouping of every work of art, and as new styles are constantly emerging, it seems that there is no lens to gaze through other than aesthetic pluralism to explain contemporary art. Therefore, describing art with a single standard or theory of art is no longer valid as it was in the past. Questions on art are also shifting: ‘What is beauty?’, ‘What is taste?’ are no longer questions of interest; now the question is focused on ‘What is art?’, which means that it is difficult to capture the phenomenon of art as a single phenomenon. Aesthetic pluralism is a compelling alternative to this problem. It does not take a specific mainstream discourse as a uniform approach to describe every work of art. It recognizes the diverse stylistic characteristics of every work of art. In other words, aesthetic pluralism is an attempt to accept works of art in their variety of styles and explain them.

The possibility of aesthetic pluralism appears in John Dewey’s *Art as Experience*. Saying that art is nothing else but experience, Dewey expands the concept of art and uses it in a different way compared to the conventional usage. On the other hand, we are aware that aesthetic pluralism started with Morris Weitz’s argument that it is impossible to define art because it is an open concept. But the discussion became serious when A. C. Danto declared the end of art. And doing this he did not only suggest the diversity of contemporary art, but also argued that there is no other way to explain the phenomenon of contemporary art.

Aesthetic pluralism emerged because the phenomenon of contemporary art could no longer be explained by a single theory. Today is the era of art pluralism, so art criticism also should be pluralistic. According to this position, a work of art has no specific goal to follow which results in giving freedom to the artist in their activities; because we do not refer to one specific style or standard in the evaluation of a work of art, the hierarchy between the styles of art disappears. So each style is measured and recognized in itself. Thus not only do artistic activities diversify, but also works of art, and the standards of criticism diversify.

On the other hand, I focus on the point that aesthetic pluralism does not mean that art and non-art cannot be distinguished. Danto’s concept of ‘artworld’ pinpoints this phenomenon. It is a new way of explanation which embraces the diversity of art while discussing the boundaries between art and non-art. However, in my opinion, even though Danto’s concept of artworld has the advantage of accurately diagnosing the phenomenon of contemporary art, it failed to present aesthetic pluralism as a philosophical theory. Therefore, the main object of this essay is to discuss on the legitimacy of aesthetic pluralism and lay its foundation.

Besides the fact that aesthetic pluralism cannot be detached from real phenomena because it coincides with the contemporary art trend, it also cannot be detached from the concept of pluralism. Despite its practical value, if it does not present its legitimacy, aesthetic pluralism will remain only as a description of aspects within the whole history of art. From this basis I consider that aesthetic pluralism and liberalism are associated, and will argue that concepts like liberty, individuality in John Stuart Mill’s *On Liberty*, can justify Danto’s aesthetic pluralism.

Through John Stuart Mill’s concept of individuality we can attempt to establish the legitimacy of aesthetic pluralism. The reason why the diversity of art should be recognized is that it is the free expression of individual personalities. Just as everyone’s personality, taste, thoughts, etc. differ, the way of expression, the content or stylistic characteristics of a work of
art vary. To say that the unique stylistic character of a work of art is the expression of the artist’s individuality is to acknowledge the stylistic diversity of art which in its turn leads to the recognition of individuality.

Moreover, the positive acceptance of pluralism of art also contributes to society. When the variety of stylistic characteristics are recognized, it enhances cultural richness and vitality. In addition, a society where diversity coexists is significant in itself. What is also noteworthy is the interactivity between works of art: their styles influence one another and even become a method for creating new styles.
On Spinoza's Weapons

BRADLEY, Joff
Teikyo University (Japan)

Through the 'polished' lens of Baruch Spinoza's thought and *Ethics* and in the light of the work of Catherine Malabou, the aim of this paper is to think about the contemporary meaning of the indifference of and to indifference. Alongside a reading of the concept of utopia in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (students yet-to-come), the concepts of *immonde* (un-world) and disindividuation in Bernard Stiegler, I address the interpretation of sad affects (fear and hope) in Spinoza's work and rethink this in terms of the apparent loss of 'wonder' and widespread sense of 'sorrow' in contemporary culture and the university in particular.

I make a point of thinking the university in terms of 'the battle of intelligence' - and, from the point of view of the student, I address the issue of resistance via friendship networks (escape and *schizo kids*, Akira Asada; 'nebularisation' and 'island-universes', Shinji Miyadai; the immobile, Masaya Chiba). I examine these matters through the tropes of escape, flight and withdrawal (*hikikomori*, *otaku* and *disaffectation*). Running throughout the paper is the scrutiny of Deleuze's exhortation to 'flee, but while fleeing, pick up a weapon'. Or as he says in the *Postscript on the Societies of Control*: "There's no need to fear or hope, but only to look for new weapons." In terms of Spinoza, philosophy, and the *pharmacological* university, I ask what these new and old weapons might signify vis-a-vis *bêtise* (stupidity) and how they could be wielded to inspire new circuits of transindividuation (Stiegler's reading of Gilbert Simondon). I conclude with a rumination on the idea that philosophy is the weapon *par excellence* to contest prevalent models of stupidity and sad affects in higher education.
Care, Self-Interest, and Sacrifice

CABRERA Jr., Manuel Mandel
Yonsei University Underwood International College (Korea)

This paper concerns a puzzle about the relationship between the three phenomena mentioned in my title. I set up the puzzle in four steps. First, I first argue for C1 below:

(C1) If I care about some $x$, benefits/harms to $x$ are benefits/harms to me.

C1 concerns a notion of care based on the recent work of Harry Frankfurt. According to this notion, I can stand in a relation to $x$ (that of caring about it) such that its well-being is criterial for my own – i.e. such that my own flourishing partly consists in the flourishing of $x$. A paradigm example of care in this sense is love.

Second, I argue that C2 below is a corollary of C1:

(C2) If I care about some $x$, then if I do A for $x$’s sake, I thereby do it for my own sake.

In other words, I argue that coming to care about something in the present sense entails an extension of the scope of self-interest: when I act for its sake, I act in my own self-interest.

Third, I defend a claim about the concept of sacrifice:

(S) If I sacrifice for $x$, I do something for $x$’s sake that is to my own detriment, diminishment, or harm.

S isn’t just intuitively plausible: it comes close to a definition of sacrifice. In light of S, let us call a sacrifice in which what I do for $x$’s sake actually benefits $x$ a successful one.

Fourth, on the basis of the claims I’ve argued for so far, I offer the following argument:

(C*) If I care about $x$, then a benefit to $x$ is a benefit to me. (Follows from (C1))

(S*) If I successfully sacrifice for $x$, I do something that benefits $x$ to my own detriment, diminishment, or harm. (Follows from (S) and the definition of successful sacrifice)

(BH) If something benefits me, then this isn't to my own detriment, diminishment, or harm.

(RC) If I care about $x$, I do not successfully sacrifice for it; conversely, if I successfully sacrifice for $x$, I do not care for it.

RC is implausible, since it’s precisely those things we care about most for which we’re most strongly motivated to sacrifice; and more importantly, we sometimes take our efforts to sacrifice for such things to be successful (which contradicts RC). How, though, do we square this with the intuitive notion that our own well-being partly depends on the well-being of what we care about?

Next, I propose a solution that undermines BH, and that turns on the idea that a successful sacrifice represents a brute benefit, but an all-things-considered harm to me. However, I argue, this solution can account neither for how I could be motivated to sacrifice for something I care...
about, nor for the sense in which sacrifice can be selfless. To conclude, then, I propose an account of selfless motivation that promises to provide a solution to the puzzle.
According to the logical pluralism of Beall and Restall (2000, 2006), there are several distinct relations of logical consequence. As they see it, an argument may be valid in one way, invalid in another way, and there may be no further fact of the matter about whether or not that argument is valid. Various critics including Priest (2001, 2006), Read (2006), and Keefe (2014) have argued that logical pluralism suffers from what I call the collapse problem: that despite its intention to articulate a radically pluralistic doctrine about logic, the view unintentionally collapses into logical monism. The thought goes that if logic L₁ judges an inference to be valid and logic L₂ judges the same inference invalid, L₁ exerts greater normative pull than L₂. The upshot is that there is always a unique answer as to whether or not one ought, logically, to draw a given inference. So, even if several accounts of logical consequence fare equally well on some criteria, the normativity of logic upsets this balance. The pluralist’s assertion that there are several distinct logics is an unstable position that will ultimately collapse in on itself. Any logical pluralist ought to be a logical monist.

What precipitates collapse is the fact that both logics bear on the same form of reasoning but exert an asymmetric pull with respect to its propriety. In this paper, I propose a contextualist view about logical validity that captures the same insights as logical pluralism, but avoids the collapse problem and improves on the original view in other ways. More than one person has noticed in passing that the logical pluralist’s treatment of validity resembles the structure of familiar context-sensitive expressions.¹ I develop this into a serious proposal by drawing an analogy with contextualist views of knowledge according to which ‘knows’ includes a parameter for an epistemic standard.² In simple terms, an epistemic standard can be modeled by a class of possible worlds that play the role of epistemically relevant alternatives. Contextualism about validity, analogously, is the view that the paradigm logical expression ‘valid’ includes a parameter for a deductive standard. In simple terms, a deductive standard can be modeled by what Beall and Restall call an admissible class of cases. These play the role of determining logically salient counterexamples. I argue that anyone moved by logical pluralism should instead embrace my proposal. Logical contextualism makes plain why the plurality of logics do not collapse into one and it does so by appeal to well-understood semantic machinery.
Beauty, Disinterestedness, and Philosophy

CASLIB, Bernado N. Jr.
University of the Philippines Diliman (Philippines)

The concept of beauty has always been a topic of interest because of its perceived nature: fluid, abstract, and seemingly amorphous. Many people take interest in the beautiful. Laymen behold it. Beauty contestants fight over it. Poets immortalize it. Artists represent it. Scholars try to understand it. Presently, one google search will yield numerous scholarly studies on beauty. This much exposure, ironically, has left humanity still baffled with the concept of beauty. No complete account of beauty is provided even by crowned beauty queens. By analyzing key positions forwarded by the modern philosopher, Immanuel Kant, this paper will revisit the perennial conundrum of what beauty really amounts to and resurface significant distinctions introduced by the eminent philosopher.

In his treatise *The Critique of Judgment of the Power of Judgment*, Kant provides a way of understanding the broad field of Aesthetics that is ultimately, the study of art and beauty. For Kant, human beings are equipped not just with the faculty of theoretical and practical understanding, but also with the capacity for judgment and the judgment of taste—the basis of all aesthetic experience.

For the longest time, we have been conditioned to think of the beautiful as an adjective. The term is used to label a particular object in the world that is adjudged as that—beautiful. Kant stirs the discourse by proposing that beauty may not be a property of the objects themselves, not mere descriptions of the objects, whether in nature or otherwise, but description of a judgment or an experience. From the focus on the object of the beautiful, in Kant, we find a shift to the judgment itself as a locus of the beautiful.\(^1\) The starting point is no longer the object that is judged but the judging subject and his feeling about what he is judging. Beauty is seen from the point-of-view of our “actually judging it to be beautiful.”\(^2\)

In trying to expose the sophistication in Kant’s theory, I will underscore key Kantian concepts such as the reflecting power of judgment and disinterestedness. In the process of doing this, I will be able to strengthen the hold of humanity on its faculty of judgment as the latter emanates from man’s natural capacity for free play of the imagination. I will also be able to shed light on the common conception that judgment of beauty is purely subjective. By utilizing Kantian distinction, I will attempt to forward a position that recognizes this subjectivity while at the same time, maintains objectivity when it comes to beauty. The notion of disinterestedness, furthermore, will be brought to the fore as one of the most important elements in the judgment of beauty. Towards the end, repercussions of this 18\(^{th}\) century conception of beauty in contemporary times and in Philosophy will be discussed.

---


\(^2\) Ibid., p. 21.
Developing a Minimal Account for East-West Debates on Human Rights

CHAN, Benedict S. B.
Hong Kong Baptist University (Hong Kong)

There are different human rights discourses between the East and the West. One of them is about the universality of human rights. Are all human rights universal? If not, then which of them are universal and which are not? On one side, some scholars argue that all human rights are universal. On the other side, some scholars believe that the answer depends on cultural factors. For example, Daniel Bell believes that East Asian cultures, especially the Confucian tradition, “can affect the justification of rights”. While they generally agree that (physical) security rights such as rights against torture and slavery are human rights, they also argue that traditional political rights in the West such as freedom of speech and political participation are not human rights because these political rights conflict with some East Asian cultural factors.

I agree that cultural factors are important, but I do not think that cultural justification would limit the list of human rights. In this colloquium, I will discuss the progress on developing what I call “a minimal account of human rights”, and I will argue that this account can contribute to this East-West discourse. Particularly, I argue that both security rights and political rights are human rights, and explain the relationship between these rights and East Asian cultures. The skeleton of my argument is like this. First, I argue that if political rights are not human rights because they conflict with some East Asian cultures, then security rights are also not human rights because security rights also conflict with some East Asian cultures. Next, I discuss the ideas from Bell and Michael Walzer that security rights are human rights because they are minimal values. Based on their ideas and other scholars such as Henry Shue and Amartya Sen, I explain what minimal values are, and argue that since security rights are minimal values, they are still human rights even they conflict with some East Asian cultures. I then argue that political rights, similar to security rights, are also minimal values. Therefore, similar to security rights, political rights are also human rights even they also conflict with some East Asian cultures. Lastly, I also discuss some possible directions to develop this minimal account further so that it can be a more comprehensive approach to human rights.
Moral Reasoning and Obligations to the Elderly

CHAN, Jonathan K. L.
Hong Kong Baptist University (Hong Kong)

It is a widely accepted view in most cultures that the young people of society have moral obligations to care for the old, both those in their own families and those who are strangers to them. It is also a widely accepted view that adult children have more moral obligation to care for their elderly parents than other persons in the society. These ethical views can also be found in the Confucian moral framework. For instance, according to Mencius, we ought to treat our elderly with the care appropriate for the elderly and to extend this treatment to the elderly of others. But why do we think that we have such obligations? By what sort of reasoning can we arrive at such a conclusion? In this paper my discussion will focus on adult children’s obligation to care for their elderly parents. Do we have more moral obligation to care for our elderly parents than any other person does in the society? According to some philosophers such as Norman Daniels, we don’t. Their argument is something like this: Children do not give their consent to be brought into this world or to be adopted. They do not choose to enter into the parent-child relationship. So the so-called children's obligation of caring for their aged parents is "non-self-imposed" and thus cannot be morally required. In this paper, it will be argued that the argument is flawed. The main idea of my criticism is that the argument seems to assume that only “self-imposed” obligations are morally required. Without this assumption, the above argument is simply a non-sequitur. The assumption, however, is not true. So Daniels’s argument is either a non-sequitur or unsound. The paper then turns to discuss some theories of filial obligations which attempt to justify filial obligations by using models analogous to parent-child relationship: the promise model theory, the debt model theory, the friendship model theory and the gratitude model theory. My discussion on these theories will focus on their reasoning style. In this paper, it will be argued that the reasoning of these theories are all flawed. The paper then turns to discuss two other theories of filial obligations which the author takes to be more promising, namely, the Contractualist theory and the Confucian theory. The main idea of the Contractualist theory is to apply Thomas Scanlon’s Contractualist principle to filial obligations, whereas the Confucian theory is to base such obligations on the idea of living a virtuous life.
Qian Zongshu’s Translation Concept—Huajing: Its Philosophical and Aesthetic Implications

CHANG, Chung An “Steven”
National Taiwan Normal University (Taiwan)

Qian Zongshu, arguably the most learned scholar in the Chinese modern times, proposes a concept of translation called “huajing” in Chinese, or the realm that a translated work not only renders faithfully the source text into target language without being spotted as a work of translation, but also the style, genre, and even the rhetoric of the original text is respected. This has posed a challenge to a translator in that firstly he should understand the ST in depth, thereby requiring him to have the hermeneutical competence, and secondly he should also have the aesthetic competence so as to keep the original taste of the ST in the TT. As Qian’s idea of “huajing” has been rendered into English in various versions, such as “the realm of transformation,” “the ultimate of transmutation,” “sublimation,” or the “transmigration of souls”, it can be seen that the interpretation of this culture term has posed a hermeneutic challenge to a translator. The discussion of Qian’s concept of translation under the East-West cross-cultural vision shall help us form a dialogue with the West. Of great importance is that the idea of “hua” is not merely a concept that belongs to literary study but one that has its roots in the Chinese philosophical and aesthetic tradition. While put the discussion of Qian’s translation concept and its implications as the foci of this thesis, the present writer attempts to draw Kant’s aesthetics in art creation and his conception of genius for discussion as well as extend the inquiry to include the views from Heidegger, Gadamer and Benjamin as they have raised up some important issues concerning language and its relation to the work of art. Overall, this talk purports to fulfill the lacuna that has long been ignored in both translation and philosophical studies in both China and the West.
Puzzles concerning reference and attitudes have long bemused and amused the philosophical communities. We forge connections between thoughts and the world through language, especially via use of noun phrases. Our mental life, just as our empirical existence, is however not constant but everchanging. We can hold various attitudes, even conflicting ones, toward an object; we may also associate different, perhaps apparently contradictory descriptions with the same thing. Further complications arise when we entertain, consciously or not, thoughts about objects that do not exist. Meanwhile, we seek not only expressions of our own mental life, but explanation of other people’s actions; our talks are not limited to our own thoughts, but those of the others too gure prominently. As a result, a general analysis of the truth and meaning of the relevant linguistic phenomena cannot be adequate unless it takes into account the diverse range of things we can think and talk about, as well as the plethora of ways of so doing. The array of linguistic phenomena that I want to concentrate on concerns intentional identity, a problem rst made famous by Peter Geach (1967). Building on Edelberg’s (2006) observation that intentional identity has both intersubjective and intrasubjective versions, I argue that the phenomena are indeed much more widespread than previously perceived. In fact, what underlies the problem is responsible for many other wellknown puzzles (e.g. Kripke (1979), Roberts (1996) and Cumming (2014)), and so the need for a proper analysis is eminently pressing. I will specify a template for the generalized intentional identity, identify the challenges involved, and argue that positing a level of representational entity in both philosophy of mind and language is a promising way to tackle the problem across the board.
The Principle of Non-Contradiction as an Ultimate Truth in Madhyamakālaṃkāra

CHEN, Hsun-Mei
National Taiwan University (Taiwan)

The research question I would like to explore in this paper is the role of logical principles in Śāntarakṣita’s philosophy.

The main purposes of Buddhism is to achieve liberation, and one cannot obtain liberation without intellectually understanding the ultimate truth. Therefore, rationality is essential to Buddhist salvation. However, while our intellectual activities are conceptual, the ultimate truth in Buddhism, especially in Mahāyāna Buddhism, is nonconceptual. Hence, it seems that there is a tension between the ultimate truth and rationality, and therefore, a tension between soteriology and rationality. Since this tension can undermine the rational ground of Buddhist soteriology, it is important to solve this conundrum.

One of the solutions is to investigate the nature and limit of rationality in Buddhist context, and to what extent rationality enables the achievement of liberation. I would like to probe into these issues by investigating the status of logical principles in Buddhist arguments, since rational discourses are presumably based on fundamental logical precepts such as the principle of non-contradiction, and those logical precepts have a close connection with truth. I am intrigued by two questions in particular: (a) What kind of truth can logical principles yield? (b) Can logical reasoning aid people to liberation?

Strikingly, the issues of logical reasoning had been in vigorous debate in Śāntarakṣita’s Madhyamākālaṃkāra. Śāntarakṣita, a prominent Indian Buddhist philosopher of the 8th century, synthesized Yogācāra and logico-epistemological thought into the Madhyamaka system and proposed famous neither-one-nor-many argument in Madhyamākālaṃkāra. In this paper, I argue that Śāntarakṣita advocates in his influential Madhyamākālaṃkāra that it is possible to access ultimate reality by logical reasoning. I also argued that if one regards logical reasoning as the path to ultimate reality, as Śāntarakṣita did in Madhyamākālaṃkāra, he or she must embrace the logical principles as ultimate truths.
How Can We Explain Operation of the Brain?  
Capacity-Based versus Law-Driven Models of the Brain

CHEN, Szu-Ting  
National Tsing Hua University (Taiwan)

NORTHOFF, Georg  
The Royal’s Institute of Mental Health Research (Canada)

The brain is part of nature and the world; therefore it should adhere and conform to the principles and mechanisms that operate in the former. There is much discussion in philosophy of science whether nature conforms to a law-driven model or a capacity-based model, as suggested by Nancy Cartwright. Empirical support for the capacity-based model is mainly driven by findings in physics and economics. In contrast, neuroscience in general and the brain in particular have not yet been conceived in the framework of a capacity-based model. Here we argue that the capacity-based model of the brain fits better with the empirical data than the law-based model of brain. Specifically, we discuss two empirical examples, non-additive interaction between the resting state and stimulus-induced activity in the brain (non-additive rest-stimulus interaction) and the brain’s encoding strategy (statistically- and difference-based coding) that support the view of the brain’s neural operations as acting in terms of capacities rather than laws. Taken together, we suggest that the capacity-based model is more appropriate model of the brain. This suggestion has major implications, reaching beyond the empirical domain into ontological and epistemological issues concerning the mind-brain relationship.
Leibniz has distinguished two levels of time (Rescher, 1979; Russell, 1937). One is real time, time as it is independent of us or of any sentient beings. It is also known as monadic time or world-based time, given monads’ being basic constituents of the world in Leibniz’s view. Another is ideal time, time as we cognize it in terms of discrete points as characterized by concepts of physics and mathematics delivered by human rational capacities. It can thus be understood as cognition-based time. Some scholars (Winterbourne, 1982; Harz & Cover, 1982) have pointed out an ambiguity in the notion of real time, that time can be real in at least two senses: metaphysical and phenomenological. In the latter sense, we experience time in our stream of consciousness. In this view, three levels of time can be distinguished in Leibniz: cognition-based time (ideal time), experience-based time (phenomenally real time), world-based time (monadic real time). The aim of this paper is two-fold. One is to show that three corresponding levels of time can be found in Zhuangzi. Another is to demonstrate that a fourth level of time can be suitably distinguished in Zhuangzi’s philosophy. Some implications of this study for the brain neuro-scientific research of self and consciousness will also be drawn and discussed.
The Structural Heterogeneity of Concepts in Scientific Practices

CHEON, Hyundeuk
Ewha Woman’s University (Korea)

Given that scientific concepts are arguably a kind of concepts, some philosophers have attempted to develop the theories of scientific concepts and conceptual changes by exploiting empirical psychology of concepts (Thagard 1986; 1990; Nersessian 1989; Andersen et al. 2006). The methodological strategy they adopted was to selectively pick up a set of models in a wide range of psychological literature on concepts, and to apply it to scientific concepts. However, this strategy fails to take a comprehensive perspective and overlooks an embarrassing situation in the empirical studies about concepts: several theories of concepts (the prototype theories, the exemplar theories, and theory theories) are still competing, and there is no consensus on the nature of concepts. Strikingly, no single theory of concepts, which takes one type of informational structure (i.e., prototype, exemplars, and theories) as the basic building block for human higher cognition, has failed to provide a satisfactory explanation of all the experimental results. Some results can be easily explained by one theory, but not by others, and *vice versa*. The challenge we face is to specify how to accommodate all of them. In this paper, it is suggested that concepts are structurally heterogeneous in that each category may be represented by multiple types of informational structures, each of which is involved in most, if not all, of higher human cognition. Not only does this structural pluralism make a sharp contrast with the monolithic view that concepts are the unified entities underlying higher cognition, but it is distinguished from other radical solutions like Machery’s (2009) *concept eliminativism*. The adoption of the structural heterogeneity of scientific concepts, I will argue, allows us to illuminate the conceptual problems, where there are no agreed-upon definitions of central theoretical terms such as ‘species’ and ‘human nature’.
The Differentiability between ‘the Re-self-attesting Part of Mind’
of Mere Consciousness Buddhism and ‘Reflexion’ of Phenomenology

CHEONG, Eunhae
SungKyunKwan University (Korea)

One main struggle about the theory of four parts of mind in Mere Consciousness Buddhism is whether the 4th part (the re-self-attesting part) of mind is necessary or not. My basic premise is the following: Although recollection is different from contemplation, this proves the 3rd part just as recollection does so; in this case, recollection means that the 2nd part (the present seeing part) sees the 2nd part (the past seeing part), while contemplation means that the 4th part attests the 3rd part. It is generally acceptable that the 3rd part (self-consciousness in terms of a phenomenological concept) makes possible not only recollection but also contemplation. This acceptance means also that the 3rd part becomes the basis for generating the activity of contemplation (the 4th part), while contemplation becomes the basis for acknowledging the existence of the 3rd part. Zuanzang asserted, for the sake of eliminating the infinite regress of consciousness, the mutual proof of the 3rd part and the 4th part by each other. This assertion seems to include at least two problems. The first problem is following: the assertion that, when the 4th part attests the 3rd part, the former becomes the resulting mind-part by the attestation, is in collision with the common view in Mere Consciousness Buddhism that all seeds (all results of attestation) become stored in the 3rd part. But this problem is dissolved by the understanding that the results of attestation by the 3rd part becomes stored not directly in the 4th part, but indirectly in the 3rd part which attests again that 4th part. The second problem is that, although the 4th part attests the 3rd part, the attested 3rd part does not become known by both recollection and contemplation. But this problem is dissolved by the understanding that, when the 4th part attests the 3rd part, what becomes attested is not the attesting function of the 3rd part, but the resulting function (the results of attestation) of the 3rd part. E. Husserl distinguished reflexion and recollection from each other, and elucidated that they are possible only by virtue of retention of consciousness. Reflexion that is meant by Husserl is the being directed of consciousness towards a proceeding present perception, while recollection is the being directed of consciousness towards a finished past perception. Husserl’s Reflexion is the method of phenomenology, which tries to distinguish and describe the phenomena and the processes of consciousness. On the contrary, the contemplation in Buddhistic practice is only the attestation of a proceeding present perception without distinguishing it. So, Buddhistic contemplation is differentiated from Husserl’s reflexion. In the end, the 4th part in Mere Consciousness Buddhism is necessary both as the basis for acknowledging the existence of the 3rd part and as the epistemological principle for explanation of Buddhistic practice (contemplation).
Kuhnian Paradigms Revisited

CHO, In-Rae
Seoul National University (Korea)

Kuhn’s notion of paradigm(s) plays a key role in his philosophy of science. In this inquiry, first of all, I raise the question of why Kuhn introduced the new jargon “paradigm” into the philosophical discussion of science. Among many considerations potentially relevant to this question, I pay special attention to two issues. One issue is that what Kuhn calls “symbolic generalizations”, i.e., his version of laws of nature, need to be specialized in order to apply to their instances. But this process of specialization is not that of deductive inference expected from the then-received philosophy of science, especially logical empiricism. Let’s call this issue the problem of specialization. The other issue is, according to Kuhn, that how to solve new problems in a given domain of science needs to be learned from the existing exemplary problem solvings in that domain. According to him, this learning amounts to acquiring the ability to recognize relevant similarities between new problem solvings and the existing exemplars. Thus solving new problems, that is, making new applications relies on horizontal similarity relationships between new and old problem solvings. However, considerations of such horizontal relationships are lacking in the then-main stream philosophy of science. Let’s call this second issue the problem of acquiring learned similarities. The then-main stream philosophy of science failed to recognize these problems, and furthermore, it does not seem to have conceptual resources for dealing with them. I suggest that these negative findings and assessment were major, though not the only, considerations which led Kuhn to introduce his notion of paradigm(s), which seemed to him apt to handle these challenging issues. I also admit that Kuhn’s notion of paradigms as exemplars has the potential to solve these problems. The reason is, first of all, that exemplars are suitable for similarity-based reasoning, which seems to provide us with a good lead for solving the problem of acquiring learned similarities. Furthermore, exemplars are taken to be operative relatively independent of certain top-down general principles. Nonetheless, Kuhn’s answer to the question of how scientists or would-be scientists acquire learned similarities in their scientific inquiry remains far from satisfactory. In the rest of the discussion, I suggest that we need to pay much attention to the role of models in trying to solve the above-mentioned two problems, namely the problem of specialization and that of acquiring learned similarities in a more satisfactory manner, and argue for it.
How to be a Sibleyan Particularist: 
A Defense of Radical Aesthetic Particularism

CHOI, Kunhong
Seoul National University (Korea)

When it comes to aesthetics, the generalism-particularism debate primarily concerns whether we should accept the metaphysical claim that there are codifiable or law-like aesthetic principles. These principles are supposed to characterize how various properties of artworks contribute to overall evaluations of them. It is generally said that there are two different levels at which those principles operate. At a lower level, the principles are codified to determine how non-aesthetic, or ‘base’, properties of an artwork contribute to its aesthetic, or ‘middle-level’, properties. At a higher level, there are some criteria or canons that may be used to predict how the latter contribute to an overall evaluation of the work. Generalists accept the metaphysical claim, and thereby believe that aesthetic principles play a certain epistemic role in justifying aesthetic judgments and evaluations. So, they stand against particularism by saying that the particularists who deny the metaphysical claim cannot give any aesthetic justifications.

In this paper, I take a metaphysically radical position that there are no codifiable aesthetic principles whatsoever, and nonetheless argue that aesthetic justifications without principles can be given by way of an alternative epistemic route. First, I show that several generalist strategies cannot be successful, which have tried to accommodate the metaphysical claim in various degrees of its strength—according to which the principles are codified in the form of necessary and/or sufficient conditions, or tempered by ‘in isolation’ or ceteris paribus clauses, or even revised to a version of statistical principles. Second, I provide some positive arguments for my radical approach. These arguments involve (i) the argument from holism according to which aesthetic reasons are context-sensitive, (ii) the shapelessness thesis that claims that aesthetic concepts have an evaluative shape but are non-evaluatively shapeless, and (iii) a relativistic view about aesthetic sensibilities, which says that even among qualified critics their tastes may be irreconcilable. Finally, I suggest an alternative route, other than principles, that will make aesthetic justifications possible. Along this route, some of the purported ‘codifiable’ principles are to be understood as rules of thumb. Specifically, I have in mind two principles of Sibley’s, each of which states that aesthetic concepts are only negatively condition–governed, and that aesthetic properties inherently possess evaluative polarity, respectively. These alleged principles now turn out to be defeasible presumptions, which means that we come to have a negative presumption about the connection between the non-aesthetic and the aesthetic from the former principle and a positive presumption about the evaluative polarity of aesthetic properties and their contribution to overall aesthetic evaluation from the latter, and that we have them in a defeasible manner. The epistemic role in aesthetic justifications can thereby be assigned to them, for those aesthetic presumptions provide a kind of epistemic warrant for aesthetic judgments and evaluations. Denying the metaphysical claim, then, is not inconsistent with the possibility of aesthetic justifications. Therefore, there is room for us to become a Sibleyan particularist by replacing his principles with corresponding presumptions.
The Metaphysics of Superheroes

CHOI, Sungho
Kyung Hee University (Korea)

Many recently released Hollywood films feature superheroes like Superman, Ironman, Hulk, Optimus Prime, and so on who possess amazing superpowers and defeat supervillains with unassailable commitment to moral justice. Interestingly, different superheroes possess and exercise their superpowers in very different fashions. What is more, this aspect of their difference is intimately related to an issue that is lately in intense debate among metaphysicians of powers and dispositions, the issue of the possibility of intrinsic interferers with dispositions. This paper will argue that a strong case can be made against this possibility when we give due weight to the commonsensical understanding of superheroes and their superpowers. Whilst other arguments have been raised against the possibility of intrinsic interferers with dispositions in the latest literature, this will present further difficulties to those who accept it.
A Constructive Iterative Conception of Set

CHUNG, Inkyo
Korea University (Korea)

It has been widely held that some version of ‘the iterative conception of set’ provides a coherent notion of set which justifies, or is described by, the main axioms of classical set theory, especially Zermelo’s axioms. But the conception has not been fully clarified for the classical mathematician’s satisfaction. In particular, it has been suspicious that the iterative conception does not justify some important principles of classical set theory like the Replacement and Choice axioms. So, even from the classical realist point of view, it has been doubted whether a uniform coherent notion of set underlies all the principles of classical set theory.

From the intuitionist’s viewpoint, the classical iterative conception has some serious defects. For example, it is based on non-constructive platonistic notions of ‘all possible collections’ and ‘stages’. This is in contrast with the conception of set underlying the constructive set theory, CZF. CZF is an intuitionistic version of ZF formulated by Peter Aczel, following the lead of John Myhill. It is a foundational system of constructive mathematics in which Bishop-style constructive mathematics can be naturally developed. Aczel provided an interpretation of CZF in Martin-Löf’s type theory, and a uniform coherent notion of iterative set emerges from his interpretation. This notion, which may be called ‘the constructive iterative conception of set’, justifies all the axioms of CZF, which include intuitionistic predicative versions of ZFC axioms. In contrast to the quasi-constructive, but platonistic in reality, notion of classical iterative sets, this notion is based on a constructively acceptable iteration of the constructively acceptable operation ‘the collection of’. An alternative version of ZF based on intuitionistic logic is IZF as developed by Harvey Friedman and others. CZF differs from IZF in precluding impredicative principles, in particular, the power set axiom and full separation axiom scheme. These principles are illegitimate according to the constructive iterative conception of set. In this talk, I shall present an exposition of the constructive iterative conception of set, paying special attention to the reason why impredicative principles, the power set axiom and the full separation axioms in particular, are illegitimate.
The Origin, Nature and Role of Four Sprouts?
Present Questions and Past Answers

CHUNG, So-Yi
Sogang University (Korea)

This article attempts to describe the recent questions regarding origin, nature and the role of “moral emotions” and construct the respective answers by borrowing insights from traditional Joseon scholar’s perspectives on Mencius’ Four Sprouts, viz., the heart-mind of compassion, indignation, humility and approval/disapproval.

The first question to address here is what kind of emotion Four Sprouts are. Traditionally, the point of dispute over this question has been on their origins; that is, whether the moral emotions are qualitatively different from every day, value-neutral emotions such as Seven Feelings (pleasure, anger, sorrow, joy, love, hate/fear, desire). Some would argue that the moral emotions are different from their sources; they are the affective responses from the ‘higher self,’ or some special place within our heart called ‘principle’, while others are just physical reactions. Some rebuke that sorting out this special set of emotions has no objective criteria. Moral emotions are like any other emotions, but appropriate responses befitting circumstances, or conforming to social norms. Some further specify that Four Sprouts are distinguished in natural sense. The Four tend to connect the self to others and to place the self in a greater whole, while the Seven tend to separate the self from others and are more concerned in one’s physical desires and interests.

The second question is on the nature of Four Sprouts, especially on how much cognitive or affective they are. Some argue that they are not mere passions or visceral reactions, but perceptions of a value. The fact that we feel a certain moral emotion tells us some value of the situation at hand. Some argue that Four Sprouts spring forth intuitively and spontaneously, without interference of cognition or intention. Many still maintain that Four Sprouts fall somewhere in the middle – between automatic reflex and full-fledged perceptual judgment.

The last question asks what kind of role Four Sprouts play: Inquiry into the origin and nature of Four Sprouts would have no meaning if the Four bore no further consequences beyond themselves. In other words, they are moral in the sense that they are conducive to moral consciousness and behavior. Emotions are regarded as moral primarily because they tend to stimulate and generate other-regarding behavior. But are they? Traditional scholars were keen to find that the motivational force of Four Sprouts are rather limited. As a human, one cannot but be sympathetic toward a baby falling into a well; that does not mean, however, she will invariably jump into the well to save the baby. The role Four Sprouts play in our moral life is rather on controlling our other feelings, the ones that tend to separate the self from others and pursue the individual interest. In a passive sense, the Four may prevent our private desires from going into extremes and transgressing the boundaries; in an active sense, they may channel and guide every day emotions along the utilitarian ideal of into achieving a greater good.
How to Improve the Response to Situationism from Early Confucian Thought

CLEOFAS, Jacklyn A.
Ateneo de Manila University (Philippines)

The situationist challenge against virtue (Doris 2002, Harman 1999, Vranas 2005), which involves the belief that virtue is empirically under-supported, has prompted some philosophers to turn towards conceptions of virtue from early Confucian thought (Mower 2011, Slingerland 2011, Wong 2004). In this paper I argue that such a response would fare better if supplemented with procedural recommendations for acquiring and sustaining virtue that are derived not from classical texts alone but from current empirical work on Asian populations as well. While early Confucian texts are directly relevant for developing an account of virtue that avoids the situationist challenge, they are not sufficient for generating procedural recommendations that can be empirically tested and calibrated for contemporary needs. Because the procedural recommendations for the cultivation of virtue featured in ancient texts involve strategies that are designed for a different (bygone) context they are not relevant for contemporary use. I argue that the moral is not to abandon the response to situationism from Confucian thought but to recognize the difference between the conception of virtue featured in such an account and specific procedures for acquiring and sustaining such virtues. There are two distinct advantages that comes with recognizing such a distinction. First, it addresses the worry that the kind of virtue envisioned by early Confucians is necessarily associated with a nonliberal context in which it is acceptable for a ruler, who is also a nobleperson, to manage the situation of the masses as a kind of benevolent despot (Hutton 2006). Because the strategy for managing situations through a benevolent despot is associated with specific procedures for generating good behavior instead of the early Confucian conception of virtue itself, it’s possible to replace the strategy with something more fitting for contemporary democratic contexts in Asia without necessarily abandoning insights from Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi about virtue. Second, developing procedural recommendations that are especially suited for current contexts allows us to establish a connection between the early Confucian understanding of virtue and a large body of work in indigenous, social, and cross-cultural psychology from the relevant cultures. Psychologists working in Asian contexts have done work on subjects from the so-called Confucian heritage cultures (Ho 1976, 1995; Markus & Kitayama 1991; Yang 1993; Yang & Ho 1988). At the end of the paper I briefly touch on how these and other similar empirical research are more relevant for developing effective procedural recommendations for helping moral agents attain cross-situational consistency and evaluative integration which are compatible with the early Confucian understanding of virtue.
Does Time Seem to Pass?

DENG, Natalja
University of Cambridge (England)

This paper discusses some aspects of the relation between temporal experience and the A versus B debate. To begin with, I provide an overview of the A versus B debate and, following Baron et al. (2015), distinguish between two B-theoretic responses to the A-theoretic argument from experience, veridicalism and illusionism. I then argue for veridicalism over illusionism, by examining our (putative) experiences as of presentness and as of time (robustly) passing.

I begin with our experience of the present as special, and examine a recent suggestion by Uriah Kriegel to the effect that there is a felt temporal orientation to perception, in that we perceive things as present. I argue against this suggestion and show that even if there was a good case for this, veridicalists could help themselves to Kriegel’s own attitudinal view to accommodate felt temporal orientation. I then turn to the question of why we nevertheless tend to assign metaphysical privilege to the time we’re at and show that B-theorists can explain this satisfactorily.

Next, I broaden the enquiry to passage as a whole. Here, I argue that veridicalism gains some indirect support from a close inspection of representative illusionist proposals. In particular, the common appeal to illusory motion perception ends up undermining the illusionist project, by throwing doubt on its starting point. Here too, the question arises as to why we are nevertheless sometimes inclined to think of time in A-theoretic ways, i.e. to think of time as (robustly) passing. I show that there are good B-theoretic explanations of this way of thinking, and for the associated sense of passivity we have with respect to time. The key elements of the explanation are that we remember the past but not the future, that time unlike space is one-dimensional, and that causes typically precede their effects.

I close with some remarks on the relation between veridicalism and a deflationary view that identifies passage with (B-theoretic) succession. I suggest that the deflationary view can provide further support for veridicalism. The reason is that on the deflationary view in question, ‘robust’ passage can’t ultimately be made sense of. Since B-theoretic succession appears ‘non-robust’ (or ‘anemic’) only in contrast to ‘robust’ passage, this lends further support to the veridicalist claim that our temporal experience involves only B-theoretic content.

---

A Note on Delineationism

DIETZ, Richard
The University of Tokyo (Japan)

Degree theories of gradability (Cresswell 1976, Kennedy 2007) analyse gradable adjectives as relations between individuals and degrees. This may be considered mainstream in linguistics, but there is a noticeable community of discontents. Delineation theories of gradability (Lewis 1970, Klein 1980), which may be considered the most serious competitor to degree theories, analyse gradable adjectives as simple predicates of individuals. This talk concerns the following core thesis which is pivotal to all given delineation based approaches:

(Delineationism) The meaning of explicit comparatives (Aer) is a function of the meaning of the positive form of the embedded adjective (A).

Delineationism comes in two main varieties: those accounts that are formulated in terms of (a) set-theoretic inclusion for admissible valuations in a domain (Lewis 1970, Kamp 1975); and those that are formulated in terms of (b) structural constraints on local valuations, which refer to comparison classes (Klein 1980, van Benthem 1982, van Rooij 2011a, Burnett 2016). The limitations of (a)-type approaches have been already noted (van Rooij 2011b). My talk will highlight some rather problematic implications of (b)-type delineationism, which so far, have been ignored in the literature.

According to (b)-type delineationism, x is redder than y just in case x is red as compared with y. Prima facie, this reductionist claim may look unproblematic, but some authors have raised doubts about its validity (Kennedy 2007). If something like a masterargument for the said reductionism has been offered, it is to be found in the structural constraints on comparison class-relative valuations that are standardly invoked by delineationists. Crucially, these constraints imply the following principle:

(Inheritance) If an adjective non-trivially applies (i.e., if it draws distinctions) relative to a given comparison class, it does so too for any contraction/expansion of that comparison class.

I will raise several independent objections to this principle, and hence, also to the argument for (b)-type delineationism from Inheritance: (1) Looking at prima facie intuitions, including what philosophers have found intuitive (e.g., Manor 2006, Pagin 2015), Inheritance is clearly controvertible. (2) It is far from clear either that given empirical evidence on categorisation rules lends effective support to Inheritance. (3) The argument for Inheritance from bounded rationality is self-undermining insofar as the idea of bounded rationality on its own only supports weakenings of Inheritance that are too weak to motivate a (b)-type reductionist claim.

The gist of my talk is that the given arguments for delineationism lack force. If there is a positive case to be made, it should appeal to empirical data. But with view to the previous findings, it would be quite an overstatement to say that such data are readily available.
Yusuf Has Hacib’s Kutadgu Bilig and Plato’s Republic:  
A Tale of Two Political Approaches

DOGAN, Nejat  
Anadolu University (Turkey)

The paper compares and contrasts Yusuf Has Hacib’s Kutadgu Bilig with Plato’s Republic. More specifically, it addresses the question of whether there is an argument in Kutadgu Bilig similar to the Cave, Line, and Sun similes of Republic, and if there is, in what ways these works liken to, and differ from, each other. Toward that end, the paper touches on issues such as education, state-society relations, and characteristics of the ruler.

It is possible to discern an argument in Kutadgu Bilig that is similar to Republic’s Cave, Line, and Sun similes. The two works, however, substantially differ from each other in terms of their prescriptions on the role of the ruler (or the philosopher king), on how the individual can see the Sun, and on the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. As a result, Republic and Kutadgu Bilig preach a type of government diametrically opposed to each other. Whereas the government is somewhat oppressive in the former, it is democratic in the latter.

According to Plato, a philosopher king must rule the city. Such a king is the one who knows the form of the good, and this knowledge can only be achieved through a strict education system provided by the state. Moreover, the king must inform prisoners and pull them to upper world for the general benefit of the city. On the other hand, for Yusuf, those who have seen the Sun must not return to the cave, nor must they be forced to do so. Rather they must stay where they are and concern themselves with how best to serve the form of the good. The ruler must be both just and generous. Such a person must and can be educated, first, by his father, and be counseled, and be put on the right track if he wrongs, by his elders and the wise people in the community. The political system that Plato prescribes, then, likens to an oppressive regime, whether it be aristocracy or totalitarianism, while Yusuf prescribes a democratic state where the individual choice is respected, the state-society relations are ruled by just laws, and state and divine affairs are handled separately from each other.

The paper also calls for further research about the relationship between the characters of Kutadgu Bilig and of other theoretical/philosophical works and about what the teaching of Kutadgu Bilig may suggest for the rule of modern states, especially of the Central Asian Turkic states.
Epistemology in traditional Asian philosophy

DUH, bau-ruei
National Taiwan University (Taiwan)

Asian philosophy concerns about ideal human life building theory to rationalize their suggestions. Then, how could people accept their ideal as value? How is the follower really achieve his ideal goals? This is the main issue discussed here in the article. The author try to do this research through two approach. First is to concern the man who was connected with his theory. Because different character played in the same theory will have hold different attitude toward the truth of his theory. These characters include the creator, the researcher, or the believer and practitioner. A creator of a philosophical school experienced his knowledge and take it as the ultimate truth in the universe. The researcher study the theory happened to understand it then agree with it or opposite it. Or, beyond his ability to know it then propose any kind of meaningless opinions. The believer and at the same time as a practitioner without any real experience at first but has took the theory as true then starts his practice while meet with the judge of success or failure. Second is to concern the world view this theory is talking about, there include empirical world and those reach into the other world. Confucianism and Daoism are the theory attached with the empirical world while the Buddhism and the Daoist religion involved with the other world. While the theory in this world run for their idea completed in the society that means its event could be valued by any person with their daily experience. The theory contain the other world run for a better life after death or a supper ability beyond sensation then made it not easy to estimate and prove. The important thing that philosophy can do for it is to describe all the complexity involved here.
Computational Diagnostics and Scientific Modeling in an Exploratory Mode

FISHER, Grant
Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (Korea)

Much contemporary modeling in organic chemistry employs the use of digital computers to facilitate studies of transition structures and energies in organic reactions. It will be argued that this has resulted in a form of scientific exploration – diagnostics – in response to difficulties and controversies resulting from the use of plural methods and models to study reaction mechanisms. One sense of exploration relevant to chemistry is simply the use of models to explore the characteristics of the targets systems, which has been important to chemists with restricted experimental and theoretical access to the chemical structures present in the transition from reactants to products. However, much more distinctive of computational modeling in chemistry are the practices that have resulted from disagreements about the best quantitative approaches and models to study organic reactions. The construction of computational models has come to focus on the applicability of various quantitative methods to organic reactions and, simultaneously, the reliability of the models themselves given their extensive idealizations and the pragmatic constraints resulting from, for example, restrictions in computational speed and cost. It will be argued that a central characteristic of computational diagnostics is the diagnostic controllability of models: the ability of cognitive agents to identify and determine the effects of specific idealizations on results. Although this might sound relatively trivial, it is a considerable epistemic achievement to know how specific misrepresentations will impact on the accuracy of predictions and the veracity of explanations of target systems given that computational models are grey-boxes. This means cognitive agents must balance the advantages of computational models, such as their automated tractability, against their cognitive accessibility, which concerns the skills needed to unpack grey-boxed models to diagnose sources and the impacts of misrepresentation. Furthermore, diagnostics in chemistry includes the use of alternative models called composite models to explore the applicability of models and methods to organic reactions. It is hoped that this paper will thereby highlight not only the importance of model-based exploration in chemistry but also to emphasize how models themselves are the objects of exploration.
The Beginning of Spacetime and Vacuum

FUJITA, Sho
Osaka University (Japan)

There have been ongoing debates on the existence of spacetime for a long time. To a familiar question “In this world, What is space or time?”, many philosophers have answered on the basis of their own position called substantivalism or relationism. In modern philosophy of science, Structural realism was advocated (Worral 1989) and applied to spacetime. (Dorato 2000) I hold that this new structural spacetime realism (SSR) captures the nature of classical general relativity which corporates general covariance for all coordinate systems built on spacetime. In this structural perspective, gravitational fields bear relations (structure) among spacetime points and not manifold but metric refers to what spacetime actually is. That is to say, each spacetime point exists as a part of whole gravitational field influenced by matter and other physical fields.

I am willing to put a whole cosmological history of spacetime into focus, taking not only classical spacetime but also quantum one into consideration. Bigbang model (Garmow 1948) claims our universe has grown because space has been expanding as time has been passing. In order to tackle the origin of spacetime including quantum cosmology, I interpreted the expanding universe whose scale is big enough to be treated as classical general relativity from the point of view of SSR at the beginning. As a result, as long as one sustains SSR, space itself can’t expand unlike a balloon. But if space doesn’t have any substance-like property, what causes stars and galaxies far away? Is it energy having occurred along with the birth of universe? Is the phrase “space explodes” a just metaphor to explain a phenomenon that the distance between things existing in our universe becomes longer? SSR denies expanding space from a singularity in vacuum when this universe emerged at the beginning of cosmological time (t=0). If I continue to obey this philosophical position even when I consider the micro universe which is so small that we can’t ignore quantum effects, How should I understand the mechanism? What does SSR mean vacuum is?

In this paper, I am intended to develop SSR into micro universe and categorize a relationship of spacetime with universal beginning. Consulting lately representative quantum gravity to study micro space, I will examine whether some of these ideas are consistent with SSR. Of course now that quantum mechanics and classical general relativity are different in many aspects, SSR can’t always satisfy closely what quantum cosmology demands. For example, loop quantum gravity treats spacetime as distinctive entities rather than as a whole structure while string theory does it as a complete background. (Callender and Huggett 2001) I want to introduce a new substance-like spacetime different from SSR. Through this paper, I try to understand the birth of universe from SSR’s viewpoint or from the new philosophical one and to advocate answers for the nature of vacuum.
Much of the growing philosophical discussion about scientific models over the past twenty years or so has focused on theoretical models as intermediaries between theory and data, and on the various representational and explanatory uses to which such models are put. Tarja Knuuttila aptly characterizes this focus on the representational role of models in terms of its tendency to take ‘the model-target dyad as a basic unit of analysis concerning models and their epistemic values’ (2010: 142). Recently, there have been attempts to move beyond a narrow focus on the ‘model-target dyad’, by shifting attention away from models and the abstract relations they stand in, towards modeling as a theoretical – and indeed practical – activity. This paper develops a previously overlooked aspect of scientific models: their exploratory uses. The importance of exploratory modes of scientific inquiry has recently begun to receive attention from historians and philosophers of science, especially those who focus on scientific experimentation. Thus, it has been argued that ‘exploratory experimentation’ is a suitable strategy in situations where no well-formed theory or conceptual framework is available (or is regarded as reliable); in such a scenario, the elementary desire to obtain any sort of empirical regularity may prevail over more specific theoretical research questions. In my paper, I analyze and clarify the notion of exploration in scientific research in two ways: first, by distinguishing between a ‘convergent’ and a ‘divergent’ sense of ‘exploration’, and second, by applying the idea of exploration to the case of scientific modeling. The shift from experimentation to modeling necessitates a number of significant changes in emphasis: for one, several strategies that have been identified as typical of exploratory experimentation, such as the simultaneous variation of a large number of different parameters, do not readily generalize to exploratory modeling. For the experimenter who intervenes in nature and explores the dynamics of the target system through causal means, variation of experimental parameters requires skill and, when successful, constitutes a great achievement. For models, this need not be the case, since variation of parameters, for example in the case of mathematical models, may come too cheaply: curve-fitting would not, in either the convergent or the divergent sense, count as an interesting case of ‘exploration’. Instead, I shall identify four distinct functions that models serve in exploratory research: they may (1) function as a starting point for future inquiry, (2) feature in proof-of-principle demonstrations, (3) generate potential explanations of observed (types of) phenomena, and (4) may lead us to assessments of the suitability of the target. These functions are neither mutually exclusive, nor should they be seen as exhausting the exploratory potential of models. This results in a general framework for thinking about the exploratory uses of models which I will illustrate via examples of models from population biology, human geography, organic chemistry, and statistical physics.
The Augustinian Providence:
Structure and Roots of Saint Augustine’s Philosophy of History

GUIANG, Francisco Jayme Paolo A.
University of the Philippines Diliman (Philippines)

Saint Augustine of Hippo was one of the most influential Latin Doctors of the Early Middle Ages who contributed to the development of Christian dogma and philosophy starting with his seminal autobiographical exposition in the *Confessions* and his extensive work on Christendom’s viewpoint of human history in *The City of God*. It is interesting to look at how the Latin Doctor contributed to an explanation of human history in the context of the City of God as mankind’s utopian goal. The relationship of the concept of utopia and the role of human autonomy in Saint Augustine’s Providential Historiography are very interesting aspects to explore because it allows readers to have a profound understanding about humanity’s fate in history.

This paper will look at the essential components of Saint Augustine’s philosophy of history. An analysis of the Latin Doctor’s interpretation of history will be done by looking at the structure of Saint Augustine’s theoretical framework – its defining aspects such as divine providence, linearity, utopianism, and human agency. These components will be examined based on how each function to validate the framework of providence in human history. More so, this paper shall also attempt to look at scholarship pertaining to Saint Augustine’s biography. It is important to have a grasp on the conditions of the Latin Doctor’s life which may have influenced his philosophy and approach on history. By doing so, this study could elicit a better understanding on the Augustinian philosophy of Providential History. This study will only be limited to an analyses of two of Saint Augustine’s seminal works, the *Confessions* and *The City of God*. In addition, secondary sources concerning the Latin Doctor’s philosophy will also be consulted. Recent scholarship on Saint Augustine’s biography like *Augustine: A New Biography* by James J. O’Donnel will be cited to elaborate on some points that would be raised in this research.
The Identification of the Daeseung-saron-hyeonui-gi(大乘四論玄義記) as a Baekje text of course is significant already in as far as it gives us important clues on how 6th c. San-lun Buddhism was brought to the peninsula. The contents of the Daeseung-saron-hyeonui-gi should be studied more carefully, in particular the passages referring to Silla Buddhism. Some passages in Wonhyo’s Yeolban-jongyo(涅槃宗要) entail that Wonhyo was aware of the Daeseung saron hyeonui gi. These passages, which deal with different interpretations of the meaning of “Buddha-nature”, have obvious precedents both in the chapter “Bulseong-ui(佛性義)” in the Daeseung-saron-hyeonui-gi and a part of Chi-tsang’s Ta-sheng hsün lun(大乘玄論). The occurrence of the “six masters heretic views” in Hyegyun’s text very well might have been the inspiration for Wonhyo’s reduced list of six views.
Can Bennett-Style Nonreductive Physicalists Solve the Causal Exclusion Problem?

HA, Sangyong
Seoul National University (Korea)

Bennett has recently claimed that nonreductive physicalists armed with so called "compatibilism" can solve the causal exclusion problem. In her view, "intimately-related-but-distinct" mental causes and physical causes do not overdetermine their effects. The reason is that \((P & \neg M) \Box \rightarrow e\)---call it the physical independence condition or PIC---, one of the necessary conditions for the overdetermination of mental causation, is false. Keaton and Polger criticize Bennett's argument for the untenability of \((P & \neg M) \Box \rightarrow \neg e\), Bennett's official grounds to deny PIC. In my view, Keaton and Polger fail to refute \((P & \neg M) \Diamond \rightarrow \neg e)\) which is genuinely necessary (and sufficient) for Bennett to deny PIC. However, I argue that PIC is true on Lewis's semantics for counterfactual conditionals, considering some possible objections to my claim. If my argument is correct, it shows that Bennett-style nonreductive physicalists have not yet overcome the difficulty raised by the causal exclusion argument.
Since Saul Kripke proposed origin essentialism in *Naming and Necessity*, one prominent line of defending origin essentialism has been to complete a sketchy argument Kripke himself offered in a footnote by appealing to some or other principle. My aim in this paper is to show that this line of defense or the Kripkean defense has a fundamental limitation that puts origin essentialism into potential incoherence. Many philosophers think that the Kripkean defense is not successful (perhaps solely) for the reason that they find the additional principle problematic or no less contentious than origin essentialism. But the problem with the Kripkean defense is deeper than it has often been noted. In order for the Kripkean defense to succeed, in addition to the additional principle, it must also rely on the assumption that any disjoint hunks of matter can coexist. Behind the assumption is the Humean idea that for any disjoint objects, one’s matter is in its identity independent of, or “alienated” from, the other’s matter. I argue that, given the Humean idea, the Kripkean defense can vindicate an origin essentialist claim, according to which the original matter of an object (if any) is essential to it but it refutes another origin essentialist claim, according to which the biological precursor of an object (if any) is essential to it.
The Müller-Lyer Illusion and Nonconceptual Content

HAN, Woojin
Duksung Women’s University (Korea)

Since Gareth Evans suggested that our experiences have nonconceptual content before our conceptual activity comes into play, there have been debates between conceptualists and nonconceptualists over whether our experiences are all conceptual. Evans mentioned a fact about the Müller-Lyer (M-L) illusion for nonconceptual content. We know that two lines of the M-L figure, one with arrowheads inward and the other with arrowheads outward, have the identical length, but one still looks longer. This implies that knowledge or beliefs cannot penetrate perceptual experiences. The M-L illusion was a highlighted example between Jerry Fodor and Paul Churchland over penetrability in 1980s. Fodor contended that the fact noted by Evans is evidence for the impenetrability of sensory experiences. On the other hand, penetrability proponents argued that background knowledge affects the M-L illusion. The degree of the M-L effect is considered to be related to the penetration of our databases of previous experiences. The M-L illusion thus seems to show that nonconceptual content has a strong link to penetrability. But nonconceptualists have not paid serious attentions to the illusion.

I revisit Fodor vs. Churchland about the M-L illusion. I also examine cutting-edge psychological and neurological discussion of the M-L illusion about whether top-down or bottom-up processes are responsible. It appears that top-down influences support conceptualists, whereas bottom-up influences back up nonconceptualists. I argue although it is hard to deny top-down processes are operating in the M-L illusion, conceptual penetrability is not guaranteed. The M-L illusion teaches us that penetrability has two layers, conceptual and nonconceptual, and that perceptual experiences are penetrable only at the nonconceptual level. This distinction is applicable to notions, which imply conceptual activities, such as intentionality, inference, interpretation, judgment, or problem-solving. Conceptualists used these notions to explain that our experiences (e.g. the 3D interpretation of a 2D picture) are conceptually penetrable. But the conceptuallist notions have two layers, too.

I also argue that conceptualists face a dilemma. Lower animals including non-human primates, ring doves, and even flies experience the M-L illusion. Some of them are shown to have visual mechanisms similar to human primates. Conceptualists explain the M-L illusion in terms of conceptual capacity which comes from our rationality. If we attribute conceptual content to lower animals, then rationality becomes trivial. If not, then this seems unfair and chauvinistic. We had better attribute nonconceptual content to any creatures which entertain the M-L illusion (i.e. to both rational and pre-rational creatures) and attribute conceptual content only to rational ones.
Rethinking Ethical Foreign Policy in Global Politics: Urges, Dilemmas, and Prospects

HAQUE, Ehsanul
University of Dhaka (Bangladesh)

With the demise of the cold war, the global political landscape has undergone a cardinal change. The resultant world order offers an opportunity to rethink about the pursuit of idealistic principle in international relations and building of distinctive moral approach to foreign policy. It is in this context that this paper focuses on enduring academic debates and discourses on the urges for formulating foreign policy with ethical and moral dimensions. The study examines and explores perceptions and misperceptions of ethical questions, problems, and dilemmas arising from some of the most crucial aspects of contemporary global politics. Indeed, the classical understanding of international relations suggested that national interest, national security, and political realism ought to be the driving forces of foreign policies of states. However, the paper claims, the post-cold war world witnesses a growing surge in the academic literature on the notion of and need for ethical foreign policy. Currently, an open and robust debate revolves around to what degree states should focus on national interests and to what extent they should stress on their moral responsibilities for the protection and preservation of the interests of others in a complex and competitive world. Indeed, many voices are heard in support of reasonable practice of idealism in foreign policy as opposed to realism that underplays the role of ethics and morality in international relations. In particular, the paper reflects on the importance of moral conscience and humanitarian impulses in foreign policy decision making process. It suggests that in line with the dictates of international law great powers with their political, economic, and military resources should not only be concerned with the protection and advancement of their national interests but should also step up and shoulder the responsibility of exercising power with restraint and prudence, and demonstrate ethical/moral leadership. The assumptions and arguments advanced in the paper lead to the construction of a perspective that the preservation of international order and stability calls for a demonstration of responsible leadership with ethical obligations and prudential calculations. The paper concludes that although the proponents of realist theory tend to be skeptical about ethical considerations in foreign policy deliberations, a balanced blend of national interest and moral reasoning would bring better results in world affairs.
Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250 CE) was the purported founder of Madhyamaka, a prominent philosophical school of Indian Buddhism. For him, all things originate dependently, because their arising and perishing depend on various causes and conditions. They are devoid of any independent, unconditioned, and invariable nature or existence. Consequently, all things are said to be empty. Nāgārjuna criticized what he seemingly regarded as an exhaustive compendium of the possible ways of construing causation and concluded that things do not really arise. This appears to be tantamount to the Western causal eliminativist view that there are no causal relations or processes in the world.

Nāgārjuna’s fundamental conception of causality is that because all causal factors in a putative causal nexus are empty that they can interact with each other to generate the effect, which, being dependent and impermanent, cannot but be empty as well. However, it is difficult to uncover further positive implications of his critique of causality. As a source of aid in this regard, I will explore the views on the Indian Madhyamaka critique of causality of Jizang (549–623), the foremost exponent of Chinese Madhyamaka. Jizang’s philosophy of emptiness differs in some ways from Nāgārjuna's, so I am not here concerned with the faithfulness to Indian Madhyamaka of his views. Rather, my aim is to offer a rational reconstruction of Jizang’s thought on causation, thereby making it accessible and relevant to contemporary readers in different philosophical traditions.

For Jizang, the myriad things as we experience them are interdependent, ever-changing, empty, and ultimately illusory. Significantly, things are empty mainly because they are devoid of any determinate form or nature. This means that a thing cannot ultimately be determined as such and such: any determination we may impose on it is never to the exclusion of other determinations and no determination is definitive. For him, I believe, the Madhyamaka critique of causality follows from a recognition of the ontic indeterminacy of things.

This paper begins with an introduction as section I. Section II elucidates Nāgārjuna’s critique of causality. Section III discusses a prominent contemporary interpretation of the critique. Section IV explicates the rationale that Jizang provides for the alleged Madhyamaka denial of causality. Section V attends to Jizang’s philosophy of ontic indeterminacy to further reconstruct his thought on causation. Section VI concludes.
Measures and Countermeasures:
How to Evaluate Attempts to Address Funding Bias

HOLMAN, Bennett
Yonsei University Underwood International College (Korea)

I argue that industry-funded areas of science are best conceived of as an "asymmetric arms race." Such a dynamic is typified by a series of moves and countermoves between competing parties who are adjusting to one another's behavior. In the case of regulation (government or private) of industry-funded science, this dynamic occurs between those who seek to make practice more responsive to good evidence and those whose primary motivations are instead commercial in character. Given this adversarial dynamic, any regulatory measure that results in curtailing profits evokes a response from industry to seek countermeasures. Accordingly, policies, even ones that demonstrate initial success, must be monitored to ensure they have not been corrupted. I explore the FDA's Patient-Focused Drug Program as an example of a policy that has been recently corrupted.

Though Flibanserin had twice been rejected by the FDA, the drug was approved on its third attempt in August, 2015. Scrutiny of the case shows that FDA approval was gained, not because of new data (there was virtually none), but rather because of a sophisticated public relations campaign and the manipulation of public discourse. In particular, I will focus on the “patient focused drug development meetings” convened by the FDA in October 2014. These meetings were designed by the FDA to make sure approval requirements did not grow detached from patient needs. During such meetings representatives from pharmaceutical companies are asked “to remain silent.” However, by providing travel stipends to patients that would voice Sprout Pharmaceuticals’ narrative, the manufacturer successfully co-opted the development meetings.

By analyzing the proceeding transcripts and comparing participants brought to the meeting by industry to those without such sponsorship, I show that industry-funded participants presented a unified message that was almost completely distinct (and often in direct opposition to) participants without conflicts of interests. Moreover because industry-funded participants seized two-thirds of the speaking occasions, the official FDA report from the meeting, while noting some variation, represented the manufacturers view as the dominant experience and concern of patients. This meeting in turn informed the evaluations of the FDA during the third approval attempt.

While corruption of this particular process is important to note, there are more general morals for epistemology. I use this example to elaborate the arms race framework and draw out three central morals for science policy. First, the search for the perfect incorruptible method is a fool’s errand. Arms races are necessarily dynamic and changing. Policy solutions should always incorporate the assumption that the proposal will need to be abandoned or changed at some point in the future and incorporate ongoing assessments of the reliability. Second, we typically search for policies that will address our current problems; however, rather than mere reliability, policies must also be evaluated on their robustness to manipulation. Finally, the best solutions are not policies that “undo” an opponent’s measure, but rather general solutions that identify and exploit inherent weaknesses of a general range of otherwise corrupting forces.
The Problem of Auto-Reference in Epistemology:  
A Critical Thinking by Foucault

HONG, Jing-Li  
Chang Jung Christian University (Taiwan)

How do we consider the existence of author? The reality of his existence depends on his works or on the man who writes? Does his existence empower the words of his works or, on the other hand, his words empower the existence of author? Could the author of the self-portrait empower his work to produce?

A book for Foucault has its value as an experience. Through a book, the author and his reader are transformed. As regards Foucault, each of his works would cause a typical transformation: we can observe these phenomena of transformation in his three works: the History of madness, Surveillance and punish, the History of sexuality. Nevertheless, the work of The order of things is not an experience as that of madness, prison or sex. It is rather about an exercise than an experience. Hence, the movement of thinking appears. We want to point out here in The order of things where a paradox exists. This paradox is about the existence of Foucault’s thinking. In this work, Foucault’s thinking appears in the juxtaposition between the picture and the archeology of human science. However, out of this book and its disposition, where can we recognize Foucault’s thinking?

This difficulty brings us towards the "Introduction" of the History of sexuality II. The "modification" in "Introduction" is implicitly ambiguous. Firstly, if this modification marks precisely the character of Foucault’s thinking, it is like a foreseeable point in the sequence of his thinking, this modification couldn’t consequently be a real modification. Secondly, if this modification points out a break in his thinking, it is undoubtedly a typical modification of Foucault, but it would not be a true break. In other words, if I state that I am no more myself, how do we understand this subject who is speaking. Here, it is similar to the paradox in the sentence « I lie ». It is the same way what we can acknowledge in Velázquez’s picture where the painter stands. The difficulty of auto-reference drives us to question our philosopher. This is an existentialist question (both epistemological and aesthetic) Foucault, as a philosopher, poses to his reader, much in the same manner of the painter in the painting The Maids of Honour (French: Les Ménines, Spanish: Las Meninas), who stands half-hidden behind his canvas either gazing at the viewer (the perceiver) or at emptiness. Such a paradox might reveal another unspoken lacuna or the beginning of another fiction. Using this method, Foucault succeeded in concealing himself out of his own thought: behind that which is concealed is the attitude toward philosophy that the philosopher seeks to portray. Rather than pursuing the course of a philosopher substantiating his thought, Foucault instead is more concerned with “thought” itself: What is thought? How do we practice methods of thought outside of transcendence (transcendance)? Using his own thought as a model, the philosopher renewed the category of experience (la catégorie d’expérience) in epistemology.

In this paper, we will compare two subjects in Velázquez’s painting: one is the subject of the image in the mirror and the other is the subject in front of his work. According to Foucault’s analysis, we will point out how the juxtaposition of these two subjects makes an illusion as a panoramic view.
Causation and Dependence in Hume's Account of Property

ISE, Toshihiko
Ritsumeikan University (Japan)

In our daily life, our behavior depends on vague assumptions about how other people act towards us. We depend on others for the achievement of various goals, and thus are vulnerable. I aim at highlighting this fact through examining David Hume’s account of property. To this purpose, I will compare the kinds of causation Hume finds in the relationships between persons and objects in society with the causal chains that connect our acts of designation to the things designated, as pointed out by some contemporary philosophers of language, notably Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam.

As Putnam has shown, our success in using terms that denote things like elms and beeches depends on the “linguistic labor” of other language users. Consequently, the success of language use is not guaranteed by what is “in the head” of the utterer. Similarly, the power a person has over objects in his possession depends on the behavior of other members of society. I presume that the problem Hume finds with the idea of property is related to the insufficiency of what is present in one’s mind for making sure that there are proper kinds of causal connections between him or her and the objects he or she tries to control.

In a sense, it is true but trivial that we cannot have power over things simply by having something in mind. The point I would like to make about property is that we do not know what we have to have in mind in order to have the idea of property. According to Hume, “[the] property of an object, when taken for something real, without any reference to morality, or the sentiments of the mind, is a quality perfectly insensible, and even inconceivable.” (Treatise, III, ii, 4, para. 2) The point Hume is making here is that property depends on human artifice, but the difficulty does not end there. Since according to Hume “[possession] […] is a species of cause and effect; and as property is nothing but a stable possession, deriv’d from the rules of justice, or the conventions of men,” (op. cit., III, ii, 3, para. 7) it seems that where there is property, there must be a relation of possession, understandable independently of conventions. Here is how Hume describes the problem with the idea of possession. “[As] the power of using any object becomes more or less certain, according as the interruptions we may meet with are more or less probable; and as this probability may increase by insensible degrees; ’tis in many cases impossible to determine when possession begins or ends.” (Ibid.) An important feature of this description is that possession is characterized as the absence of interruption, rather than something positive and sensible. Our relationships to things we suppose we have a right to depend on the absence of abnormalities of which we have no definite idea, just as meaning what we intend to mean depends on what is not in our heads.
Minimal Predicativism

IZUMI, Yu
Kyoto University (Japan)

According to “Predicativism” about proper names, names are predicates that are semantically on a par with common nouns, but they form singular expressions together with an overt or covert determiner in an argument position of a sentence (Burge 1973; Elbourn 2005; Fara 2015). A Predicativist analysis of names adequately explains many important characteristics of names (e.g. rigidity).

Predicativism has a serious challenge that has not been addressed in previous research. García-Ramírez and Shatz (2011) argue that, from the vantage point of developmental psychology, any forms of Descriptivism about proper names as well as Predicativism fail to account for some of the well-documented facts about the early development of child language and cognition. First, there is evidence that infants show comprehension of proper names at 6 months of age, earlier than they start learning common nouns. Second, infants at the early stage of development do not show an understanding of property concepts; for example, 12-month-olds are unable to distinguish two objects differing in color, shape, etc.

Since the Predicativist theorist typically treats proper and common nouns on a par and analyzes a name as signifying a metalinguistic property (e.g. “being called ‘Mary’”), Predicativism seems incompatible with these developmental facts that indicate there is a fundamental distinction between proper and common nouns. The goal of this paper is to formulate and defend a simpler version of Predicativism, “Minimal Predicativism,” that can accommodate these facts about child development.

Within the framework of generative linguistics, each common noun as an item in the lexicon can be understood as a pair of semantic and phonetic features. For example, the noun *tree* can be described as <ˈtrē, T(x)>, where ˈtrē stands for its phonological characteristics and T(x) its semantic characteristics. T(x) is a conceptually rich monadic predicate that appropriately applies only to trees. Minimal Predicativism states that the semantic feature of a proper name lacks a conceptually rich content: it merely expresses the bare minimum structural information of a monadic predicate. For example, *Mary* is analyzed as <ˈmer-ē, F(x)>, where F(x) appropriately applies to every object in the domain. Since the presence of the form F(x) is a prerequisite for the acquisition of any conceptually rich predicate, such as T(x), the acquisition of proper names is expected to precede that of common nouns. Furthermore, the presence of F(x) does not require a grasp of a conceptual property. For these reasons, Minimal Predicativism answers the objection raised by García-Ramírez and Shatz.

According to this proposal, the semantic content of each proper name is the same as the rest. The differing phonetic features of names, however, explain why names can be used differently to refer to different individuals. When a proper name is used within an utterance, the fact that a name with a particular sound was used can be included in the common ground of a conversation (Stalnaker 2014), and the individual uniquely associated with that sound can be contextually determined. Thus, Minimal Predicativism is as descriptively adequate as the extant Predicativist analyses of names.
Northern Song Confucian thinkers like Zhou Dunyi 周敦颐, Shao Yong 邵雍, Zhang Zai 张载, and the Cheng brothers(Cheng Hao 程顥 and Cheng Yi 程頤) have laid the foundations for Song and Ming Neo-Confucianism. Zhu Xi(朱熹, 1130_1200) of Southern Song compiled their philosophical thoughts. Especially he has synthesized their metaphysics in his theory of the principle li 理 and material force qi 氣. Tai-ji is the most important concept in his metaphysics. And it gives the theoretical basement to his ethics.

In this paper I will show that tai-ji has several metaphysical meanings. First, tai-ji is the origin of the myriad things in the cosmological sense. Its dong jing 動靜 is not the mechanical movement and quiescence at the empirical level but the cosmological self- unfolding of tai-ji. This is one of metaphysical activities of tai-ji. Second, tai-ji is the universal principle of the myriad things in the world. All the things in the world have the same principle in themselves. It is similar to the one moon becoming the ten thousand moons when reflected in the ten thousand rivers. Finally, human innate nature (ren 仁・yi 義・li 礼・zhi 智) is the manifestation of tai-ji. This constitutes human mind and heart, and thus we can also find a moral dimension in tai-ji.
A Review of Yin Hai-guang’s Philosophical Works

JIN, Yuqiong
Kyung Hee University (Korea)

This paper presents an expatiation of Yin-Haiguang’s works, and makes a review of his viewpoint, which is still an issue of concern, (a) The reasonable(logical) words are not equal to the acceptable words.

Yin-Haiguang is a scholar of analytic philosophy in Taiwan, who tries to clarify the semantics of Chinese language. He makes a critic's explanation of the problems that many people who use Chinese language as their native do not realize it is ambiguous when we use mandarin. That is, for instance, the opposition of the sentence ‘something is logical’, is not the sentence ‘something is illogical’, but also can be said as ‘something is non-logical’.

Among his many masterpieces, I would selectively focus on his『邏輯新引』 and『學術與思想（上、中、下）』, by which he tried to introduce analytic philosophy to the people using Chinese language. In those works, he provided a systematic analysis of Chinese language, and interpreted classical formal logic in a way that make sense to Chinese native speakers.

In An Introduction to Logical Empiricism and the Linguistic World, and the Empiric World, he firstly argues that because Chinese language could hardly express the abstract concepts, many Chinese native speakers could not distinguish ‘sense’ from the ‘denotation’, and ‘use’ from ‘mention’ of a name.

Yin also disputed the common belief that a sentence is acceptable, if and only if the sentence is logical.

There are mainly three reasons Yin has presented for his proposition.

i. To say something is logical is to say any of arguments conforming the deduction rules.

ii. The oppositions of ‘logical’ should not only be ‘illogical’, but also be ‘non-logical’, and they have no relationships with the truth values of a sentence. That is to say, one should not take a sentence is illogical or logical just because the sentence false or truth, and vice versa.

iii. Many people use mandarin as their native believe that something logical is equal to something acceptable, so when they feel something unacceptable, they are likely to say, ‘what you have said is illogical.’

However, I think, after scrutinizing his works, although Yin rightly presents the proposition, to argue(a), his reasons for the proposition is insufficient, and the reasons above will make his entire theory inconsistent.

In presenting the interpretations of Yin’s philosophical works, the paper gives an account of efforts for the semantics of Chinese language, and discusses the inconsistences when Yin made his argument for his proposition. Hence, I would indicate the difficulties in his argument, and try to provide a revision in this paper.
Cognitive Decision Theory and Permissive Rationality

JUNG, Jaemin
Arizona State University (USA)

Standard decision theory says that a rational action to perform is one with the greatest expected practical value. Recently, many philosophers have deployed a decision theoretic approach to justify various epistemic norms. A family of such accounts has recently been called Cognitive Decision Theory. A rational belief, according to Cognitive Decision Theory, is one with maximum expected epistemic value.

One of the central issues in epistemology is whether epistemic rationality is permissive or not: Some claim that (Uniqueness) for any total evidence, there is a unique doxastic state that any agent with that total evidence should take; others claim that (Permissivism) for some total evidence, there are multiple doxastic states that an agent with that total evidence can take.

How does Cognitive Decision Theory relate to the debate over permissive rationality? As one way of addressing this question, I present and assess an argument against Cognitive Decision Theory: On the assumption of Epistemic Conservatism, the correct theory of epistemic rationality will not endorse non-conservative doxastic state shifts from one degree of belief function to another, in the absence of new evidence. There are general norms that dictate how epistemic utilities constrain the set of rational doxastic states, one of which is Epistemic Immodesty: A doxastic state should rank itself at least as highly as it ranks any other possible doxastic state. We can distinguish strict immodesty from non-strict immodesty in the following way:

**Strict Immodesty:** If a rational agent’s current credence function is \( c \), then the agent should take her own degree of belief function \( c \) to uniquely maximize expected epistemic utility from the perspective of her doxastic state \( c \).

**Non-Strict Immodesty:** If a rational agent’s current credence function is \( c \), then the agent should take her own degree of belief function \( c \) to be one of the possible degree of belief functions that maximize expected epistemic utility from the perspective of her doxastic state \( c \).

In some cases in which Non-Strict Immodesty holds, Cognitive Decision Theory endorses non-conservative doxastic state shifts, in the absence of new evidence. This seems to be an unfortunate consequence. However, I will further show that when we clearly distinguish among several versions of Permissivism/Uniqueness, the argument is not a real threat to any cognitive decision theorist. Depending on which version of Permissivism/Uniqueness a cognitive decision theorist endorses, they may avoid the argument in one of two general ways. One response appeals to the stability of beliefs over time, while the other allows that the instability of beliefs over time fits naturally with epistemic rationality.
Happiness and Dignity

KANG, Cheul
Yonsei University (Korea)

Is my death the end of my happiness? The answer to this question seems too obvious. Suppose, first, according to the annihilation of death, I no longer exist after my death. Second, according to the absolute inevitability of death, I cannot avoid my death. Third, according to the fundamental dependence of happiness on experience, happiness is the thing I can only experience as long as I live. Therefore, my death makes me lose absolutely and necessarily the entire opportunities to be happy. But I maintain that the limit of my happiness and unhappiness does not coincide with the limit of my experience while I live. In addition, I distinguish the two kinds of approach concerning the human death and happiness, one is the biology-centered and the other is the person-centered. I present the concept of ‘life as a trilogy’ and articulate my version of extended-narrative identity. Furthermore, I discuss the concept of posthumous harm in order to illuminate whether I could be happy or unhappy after my death. In conclusion, I suggest the concept of ‘the happiness as dignity’ that has not been discussed in almost all the theories about happiness.
Propositions as Complex Acts and the Content-Force Distinction

KANG, Jinho
Seoul National University (Korea)

In recent years Scott Soames and Peter Hanks have developed and defended a new account of propositions, according to which a proposition is a complex act that consists of the sub-acts such as cognizing objects, cognizing a property, and predicating the property of the objects. Both Soames and Hanks argue that this account is superior in a number of respects to the leading traditional accounts of propositions as structured entities or as sets of possible worlds. In particular, they argue that their account successfully explains how propositions can be inherently representational and how two propositions can be different from each other even though they are concerning exactly same objects and properties. But Soames and Hanks have opposing views about the implication of their account for the widely accepted distinction between content and force. While Soames retains the content-force distinction with the supposition that the sub-act of predicating a property of objects is a noncommittal act, Hanks argues that we should give up the content-force distinction because the act of predicating must be assertive (in a normal context) and, accordingly, committal.

In this paper, I attempt to reconcile the debate between Soames and Hanks while developing a different version of the account of propositions as complex acts. I propose that a proposition is an act of understanding a certain propositional sign, which must be a complex expression, in such a way that an agent who performs this act knows both that the propositional sign is true if the state of affairs it represents exists and that it is false if not. This act of understanding a propositional sign is assertive and committal in the sense that the agent who performs it must commit herself to only one of the two possible ways of understanding the sign, that is, to such a way that the propositional sign asserts rather than denies the existence of the state affairs it represents. But the assertive nature of propositions in this sense does not imply that one asserts a proposition when one understands a relevant propositional sign, for one need not hold the propositional sign to be true in order to understand it. Accordingly, we can accept the inherently assertive nature of propositions without giving up the content-force distinction.
Is Metaphor Machine Possible?

KANG, Sun Ah
Seoul National University (Korea)

Making a machine that could produce creative results would be one of the most difficult projects which intend to implement human intelligence in a mechanical way. Boden claims that the question whether computer could be creative is not a scientific question but a philosophical one. For the concept of creativity is closely connected with the nature of meaning, intentionality, and the question of the possibility of scientific theory on consciousness and psychology. Creativity is a capacity in which various aspects of human mind work together. Metaphor has been considered to be intrinsically related with creativity. Then is it somewhat easier to make a metaphor creating machine instead of full-blown creative machine?

Interests on implementing metaphor machine continues from the early days of AI development. Lawrence F. Young introduced an incipient idea for metaphor machine based on database in 1987. Boden introduces some computer programs such as Copycat which are designed to generate the fourth term, given the other three, of a proportional analogy. Analogy itself is not a metaphor but is closely related with metaphor. However these existing approaches to metaphor machine is based on a superficial concept of metaphor which does not reflect recent influential researches on metaphor. If metaphor machine could ever be possible, its mechanism should be based on persuasive metaphor theory. Existing metaphor program is based on the Comparison Theory of metaphor which is rarely accepted among influential metaphor researchers nowadays. Comparison Theory of metaphor is almost obsolete. Metaphor theory should be able to explain the mechanism of genuine creative metaphor as well as conventional metaphor.

Black claimed that metaphor really create similarity between tenor and vehicle (two terms of metaphor), but his explanations of creativity of metaphor largely rely on figurative examples and are lack of consistency. Most of all, his theory is circumscribed by the very concept of ‘the associated commonplaces’ which is a kind of conceptual network. Creative metaphor requires representation systems which could contain much richer information than conceptual network. In order to overcome the limitations of conceptual network, it is promising to introduce interaction between iconic representation system and conceptual representation system. In this framework, creative metaphor could be understood as new concepts which are formed through interaction between two different forms of representation. I argue that this is the best explanatory model for creativity of metaphor.

Three conditions should be satisfied in order to mechanize the model of creative metaphor. First, metaphor machine should be able to get information from the external world. Creativity could be understood as revealing hidden aspects of reality which existing conceptual systems fail to capture, so the capacity to hold abundant information from reality that could be the base for creativity. Second, metaphor machine should be able to form an iconic representation from sensory information. Third, it should be possible for iconic representation and conceptual representation to interact with each other and produce conceptual representational form as a result which you can understand.

I think it is possible to make a machine that produce creative metaphor based on creative procedure. However creativity is an essentially evaluative concept. The metaphor machine would never be able to understand and evaluate its product. In that respect, genuine creativity would never be implemented in a mechanical way.
Parmenides and Categorical Being

KANG, Sung-Hoon
Seoul National University (Korea)

It is often said that Parmenides was the father of ontology. Etymologically, “ontology” means a discussion about to on (that which is), and Parmenides was the first who had a thematic discussion about to on. The most important claim he made about to on is that it is one and ungenerated. It is uncontroversial that this claim was widely and immensely influential. But what this claim amounts to and what exactly Parmenides meant by to on has been much debated in modern scholarship. Accordingly, the nature of its influence is debated as well.

The traditional story was that the Eleatics were the ones who inherited Parmenides’ doctrine of numerical monism, and the so-called pluralists tried to save the phenomena against Parmenides’ challenge. In recent decades, however, it has been argued that Parmenides was not a numerical monist, and the pluralists actually took over Parmenides’ predicational monism (Curd) or generous monism (Palmer). And if this new story is right, the Eleatics rather misunderstood or misrepresented Parmenides’ ideas.

I am not going to enter into this debate. What we can safely say seems to be that Parmenides’ immediate successors who accepted his claim about to on (with or without misunderstanding) developed quite different philosophical systems from each other. This strongly suggests that Parmenides’ to on was ambiguous enough at the time to allow differing interpretations; in that case, even if some of his successors misunderstood him, such a misunderstanding would be understandable. And this gives us a new perspective to appreciate the philosophical significance of what Parmenides did.

The Greek verb “einai” (be) was used in various senses relative to contexts. I suggest that what Parmenides did was to “categoricalize” einai; the verb was used at the time only context-dependently and did not have any context-free use, and Parmenides was the first to recognize the need for it to have a constant meaning that transcends any contexts; otherwise, we cannot have any philosophically significant inquiry into, and understanding of, truth that goes beyond particular contexts. Parmenides may have not realized that there can be more than one such categorical meaning for einai, but only claimed that the object of genuine knowledge and true understanding must be something that categorically is. Each of his successors followed his footsteps in one way or another, I suggest, by giving flesh to the indeterminate to on (Melissus’ the One, Empedocles’ “roots”, Anaxagoras’ “things (khrêmata)”, or Democritus’ atoms).

The two ways in Parmenides’ Fr. 2 are generally referred to as the way of Being and the way of Non-Being. This practice neglects the fact that the first way is not “the way that it is” but “the way that it is and that it cannot not to be”, and the second way is not “the way that it is not” but “the way that it is not and that it is necessary not to be.” If I am right, the first way is the way of Categorical Being and the second way is the way of Categorical Non-Being.”
Philosophical Issues in Risk Analysis:
Evaluating Definition of Risk and Its Implication for Decision-Making

KANO, Hiroyuki
Osaka University (Japan)

The purpose of this presentation is examining the issues in the nature of risk: how they should be characterized and reflected in decision-making. As it is well known, distinction between risk and uncertainty has been occupying a prominent position in decision theory. At a first glance, this seems to be fairly straightforward. When decision makers have quantitative information that enables them to assign probabilities to the outcomes associated with their actions, decisions under risk occur. In contrast, decisions under uncertainty occur when they don’t have sufficient information to assign numerical probabilities, but only estimates. Despite the significance of this distinction for decision theory, clear-cut cases of decision-making are unusual in risk analysis, especially in cases of emerging technologies where there is limited information available.

Furthermore, how risk defined itself is more complex than it appears on the surface because “probability” can be interpreted in various ways. These interpretations, as emphasized by many authors, can be divided into two categories: those that stem from variability in known or observable populations and, therefore, represent randomness in samples (aleatory uncertainty), and those that come from basic lack of knowledge about fundamental phenomena (epistemic uncertainty). How to understand probability would certainly have major implications for the distinction between risk and uncertainty. As Daniel Steel (2014) points out, on the one hand, if probabilities are interpreted as strictly as objective chances, it is doubtful whether any genuine cases of risk exist outside of casinos. On the other hand, if interpreted as personal probabilities, almost any example in which possible outcomes are known can be treated as a case of risk. All of this leaves a proper understanding of risk.

The central argument of this presentation is that, while the distinction between risk and uncertainty is widely cited, it does not correspond to the practice of risk analysis. Philosophy of probability has traditionally focused on questioning how the idea of probability ought to be interpreted. Interestingly, it looks like this question cannot be answered independently of the context in which the question arises. This means that how scientific uncertainty understood concerns not only the question of whether we are dealing with philosophical issues, but also the specific scientific domain. Needless to say, it is also important to recognize that some forms of risk cannot be reduced to the real scientific practice nor to the state of the world. Based on these matters, I attempt to enumerate different types of risk.

This presentation is structured as follows. First, I briefly discuss the various characterizations of risk and uncertainty and adducing some good reasons for not adopting the distinction between risk and uncertainty as a basis for the interpreting risk analysis. Second, I provide taxonomy of risk that allows us to classify the various types of risk faced by decision-makers. Finally, I conclude by providing two compatible suggestions: (1) treating decisions as a combination of scientific practices and policy choices; and (2) proposing a method of validation in counterfactual contexts.
How Many Cartesian Skepticisms?

KASAKI, Masashi
Kyoto University (Japan)

Cartesian skepticism appeals to a skeptical hypothesis and makes a case for the claim that S does not know that the skeptical hypothesis is false. The claim, then, constitutes an important premise of the argument for the skeptical conclusion that S does not know most, if not all, of ordinary empirical propositions. Some argues that there are two radically different versions of Cartesian skepticism, depending on what skeptical hypothesis is at stake. One version of Cartesian skepticism invokes the brain in a vat hypothesis or the evil genius hypothesis, and the other version thereof does the dreaming hypothesis. There are several ways of demarcating these two kinds of skeptical hypotheses. First, unlike the brain in a vat hypothesis and the evil genius hypothesis, the dreaming hypothesis is compatible with the truth of ordinary empirical propositions. Second, while the possibilities envisioned in the brain in a vat hypothesis and the evil genius hypothesis are esoteric and far-fetched, those in the dreaming hypothesis are not. Third, it is even easier to establish as a genuine metaphysical possibility the dreaming hypothesis than the brain in a vat hypothesis or the evil genius hypothesis.

Each of the three ways of demarcating the two kinds of skeptical hypotheses entails that certain solutions to the skepticism with the brain in a vat hypothesis or the evil genius hypothesis won’t work for the skepticism with the dreaming hypothesis. If the first way is correct, the denial of closure cannot be marshalled against the skepticism with the dreaming hypothesis. If the second way is correct, the safety-based response to the skepticism with the brain in a vat hypothesis or the evil genius hypothesis does not fare well with the skepticism with the dreaming hypothesis. And yet, if the third way is correct, it is difficult to dispel the dreaming hypothesis as metaphysically impossible.

In this paper, I will argue that the three ways of differentiating between the two kinds of skeptical hypotheses are not well-grounded. Notice that even the brain in a vat hypothesis is compatible with, or even strongly, cannot contradict certain ordinary empirical propositions, such as there are computers, there are scientists, there are brains, and so on. On the other hand, the dreaming hypothesis includes some true ordinary empirical propositions. Once the brain in a vat hypothesis is set up so as to include little true ordinary propositions, there is no reason to differentiate between the brain in a vat hypothesis and the dreaming hypothesis, and hence the first way fails. The same can be said of the relationship between the evil genius hypothesis and the dreaming hypothesis. Indeed, if the dreaming hypothesis includes less true ordinary propositions, then the possible worlds in which it is true are more distant from the actual world. Thus, the second way also fails. The same consideration is advanced against the third way. If my arguments are correct, one needs no distinct response to the skepticism with the dreaming hypothesis. Good news!
Barad’s Agential Realism and Bohr’s Complementarity

KATSUMORI, Makoto
Akita University (Japan)

In *Meeting the Universe Halfway* (2007), Karen Barad explores the implications of physicist Niels Bohr’s thought in critical dialogue with current science studies and various interdisciplinary approaches. Starting from Bohr’s view of the inseparability of the object and the agency of observation in quantum theory, she develops her own philosophical framework called “agential realism,” which seeks to undo the material/discursive, natural/cultural, and human/nonhuman dichotomies, and reconceive them in terms of “agential intra-actions.” Further, in her more recent texts, Barad attempts to connect this viewpoint of agential realism with themes of Derridean deconstruction such as iterability, hauntology, or justice-to-come.

Barad’s work has greatly contributed to current discussions on science, nature, materiality, and related topics by extending Bohr’s ideas in conjunction with a wide range of contemporary scholarly themes. Her effort to link her project to Derridean deconstruction, however, seems to involve no small difficulty – a difficulty that derives in part from the basic conceptual frame of agential realism. While her criticism of the human/nonhuman and other related dichotomies runs more or less parallel to the deconstruction of metaphysical binaries, some of her key ideas and arguments are hardly in accord with the Derridean line of thought, specifically with the thematic of the wholly other or radical alterity. Even as she speaks of the other, the otherness of the other is restricted within the “intra-activity of the world,” so that agential realism largely appears to operate under the dominance of ‘intra’ or ‘within’ rather than what would exceed its limits.

In my view, however, Bohr’s philosophical thought revolving around the concept of complementarity may be interpreted in a way that comes closer to the Derridean thematic of alterity. His idea of complementarity, with an emphasis on the uncontrollable object-agency interaction, can be shown to imply a notion of radical alterity that evades and exceeds our conceptual and technical control of natural processes. From this point of view, Barad’s agential realism may perhaps be reconceived and reformulated with a focus on the notion of radical alterity as an irreducible moment of material-discursive processes.
Two interpretation of Three Virtues in Zhongyong: in the Case of Zhuxi and Dai Zhen

KIM, Hanna
Seoul National University (Korea)

In both Western and Eastern philosophy, virtue (Latin: virtus, Ancient Greek: arete, Ancient Chinese: 德) has been regarded as something excellent. A great number of philosophers have pondered about virtue such as “what is virtue”, “which is the greatest virtue”, and “how to be virtuous”. Specifically, the teachability of virtue was often brought out since its implications reach various matters. As an illustration, the beginning of the Plato’s Meno is the question to Socrates whether virtue can be taught. Comparatively, in Confucianism, Mencius made an analogy between sprouts and virtues, whereas Zhongyong (the Doctrine of Mean 中庸) mentioned three universal virtues (dade 達德). Many later Confucian scholars interpreted that the virtues are innate but need to be cultivated to reach perfection. By all means, the inherence of virtues and the necessity of cultivation contradict: if the virtues are given, people don’t have to cultivate them, and vice versa. This inconsistency solved, though partially, by many Chinese philosophers. In this paper, I would like to make comparison between Zhuxi and Dai Zhen with regard to the perfection of virtues presented in Zhongyong.

There exist diverse interpretations on Zhongyong. Some interpretations focus on the whole meaning of the text, while other interpretations focus on the specific words such as Nature (xing 性), Way (dao 道), Equilibrium (zhong 中), Harmony (he 和). For example, Zhu Xi who made Zhongyong independent book from Liji (禮記) wrote its commentary and regarded it as one of the four classics (Sishu 四書). At the same time, Zhu Xi borrowed some words (e.g. Weifa 未發 and Yifa 已發) from Zhongyong to develop his own philosophy. Likewise, Dai Zhen who was famous for a harsh critic of Zhu Xi also wrote commentary of Zhongyong (the supplementary commentary of Zhongyong 中庸補注). Dai Zhen’s commentary, however, is relatively brief and includes the commentary of Zheng Xuan (鄭玄) who was a great commentator in the Han dynasty. Instead, Dai Zhen frequently quoted Zhongyong in his major philosophical works and offered his own interpretations different from Zhu Xi’s interpretations.

It is notable that Dai Zhen’s understanding of three universal virtues in Zhongyong have both common and different point with that of Zhu Xi. It seems like that Dai Zhen agreed with Zhu Xi on the meaning of de which is a kind of innate human power whereas he had different opinion on specific content of three universal virtues. Wisdom (zhı 智), humanity (ren 仁), bravery (yong 勇) are three universal virtues in chapter 20 of Zhongyong. Dai Zhen described that wisdom is the ethical perfection of the intelligent mind; humanity is what is ultimately pure and clear; bravery is the endeavor to act ethically. What is most compelling is the description of humanity seeing that humanity is the core notion of Confucianism since Confucius and its definition varied from scholar to scholar. I suggest that Dai Zhen’s understanding of humanity refers to mirror-like clearness which signifies impartiality. This suggestion would reveal the difference between Dai Zhen’s self-cultivation theory and Zhu Xi’s.
In this paper, I develop a new emotional state account of happiness. I argue that one’s happiness in the descriptive or psychological sense is the overall emotional condition that reflects or evaluates the prudential value of one’s life. My account improves on Sumner’s life satisfaction account of happiness and Haybron’s emotional state account – the two most influential accounts of happiness in the literature – exploiting the strengths of each while avoiding their weaknesses. So I explicate my view and its virtues by comparing it with Sumner’s and Haybron’s accounts.

More specifically, I argue that happiness consists in the emotions that are reflective of, rather than the cognitive or propositional judgment about, the prudential value of one’s life. Those emotions are composed not only of positive experiences, but also of non-experiential dispositions that produce them. Unlike Sumner’s life satisfaction theory, my emotional state account, because it excludes life satisfaction as mere cognition from happiness, implies that those creatures whose mental capacities are not conceptually sophisticated can, in principle, be happy. An objection against the life satisfaction view of happiness is that most people make an assessment about their overall quality of life, if ever, only once in a while. However, we are somewhere on the scale of happiness even when we do not make any evaluative judgment about our life as a whole. My view is not vulnerable to this problem of attitude scarcity. (Un)happiness is, in my view, not the occurrent thought that we have when we make a judgment about the prudential value of life, but those positive or negative emotional states that usually come with the judgment. One can have the feelings, emotions and moods that would be appropriate to have if one were to judge that one’s life is going well, without actually making the judgment that one’s life is going well.

I disagree with Haybron about what kinds of emotional states happiness consists in. Haybron claims that happiness-constituting emotional states instantiate one or more of the following three modes of affirmative response: attunement (psychically being at home in her life), engagement (enthusiastically taking up what her life has to offer), and endorsement (joy and cheerfulness). These emotional states are constituents of psychological well-being, subjective components of what makes one’s life go well for her. In my view, what Haybron thinks happiness consists in is not happiness per se, so much as sources of happiness, i.e. part of what happiness-constituting emotions are about, or reasons to be happy, i.e. part of what makes happiness appropriate. By contrast, I take happiness to consist mainly in those emotional states which reflect or evaluate how good one’s life is for her. They include, inter alia, content, gratitude, repose, self-esteem, pride (insofar as what makes one’s life go well is one’s achievement), and a sense of being fortunate (insofar as what makes one’s life go well is thanks to luck). Unlike Haybron’s emotional state theory, it makes good sense of unreasonable or inappropriate (un)happiness.
Phenomenon of blame occurs in our everyday life. Commonly, philosophers have often analyzed blame in regards to its relation with moral domain; blame has been interpreted as carrying morally significant value due to its evaluating function – namely, judging of the subject of blame as wrong. However, these arguments have not adequately addressed the phenomenon of blame which occurs in an immoral domain as well as in a non-moral domain. My paper addresses the issue of when and how the phenomenon of blame occurs, with special attention to the value system of the blamer.

I will introduce Thomas Scanlon's relationship-centered account of blame, based on Scanlonian Contractualism. Scanlon's account appears to be plausible because he explains blameworthy action as showing an agent's reasons, intentions, and attitudes which impair the relationship with others. It leads one to blame the agent through taking one's relationship with the blamee to be modified in a way that the judgment of impaired relations holds to be appropriate. Here, Scanlon assumes the concept of ideal relationship as the foundational notion, where the condition of a mutual recognition is always taken for granted. The participants of the relationship do not have to actually recognize the impairment. It is rather an idealized reciprocity of respect because morality requires idealized relationship to be present among participants.

I argue against Scanlon's account that his account assumes a problematic conception of relationship. First, the idea of Contractualist relationship epistemically presumes the element of mutual recognition. This leads to a false conclusion that a relationship is metaphysically existent, independent from the actual participants. Second, I will claim that Scanlon commits an error of aggregating independent relationships into a conflated one. Relationship is a bundle of two or more sets of attitudes, expectations, emotions, and beliefs towards the other. These could be shared, but cannot be aggregated into one. However, by considering a single occurrence of impairment as pervasive among all relationships in question, Scanlon wrongly transform the unilateral feature of relationships into something aggregated. Third, it is uncertain that when and how the impairment occurs in regard to the participants in the relationship. Finally, asserting that we form moral relationship even with strangers, Scanlon faces a “The Problem of Stranger.” Can we have certain positive attitudes and expectations towards a stranger? It is not plausible to assume that the stranger will, in the near future, be an acquaintance of mine.

I will suggest the Axiological account of blame, asserting that the phenomenon of blame indicates the values that the blamer regard as worth keeping with respect to others. I assert that a blamer judges that X is blameworthy when the blamer’s value system does not correspond with X. A blamer blames X when the degree of non-correspondence in the value system steps over the blamer's threshold. The blamer’s threshold indicates values that are worth keeping. Such an account will be able to explain how and when the values of agents are expressed, contributing to the value-debates in the field of moral phenomenology.
Robots, in Humanoid form or otherwise has been around sometime, and their presences will certainly increase. I attempt to answer the most basic moral question in the presentation, namely the moral standing of robots. One of the key issues has to involve the following moral dictum: ‘Ought’ implies ‘can’. To apply this dictum to the cases of robots strictly would seem to result in no agency for robots. On the other hand, robots—in some sense—however different it is from our untrained moral intuitions—are “responsible,” and thus should be accorded an agency. My presentation discusses the very issue surrounding the moral agency of the possible (or, rather, potential) non-human “mechanical” agency.
Recently, there have been several suggestions about how a phenomenological research can possibly contribute to cognitive sciences, one of which widely discussed is the front-loaded phenomenology proposed by S. Gallagher. In this paper, I attempt to examine the feasibility of its application to one topic which has attracted a great deal of attention from cognitive scientists, i.e. asymmetries of perceptual span in reading (hereafter APSR). For 40 years, many researchers identifying this phenomenon in various languages have set up diverse hypotheses about its possible causes, including brain-hypothesis and habit-hypothesis. In this paper, I review some phenomenological theories and descriptions about relevant phenomena such as affection, attention, perception, time-consciousness, habit, and situation based on E. Husserl's works in order to put forward a seemingly more promising hypothesis for explaining APSR, i.e. situation-hypothesis. In this hypothesis, APSR could be explained as a phenomenon which paradigmatically shows that in most cases it is determined by the future-orientedness of perception which habit from the complex system of habits will be actualized in concrete situation. Finally, I attempt to front-load this hypothesis from phenomenological considerations to some experimental designs of cognitive sciences.
The Problem with the Compatibility Problem: A Spinozistic Solution

KLUZ, Christopher
Catholic University of Daegu (Korea)

A major philosophical debate in contemporary ethics and moral psychology concerns the compatibility of free will and determinism, often called the ‘compatibility problem.’ While there are two main camps within this debate, incompatibilists, who hold that free will is not compatible with determinism, and compatibilists, who hold that it is, neither camp seems to be able to come up with a convincing solution to the problem, at least a solution convincing to the other party. In fact, very little progress at all has been made in solving the compatibility problem since its inauguration in early modern philosophy. One main reason that this debate has become so irresolvable is that incompatibilists and compatibilists talk past each other on what exactly they mean by ‘free will’. By ‘free will’ incompatibilists often mean a capacity for an agent to choose between alternative possibilities and to be the ultimate source of her actions. Compatibilists, on the other hand, often argue that as long as an agent’s actions stem from her own wishes, volitions, or desires, then she has a free will. The second main reason, and one that makes this debate so heated, is that both incompatibilists and compatibilists argue that free will is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. Incompatibilists argue that true moral responsibility requires their definition of ‘free will’, while compatibilists argue that their definition of free will is sufficient to claim that an agent is morally responsible. In this paper, I will expose the flaws in the contemporary approaches to the compatibility problem by looking at Spinoza’s unique solution to the compatibility of free will and determinism. Spinoza is paradoxically both an incompatibilist and a compatibilist. While he denies that free will, as defined by incompatibilists, is compatible with determinism, ultimately espousing determinism and denying the existence of free will, he is also a compatibilist. He is a compatibilist insofar as he argues that human freedom, what many compatibilists understand as ‘free will’, is perfectly consistent with determinism. Spinoza’s distinction between free will and freedom, therefore, solves the initial problem with the compatibility problem outlined above. But perhaps more importantly, Spinoza does not think that either free will or freedom is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. In this respect, he is neither an incompatibilist nor a compatibilist. Rather, Spinoza argues that responsibility is concomitant with the consequences of actions that an agent necessarily and naturally suffers. Moreover, given this theory of responsibility, ultimately “moral” responsibility, for Spinoza, is a social construct that is born out of the necessities of social life divorced from the metaphysics of free will or freedom.
The purpose of my paper is to add a new perspective to Aristotle’s happiness (eudaimonia). My paper falls into two parts. In the first part, I will try to examine Aristotle’s argument that happiness is acting well (eupraxia). In *Nicomachean Ethics* I.7, Aristotle defines happiness as an activity of soul according to virtues (arêtē)–i.e. acting well–and especially according to the best and most complete virtue. This definition serves as the basis for an influential view on Aristotle’s happiness (dominant view), the view that happiness Aristotle has in mind is contemplation (theoria). However, it is not as simple as a dominant view reads. Although Aristotle argues that the intellect (nous) is put in the first order among all functions of soul and its virtue–contemplation–is the most authoritative and divine one, he also says that acting well or virtuous action is an action done for the sake of the noble (tou kalou heneka) (NE III.7, 1115b12-3; III.11, 1119b16). And, more to the point, Aristotle does not think that a noble deed can be pin down without reading individual ethical situations. As the noble deed is determined according to the circumstances agents are faced with, contemplation should not be considered as the noble deed no matter what circumstance is like. We can find this consideration in the several passages of *Nicomachean Ethics* where Aristotle deals with the noble deed according to the virtue of character (hē ēthikē aretē). The second part is concerned with the question about how to single out a noble deed in a concrete situation. I will try to answer to this question by examining how a practically wise person (phronimos) acts in political sphere. According to Aristotle, practical circumstances we face with are constantly fluctuating, and, for that reason, all precepts we have had must fail to correspond with the present circumstance (NE I.3, 1094b14-6). To solve this kind of problem, phronimos needs to have both the architectonic (architektonikos) knowledge about human good and an ability to read correctly individual ethical situations, and then he should successfully bridge the gap between the knowledge and concrete circumstance. The exemplary case is the true statesmen–they are also phronimoi–who try to set up political system (Politics IV.1, 1288b22-27). They are acquainted both with the conception of the best city and with particulars they are involved in, and then they come to determine what is the best city relatively to circumstances. For that reason, Aristotle says that true statesmen use the architectonic knowledge as “lead ruler used in Lesbian building” (tēs Lesbias oikodomias ho molibdinos kanōn)–flexible ruler made of lead–not as a rigid ruler which cannot be adaptable to the specific circumstances (NE V.10, 1137b13-1138a3). Given these consideration, it should be supposed that Aristotle’s happiness is acting for the sake of the noble and the happy life is brought about only by phronimos, and that a sophos is just a phronimos contemplating theoretical principles.
Truthmaker theorists have trouble finding truthmakers for negative existential truths, especially if they are committed to the conjunction of two principles that orthodox truthmaker theorists embrace. One of the principles is called Truthmaker Maximalism, according to which all truths have truthmakers, and the other is Truthmaker Necessitarianism, according to which truthmakers necessitate their truths. Thus, orthodox truthmaker theorists are in need of entities that necessitate negative existential truths. What kind of entities are they? This is called the problem of negative truths.

A couple of strategies are known to solve the problem of negative truths. The most straightforward strategy is to accept some “negative” entities for the job such as negative facts or states of affairs (including Armstrong’s totality state of affairs). Instead of it, many theorists restrict Truthmaker Maximalism to non-negative truths. Some favor Truthmaker Maximalism and replace Truthmaker Necessitarianism with other principles. All of these strategies may work fine, but if you take one of them, you must accept bizarre entities in your ontology or an unorthodox truthmaker theory.

A couple of accounts have been proposed to maintain both of Truthmaker Maximalism and Truthmaker Necessitarianism without accepting negative entities. The alleged truthmakers include the world (Ross Cameron) and qua-objects (David Lewis). However, they are bizarre no better than negative entities.

In this paper, I propose a new account, according to which the truthmakers for negative existential truths are their domains of quantification. The domains are worth considering as truthmakers for the following reasons. First, quantificational truths (including negative existential truths) are about, and presumably grounded in, their domains. Second, the domain can necessitate its truth since whenever it exists, its members do not change. Third, the domains are on a par with tropes and facts as truthmakers in the sense that all of them necessitate their truths in virtue of their nature. Fourth, the domains are not bizarre, at least not metaphysician’s toy.

From the metaontological point of view, my account entails that what truthmakers tell us about ontology is nothing different what the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment does because if truthmakers are the domains of quantification, the Quinean criterion are about truthmakers. Thus, I argue that truthmaker theory does not play any important role in ontology unless we have some reason to be unorthodox truthmaker theorists.
My aim in the present paper is to discuss Matt Bower’s argument, in “Husserl’s Theory of Instincts as a Theory of Affection”, to the effect that Edmund Husserl’s earlier theory of affection, viz., as presented in Husserl 1966, is the same as Husserl’s later theory of instincts, insofar as both theories are concerned with the same phenomenon. To be precise, Bower argues that affection, i.e., being passively stimulated or excited by phenomena, is identical with instinct, i.e., a natural urge or impulse, e.g., for food, sex, self-defense, etc. (Bower 2014, p. 134). I contend that Bower’s arguments do not succeed, and that there is reason to reject his conclusion.

Bower importantly engages in a polemic with the views of James Mensch and Nam-In Lee, who have previously covered the same ground in considerable detail. Mensch and Lee duly note the passages where Husserl speaks of affection and instinct as though he regarded them as identical, and to some extent they make use of the language of identity themselves, but they nevertheless demur from accepting the identity claim as literally true, and at least sometimes speak of instinct and affection as closely related but distinct. Thus, Mensch seems to underscore the distinctness of affection and instinct (or striving), when he conceives of the relationship between them based on the lock (instinct) and key (affection) metaphor, with what can stimulate us being dependent on our proclivities of responding to stimulation (Mensch 2010, Ch. 6, § 5). Lee, based, in part, on the same textual evidence as Mensch, argues that what may seem like Husserl’s identity claims, are, in fact, rightly construed as merely highlighting the close relationship between instinct and affection, insofar as the former can be viewed as the ultimate “addressee” of the latter (Lee 1993, p. 110).

Bower’s arguments for the identification claim center on two points. First, he undertakes to “point out how instincts have all the same features as affection and how Husserl goes beyond those details by clarifying affection as an experience of desire and pleasure” (Bower 2014, p. 134). In accomplishing this, Bower also believes that he has accomplished an identification of affection and the instinct of curiosity (Ibid.). Second, he tackles what he regards as a possible objection to his thesis, viz., affection associates diverse items within experience, and if the instinct of curiosity cannot do it, then the identification claim must be false. However, Bower contends, the instinct of curiosity can do this work, dealing with the objection (Ibid.).

I take issue with both of these points. I engage in this debate because I believe it raises interesting issues regarding Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, a kind of philosophical account of how one’s intentional experience changes and develops through time. Thus, we need to ask whether different stages of such a genesis may differ in important ways, rendering it requisite for Bower to refrain from undue generalizations, and exactly what evidence is available to adjudicate the (philosophical, rather than merely exegetic) controversy regarding instinct and affection.

---

5 For a detailed discussion of the notion of affection in Husserl, including analysis in terms of a presenting intention, feeling, and kinaesthesia, see Lee 1993, pp. 104-107. For an introductory discussion of Husserl’s conception of instinct, see Lee 1993, Introduction [Einleitung], and especially p. 8, where Lee argues that Husserl’s account of instinct centers on the idea of an instinctive intention, rather than instinctive behavior. Primary sources on instincts can be found in Husserl 2006, Husserl 2008, as well as Husserl 2014, Part II. For a listing of the relevant sections in Husserl 2006 and 2008, see Husserl 2014, p. xlv, ftn. 2.
Rethinking the Source of Evil: Sinful Self or Social Corrupted Self?

LAM, Wing Kwan
Hang Seng Management College (Hong Kong)

Taking Confessions as the title of his autobiography, Rousseau intends to lead the readers to relate his autobiography to St. Augustine’s Confessions. The main theme of both Confessions lies on the problem of evil and human salvation. If man is born good, then what makes man evil? Augustine and Rousseau believe that if they know the source of evil, they will find the remedy or the way to salvation as well. Augustine traced the root of evil from the internal factor, the distorted will to Adam’s sin. Rousseau, however, took up the external path and revealed the social institutions as the source of evil.

In this paper, I will compare some events of wrong doing in both Confessions to illustrate their different understanding of the root of evil. In Augustine’s Confessions, his story of stealing pears in Book Two is his effort to find the root of evil in comparison with the story of Fall in Genesis. However, he finds the final cause of evil doing not in the theft event but in his conversion. His conversion, instead, as the climax of his salvation story, illustrates the struggle within his will, which is caused by the consequence of Adam’s sin. Augustine claims that man’s wickedness is embedded in his nature by birth and man can only be saved by God. Rousseau refuting Augustine’s interpretation and solution says that Original Sin explains everything except its principle, and it is the principle that is the issue to explain. He, rather, states in his story of stealing that he steals because his good feelings are badly directed by unjust situation. He does make fault but he is not wicked. Similar to Augustine’s struggle in the garden, Rousseau struggles between good and evil will in his false accusation of Marion. He, in that event, finally gives way to his fear of shame and accuses Marion for stealing ribbon. Rousseau’s account shows that it is not the wickedness by birth but the human weakness caused by social unjust environment the source of fault. Rousseau’s secular account of the problem of evil shifts the cause of human salvation from God to social and political institutions. However, according to Rousseau’s solution, can man really save himself by political reform or revolution? In conclusion, I will evaluate Augustine’s Christian explanation and Rousseau’s secular response to the source of evil with reference to the challenges in the modern world.
Primacy of the Other:  
Lévinas’s destabilization of the Western Philosophical Tradition

LAU, Kwok-ying  
The Chinese University of Hong Kong (Hong Kong)

It is well known that the mature Lévinas has launched the slogan “Ethics as First Philosophy” to reinforce his call for respecting the primacy of the Other by reversing the priority placed on the pursuit of knowledge in the tradition of Western Philosophy. Such a pathetic call can be traced back to Lévinas’ essay “Is Ontology Fundamental?” published in French in 1951 (object of Part 1). In *Totality and Infinity* (1961), Lévinas demonstrates the primacy of the Other through a very original phenomenology of warfare violence that the Other is at the origin of my freedom and transcendence (object of Part 2). Upon further analyses of the consciousness of time underlying the phenomena of forgiveness and hope generated in a soldier’s mind who is facing the threat of death, a new account of temporality different from the Husserlian and Heideggerian conceptions of time can be formulated: temporality as diachrony instead of synchrony. This new concept of time will be one going in pair with an “Ethics as First Philosophy” (object of Part 3).
One Health and the Will-to-Live

LEDERMAN, Zohar
National University of Singapore (Singapore)

One Health (OH) is a novel biomedical approach that is rapidly gaining traction in various professional and academic fora, including the bioethical and philosophical literature. While OH is usually perceived as an umbrella term which covers various topics, e.g. zoonotic diseases, comparative medicine, pet-assisted therapy etc., its overall definition remains relatively stable. The definition usually consists of two components: 1) interdisciplinary collaboration with the goal of 2) optimizing the health of humans, non-human animals, and ecosystems.

Absent the second component, OH is hardly of interest to bioethicists and environmental philosophers. However, it is exactly the second component that is largely missing in current OH literature and (alleged) practice.

In this paper, I will use a normative analysis and first examine the justification for the second component: why should we optimize the health of humans, animals and ecosystems? I will argue that, in addition to anthropocentric motives, we should do so for biocentric motives, because life qua life is morally valuable.

Specifically, I will raise from the dead Albert Schweitzer’s theory of ‘Reverence for Life,’ and argue for its soundness and plausibility as a secular theory. Schweitzer builds upon and develops Schopenhauer’s Will-to Live as the cornerstone of his theory. Schopenhauer, in turn, was influenced by South-Asian philosophy. Unfortunately though, perhaps because of its spiritual origins, Schweitzer’s theory is only mentioned in passing in contemporary environmental philosophy.

I aim to flush out the analytic argument that Schweitzer is making and demonstrate its validity and soundness. Once these are established, I will move on to defend it from familiar counter-arguments, such as what I call ‘the bacteria argument’ (“but bacteria are alive- should we revere them as well?”), and ‘the inevitability argument’ (Schweitzer’s theory does not work because it is inevitable that we would kill animals/or plants if we were to live).
A Kantian Defense of the Moral End as a Fact of Reason

LEE, Byeong Deok
Sungkyunkwan University (Korea)

Kant defends categorical imperatives as requirements of practical reason. If, however, our moral end were unreasonable then our categorical imperatives would lose their normative force. The question then is how to defend our moral end. This is a pressing question for Kantians. First, according to Kant, the principle of morality is a formal principle to the effect that it applies with normative necessity to all rational agents. If so, how can Kant (or a Kantian) defend our presumably substantial moral end? Second, in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant admits that a deduction of the moral law is not possible. If categorical imperatives cannot be proved by way of an inference, how can Kant (or a Kantian) defend our moral end? The purpose of this paper is to offer a Kantian answer to these questions. I argue that under our current conceptual framework, unlike mere animals, we are rational agents such that mutual interactions are governed by moral rules, and also that the categorical reasonableness of our moral end is based on this conception of ourselves.
The Two Children Problems and Failures of Reference

LEE, Chunhyoung
Pohang University of Science and Technology (Korea)

Martin Gardner presents two questions which he calls *The Two Children Problem*:

Problem 1. Mr. Jones has two children. The older child is a girl. What is the probability that both children are girls?

Problem 2. Mr. Smith has two children. At least one of them is a boy. What is the probability that both children are boys?

And recently Foshee presents the following problem:

Problem 3. Mr. Ng has two children. One is a boy born on a Tuesday. What is the probability that both children are boys?

Gardner’s answers are 1/2 for Problem 1 and 1/3 for Problem 2, and Foshee’s answer to Problem 3 is 13/27. And these answers are almost universally accepted among experts of probabilistic reasoning. But ordinary people make common errors in answering the questions and have a hard time accepting the right results. Furthermore, many experts who give the right answers find their answers puzzling and fail to explain clearly why the faulty reasonings leading to the common errors are faulty.

I argue that the common errors occur because some expressions, which do not refer in the given contexts, are mistakenly treated as referring expressions. I draw some general lessons from these examples.
Art and the Possibility of Propositional Knowledge - A Reconsideration

Lee, Haewan

Seoul National University (Korea)

In arguing whether or not a work of art is a proper source of knowledge, cognitivist and anti-cognitivist positions both have a fair amount of support. In this paper, I will try to establish the following three points concerning this issue. First, so long as discussion of this matter continues within the limitations of the traditional way, the cognitivist’s conclusion that artworks – including literature - provide propositional knowledge is difficult to establish. By 'limitation of traditional way', what I mean is the following: a) The explicitly stated content of a literary work and/or the meaning revealed through interpretation of that work are propositions asserted by the work, b) it is these propositions that may potentially constitute the propositional knowledge the work provides, and thus c) we must determine whether belief in these propositions amounts to having justified true beliefs. Here, I argue against the cognitivist argument, including Noel Carroll’s, which claims that literature may well be a source of propositional knowledge. Specifically, I believe two kinds of anti-cognitivist arguments (the lack of justification challenge and the lack of artistic relevance challenge) are hard to resolve by current cognitivist’s defense, so I explain how and why they are so.

If propositional knowledge should indeed be given up, some cognitivists instead suggest various kinds of non-propositional knowledge such as know-how or a certain kind of less rigorous cognitive value other than knowledge, such as ‘understanding.’ This move is a reasonable compromise yet has some unsatisfactory aspects. My second point is to sketch these concerns.

Finally, I will pursue the possibility of obtaining propositional knowledge from works of art by changing elements constituting the traditional way. Suppose there is an interpretive consensus concerning W, that what W means (or asserts, or says) is a proposition that p (say, ‘all men are selfish.’). So far, the debate has been about whether this controversial claim that ‘men are all selfish’ could be knowledge that W provides. My proposal is this: propositional knowledge that W provides is not ‘p’ but rather a proposition constituted in such a way that W and a true interpretative claim about W respectively occupy the role of subject and predicate in a sentence. That is, not about whether ‘all men are selfish,’ but about whether ‘W says that all men are selfish.’ This might not appear to be a substantial change, yet I believe it is significant because it shows an undeniable case of propositional knowledge that we get from a work. Further, it makes it possible for cognitivists to avoid the difficulties that they face. First, cognitivists can now unequivocally explain why and how believing this proposition amounts to a justified true belief, thus can handle the no-truth challenge and no-justification challenge. Second, it also explains why getting this type of knowledge is closely related with artistic value (since it is to believe the appropriate interpretation of the work), thus answer to the triviality challenge and artistic irrelevance challenge.
In Defense of Skepticism about Knowing Contingent Truths *A Priori*

LEE, Jeonggyu
University of California, Santa Barbara (USA)

Kripke provided a persuasive and strong argument for the possibility of knowing contingent truths *a priori*. In this paper, in order to save our plausible view that we cannot know contingent facts about the world simply by linguistic manipulation, I will argue for skepticism about this possibility by elaborating the positions of previous skeptics such as Donnellan and Salmon.

First, I categorize six alleged examples of contingent *a priori* as three cases in regard to the connection between a subject and a target object: (1) No Connection, (2) Causal Connection, and (3) Acquaintance (Perceptual) Connection. Then I argue that for the first case, the subject does not have any knowledge expressed by the stipulative sentence, and for the second and the third case, the subject has knowledge expressed by the stipulative sentence, but it is *a posteriori*. Thus, in all cases, contingent *a priori* is not possible.

My explanation for all alleged cases of contingent *a priori*, where a stipulative sentence expresses a singular proposition, is bases on my suggestion that in order to grasp a singular proposition, a subject must be causally connected with a target object, which is a constituent of the singular proposition. I provide some reasons why my suggestion is plausible.

Lastly, I consider the following objections and reply to them: (1) Objection from future objects, which claims that we can grasp a singular proposition but there is no connection, (2) Objection from proper conditions for introducing a name such as “Orcutt” for the shortest spy, (3) Objection that conditions of having singular thought are only psychological matter, and (4) Objection from the Millian Solution of Frege’s Puzzle.
Phenomenological Reflection on the Current Future Visions
- Future of the Human Being:
Artificial Intelligence or Artificial Life or Dasein? -

LEE, Jong Kwan
Sungkyunkwan University (Korea)

The purpose of this article is to examine the pivotal contents of the current future visions of humanity and then to reveal the mode of confrontation between them. First it will clarify the background, upon which the two different future visions of humanity are emerging. Then of the two vision the technofuturism which is currently enjoying the status of main stream in the field of future study, will be discussed in terms of its core, transhumanism. This discussion will be then developed into the critical reflection on the Artificial Intelligence and Artificial Life technology, the most important cutting edge technology, on which the transhumanism is based. While doing this job, the article will find out the path to the critical reflection on the Animal Life in the Heideggerian Phenomenology, specifically in his discussion on the animal life in his lecture delivered in 1929/30 in Freiburg. This reflection will lead to the result to discover the significance of Heidegger’s late essay on the humanism in supporting the neohumanism which is now confronting the mainstream future vision, the technofuturism, the core of which is the transhumanism.
Phenomenological Clarification of the Concept of Instinct through a Criticism of A. Gehlen's Theory of Instinct-Reduction

LEE, Nam-In
Seoul National University (Korea)

In the past 20 years, the concept of instinct has been discussed in various disciplines such as evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology, linguistics, ethics, aesthetics, etc. However, the meaning of instinct still remains unclarified in many respects. In order to overcome this situation, it is necessary to elucidate the genuine meaning of instinct so that the discussion of instinct in these disciplines could be carried out systematically. The aim of this paper is to establish the genuine concept of instinct on the basis of a phenomenological criticism of A. Gehlen's theory of instinct-reduction. According to Gehlen, instinct is defined as Instinkthandlung. However, this definition of instinct is problematic from the standpoint of formal logic, since the definiendum (the instinct) is already included in the definiens (Instinkthandlung). Moreover, it faces different kinds of serious material problems. Criticizing Gehlen's theory of instinct systematically, I will show that instinct should be redefined as “the inner living force that urges an organism to perform a certain kind of action,” and I will attempt to clarify this definition of instinct in a more detailed manner by offering 11 points. Thereafter, I will argue that Gehlen's theory of instinct-reduction has to be replaced by the theory of instinct-enlargement in human beings. In the conclusion, I will finally point out some issues concerning the concept of instinct which should be discussed in the future.
Conservation as Continuous Creation: 
Just like Creation but Not Necessarily Recreation

LEE, Sukjae
Seoul National University (Korea)

In a recent paper, Ken Winkler raises a thought-provoking puzzle about Berkeley’s endorsement of the continuous creation thesis, one that he describes as follows:

If Berkeley believes in the continuous creation of bodies, it seems that he should also believe in the continuous creation of human minds. … Berkeleyan minds are, like bodies, finite things, and if, as finite things, they depend on an infinite God for their existence, it seems that God should be, by parity of reasoning, the only cause of their successive existence in the parts of their unfolding lifetimes. … But in the case of minds, Berkeley emphatically repudiates occasionalism. How can continuous creation lead him to occasionalism in one case if it does not lead him to it, as it did Malebranche, in the other? (Ken Winkler, “Continuous Creation”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XXXV 2011, 287)

Winkler goes on to generalize the puzzle. As he puts it, “[w]hy, indeed, did so few of [those who endorsed continuous creation] so much as struggle with an across-the-board occasionalism?” (288)

Winkler provides an insightful and probing account of how the vast majority do without this struggle, an account that I examine in more detail in this paper. I begin by first voicing my dissent against this general framing of the puzzle. While it might be the case that Winkler’s description of the situation is apt for the late Scholastics, who indeed seem to endorse continuous creation without any particular worry about occasionalism, the situation seems rather different by the time of Descartes, with the tide slowly shifting toward more turbulence. And, with the emergence of Malebranche, the reverse current seems rather strong, and a struggle explicitly emerges for those like Leibniz and Berkeley. This diagnosis, of course, relies on the assumption that Malebranche’s argument from continuous creation to occasionalism provided a rather powerful impetus, one capable of moving Leibniz and Berkeley.

With this in mind, I critically examine two central points of Winkler’s paper. First of all, I will question whether the passage Winkler focuses on for his analysis best brings out Malebranche’s key insight. In contrast to Dialogues 115-6, which is the focus of Winkler’s attention, I will argue Dialogues 112 brings out Malebranche’s argument in a more persuasive, charitable manner. I then turn to Winkler’s second, positive point—briefly put, that continuous creation needs to be understood as continuous recreation for it to be the most persuasive platform for occasionalism. Against this reading, I suggest that the issue of whether continuous creation is continuous recreation or not is somewhat of a red herring in the overall dialectic. Instead I will attempt to bolster a reading I have presented in earlier work, one that takes the continuous creation thesis to hold that conservation and creation are qualitatively identical in terms of divine and creaturely causal contribution. That is, I think Malebranche would have no problem accepting that conservation is continuous maintenance—in contrast to recreation—and nonetheless uphold occasionalism, as long as the maintenance on the part of God is understood properly. I close with some comments on Leibniz and how to think of his reaction to the continuous creation thesis.
Reasonableness and Freedom in Aristotle

LEE, Yungwhan
Ewha Womans University (Korea)

Those who are ready for moral education in Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* are those that “heed the reason/argument” (*logoi peitharchein*). While the masses, living according to passion, should be persuaded only with threats of penalty, reason and teaching (*logos kai didachê*) cultivates the soul of the well-brought-up person to enjoy and hate proper things. It is those well-brought-up people that Aristotle targets in his lecture on ethics. They are the ones who can appreciate good reasons as such and be reasoned out of their old habit. They are reasonable in that sense.

Another characterization of the good people in Aristotle is that they are free (*eleutherios*). But Aristotle’s notion of freedom in this particular context needs examining. On the one hand, *eleutherios* is a general word that denotes the characteristic that distinguishes citizens from slaves; but Aristotle obviously does not use it in its political sense here. The majority of the people who are free in the political sense are not free in the more restricted sense above. On the other hand, *eleutheriotês* (a noun form of *eleutherios*) is in fact one of the character virtues Aristotle discusses in NE; but the word in Aristotle’s characterization of the good people cannot mean that either because *eleutheriotês* as a character virtue is limited to freedom in the matter of dealing with money, that is, a mean between stinginess and wastefulness. Since *eleutherios* in Aristotle’s characterization of the good people means neither freedom in the political sense nor freedom in the money matters, we may wonder what it means.

I will examine how Aristotle’s notion of freedom is closely related with human reason and reasonableness. Even though it is obvious that reason takes the central place in Aristotle’s ethics, the reasonableness (capacity to heed the reason) of the good person, how it is cultivated and how the excellences of the character (not only the excellences of the intellect) are related with it, has not been given sufficient discussion, especially how it is related with freedom.

*Nicomachean ethics* will be the primary text I will discuss but I will also examine Plato’s *Gorgias* and the discussion of the power of *logos* in it also. I will suggest in the end that we read *NE* as a protreptical work where Aristotle exhorts and encourages students with good upbringing to listen to and appreciate (the power of) his arguments and be properly motivated to follow philosophers’ path in their lives.
Scientific Realism, Approximate Truth and the Argument from Underdetermination

LEMOINE, Philippe
Cornell University (USA)

Scientific realists argue that we are justified in taking our best scientific theories to be approximately true because, if they were not, their predictive success would be a miracle. But anti-realists reply that, since theories are underdetermined by the evidence, that inference to the best explanation fails. After saying a few words in section 1 about scientific realism, inference to the best explanation and the no miracle argument, I analyze the argument from underdetermination in section 2 and explain how anti-realists argue that the underdetermination of theories by the evidence implies that we are not justified in taking even our best scientific theories to be true. In particular, I show that the argument from underdetermination rests on the fact that, when theories are inconsistent with each other, one is only true if the others are not. However, realists do not claim that we are justified in taking our best scientific theories to be true, but approximately true. Thus, instead of attacking the premises of the argument from underdetermination as realists typically do, I argue that, when formulated in terms of truth, it does not threaten scientific realism because it misrepresents what realists say. In section 3, I say a few words about the concept of approximate truth and distinguish it from the notion of likelihood of truth and the closely related concept of closeness to the truth. Then, I explain in section 4 that, when the argument from underdetermination is formulated in terms of approximate truth, the skeptical conclusion no longer follows because, from the fact that a theory is inconsistent with another, it does not follow that one can only be approximately true if the other is not. Finally, in section 4, I explain how this argument differs from a related point made by Gustavo Cevolani and Luca Tambolo in a recent article. I argue that, unlike my argument, the point they make does not essentially depend on the fact that realists are only committed to the view that we are justified in taking our best scientific theories to be approximately true.
In this paper I will take an exegetical approach to the philosophical issue of memory treated in Vasubandhu’s Ātmavādapratīṣedha (Refutation of the Theory of a Self), an appended chapter in the Abhidharmakośa (Treasury of Knowledge), and Viṃśikā (Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only). Regarding the topic of memory, these two texts will be examined within the continuity of two texts in Vasubandhu’s philosophical enterprise. Unlike Janet Gyatso’s edited volume, In the Mirror of Memory in 1992, which is indeed a milestone for the studies on the theory of smṛti in the tradition of Indo-Tibetan Buddhism, this paper deliberately read these texts with the aid of Chinese exegeses composed by Puguang (普光, died in 664), Fabao (法寶, c.a. 627-705), and Kuiji (窺基, 632-682). The main thrust in this paper is to show how Vasubandhu argues against certain forms of the realist theory of memory. He claims that memory can be explained without presupposing the existence of the ātman and the external world. This is equal to say that one should be more cautious when memory is employed by the realist as a valid mean of knowledge to prove the existence of ātman or external world. This study concludes that an internalist turn taken by Vasubandhu might foresee the memory argument in Dignāga’s theory of self-awareness.
Recently some Asian scholars, most notably Ruiping Fan (1997), have criticized the overly individualistic conception of autonomy and argued for the “family-determination-oriented” as The East Asian principle of autonomy. I agree that the family plays a vital role in human flourishing and should participate in biomedical decision making. However, I will argue in this paper first that the either/or contrast between self-determination and family-determination principle of autonomy is in danger of promoting a simplistic dichotomy between Western and East Asian bioethics. Second, drawing on Anne Donchin and Susan Sherwin’s feminist perspective, I will argue that a better account of autonomy entails not only the recognition of interdependence but the sensitivity to the power imbalances in human relationships, in particular in a community-based, family-dominated society. Finally, I will apply the conception of relational autonomy to bioethical issues in the context of medical ethos in Taiwan with special focus on family dynamics in decision making at the end-of-life.
Informed consent is a necessary concept when hospitals or doctors try to treat their patients. Providing full or relevant information for the patients means they have a legal or moral right to know what medical procedures would start from, what real or potential risks would have and why they need receive such treatment. It seems that only if hospitals or doctors give full information can the patients naturally would give consent to them and the caretakers concerned can avoid the responsibility they should have. However, such conception of informed consent is not sound because some patients who felt that they had to keep a researcher or hospital happy for fear of later repercussions by giving their consent to the treatment might consent with full information but they would not consent with full independence. And independence is surely as important as information. In this paper, I would like to argue that we need an alternative idea of consent in research ethics. Independent and Informed consent should be the true benchmark in relevant issues. Besides, I would draw a contemporary moral and political tradition and philosophy followed by Philip Pettit to defend the conception. Net-republicanism is just the one we pursue. We believe the road to build a robust conception of informed consent by justifying the doctrine could be a smoother way to protect both the research participants and researchers.
Wisdom Reconsidered

MARSH, Steven
Chang Jung University (Taiwan)

This paper would like to examine what the notion of philosophy actually entails and how it differs from science as a field of study. It looks at the etymological meanings of philosophy and science in an attempt to find what spheres of concern the two areas cover. While science attempts to give us clearly definable pictures of the world in which we live through immutable laws or facts, philosophy maintains the wisdom to examine these assumptions at all times, thus pushing science to never rest on its laurels. While science is “knowing”, philosophy is “not knowing,” maintaining a humbleness that is the essence of philosophical wisdom. This paper would like to show this through the example of Socrates and Lao Zi, two thinkers who have had profound impact on their respective traditions.
Nominalism and Ideological Parsimony

MARSHALL, Dan
Lingnan University (Hong Kong)

Nominalists hold that there are no abstract objects, such as properties, sets or numbers. Realists about abstract objects, on the other hand, hold that there are abstract objects. It is widely thought that, while nominalism has the theoretical virtue of being more ontologically parsimonious than realism, it has the theoretical vice of being less ideologically parsimonious than realism, since nominalists must regard as primitive many notions realists can reductively analyse. An important class of alleged examples are modal comparitives. For example, while a realist can analyse 'x might have been more massive than y actually is' by (1), it is widely thought that nominalists must regard it as primitive.

(1) x might have been more massive than y actually is =df there are masses m1 and m2 such that i) m1 is less than m2, ii) y has m1, and ii) it is possible that x has m2.

This paper argues that this is not the case: nominalists can provide a reductive analysis of 'x might have been more massive than y actually is' that is just as good as the analysis realists provide and hence do not need to regard it, or other similar modal comparitives, as primitive. It also argues that the manner in which a nominalists can analyse modal comparitives suggest that nominalism isn't less ideologically parsimonious than realism after all. If this is correct in one major reason for rejecting nominalism fails.
For an Approximate Continuity of Structure between Newtonian and Bohmian Mechanics

MATARESE, Vera
University of Hong Kong (Hong Kong)

Structural Realism (SR) endorses a notion of continuity of structure across different theories that needs clarification (Worrall 1989). In light of this, my contribution aims to provide an example of such continuity. More specifically, my talk concerns Newtonian and Bohmian Mechanics and raises the question of whether it is possible to see a continuity of structure between the two theories in case we endorse Ontic Structural Realism (OSR).

In the first part, I present SR and OSR. In a nutshell, while SR claims that there is continuity of structure and not of content (Worrall 1989) between shifts of different Scientific Theories, OSR advances the bolder claim that all that really exists is structure (Ladyman 1998) and that, for this reason, we have to re-conceptualize objects in terms of the relations they entertain (French and Ladyman 2003). These relations are spelled out by the laws of the theory through mathematical equations. In light of this, two theories present a continuity of structure when the laws remain invariant. However, this is hardly ever the case, since often the equations of one theory reappear as limiting cases of another one. In this case the continuity of structure is only approximate.

In the second part, I present the case of the shift between Newtonian and Bohmian Mechanics. Bohmian Mechanics seems to be the most suitable quantum theory that can account for a continuity from Newtonian Mechanics to the quantum domain, since both theories share a primitive ontology that consists of particles in motions. However, if we re-conceptualize the ontology according to OSR, in order to detect a continuity between the two theories, we need a continuity of structure. Hence, the question is whether or not the two theories rely on the same structure. Both theories present a non-local dynamics according to which each particle position depends simultaneously on all the other particles’ positions of the system. Hence, it seems that both ontologies present the same underlying structure. However, contrary to Esfeld (forthcoming), I claim that it is not the case. Indeed, I show that the structure relating all the particles of the system is reducible to many one-to-one relations in Newtonian Mechanics, but not separable in Bohmian Mechanics (Hubert forthcoming). Hence, I argue that while for the Newtonian case the structure is simply non-local, in the Bohmian case it is holistic, since in the latter the whole is prior to the parts.

My final question is whether it is still possible to recover a continuity of structure between the two theories. I claim that the answer is up to the physicists working in the classical limit of Bohmian mechanics. In case it is possible to regard the Newtonian laws as limiting cases of the Bohmian laws when some quantity goes to zero (for example Q or h as was suggested in the literature (Allori et al. 2002, Holland 1993)), then we can still talk of a continuity. However, this continuity is only approximate, since the two theories do not share the same dynamical structure.
Leibnizian Naturalism Seen from his Reception of Anaxagoras’s “perikôresis”

MATSUDA, Tsuyoshi
Kobe University (Japan)

According to the standard understanding of “the chain of beings” originated from Greek and Christian traditions, the hierarchy of living beings or species is said to be not only eternal and immutable, but also *ab initio* determined by the preformation also in Leibniz. The question of this paper is historical, as long as it is thought from Leibniz’s reception of “perikôresis” (rotation or interdependence of things) of Anaxagoras as “pre-Socratic philosopher of nature.” However, the question is at the same time contemporary, because our issue here is our ontological status as living beings from naturalist position. After a series of the contributions by Loemker, Mugnai, Lamara, Antognazza and Beeley to the explication of Leibniz’s “perikôresis” in connection with Bisterfeld’s *Philosophiae primae seminarium* in Leibniz’s *Dissertatio de Arte Combinatoria* and also partially with Anaxagoras, it is interesting to pick up the moment of the temporalization in Leibniz’s perikôresis or “the chain of beings” from the irreversible character of *series rerum*, so as to shed light on a phase of naturalism in his philosophy.

Lovejoy gave us a clear view to Leibniz’s temporalization of “the chain of beings” in *The Great Chain of Being* in 1936 (p.255). We argue for our commitment to the temporalization in Leibniz from his understanding of “perikôresis” and “golden chain of each state of beings” (Dutens II,132ff) in his rebuttal for Stahl in 1709 and the letter to Des Bosses on 7th November in 1710 (GP II,412). Through it, Leibniz turns out to have taken a naturalist step to the temporalization of “the chain of beings” in his recognition of “perikôresis” as causal dependence of present state of living beings on the previous ones directed by Nôus as in DK B12/13, despite his well-known anti-naturalist attitudes from Plato’s *Phaedo*’s episode (67bff. GP IV,446, VII,335).

While for the early modern Platonist such as Cudworth in *The Intellectual System of the Universe*, all kinds of creatures, once created, do not change their “forms” in relationship with the One (728ff), Leibniz sees the transformation of animals in a tremendously long time periods from paleontological observations about fossils in *Protogaea* or zoological and botanical observations of changes of living things in the Book IIIch.6 of *New Essays* which raise the question about the fixity of species including human beings. Leibniz as a “modernist” wishes to casually explain the natural facts within the mechanical framework (GP VI, 544ff) before appeal to the theological components such as providence, although the process of “*evolutio*” in Leibniz’s understanding also must be finally evaluated as optimal growth of the nature predetermined by God (cf. GP VII, 302ff), so as not to deviate from the orthodoxy as far as possible. The consequences of temporalization of “perikôresis” in our claim are still provocative not only in Leibniz study, but also for us today, if we take them seriously as the problem of our origin in this world.
Implicit Biases and Pushmi-Pullyu Representations

MIYAZONO, Kengo
Hiroshima University (Japan)

Tamar Gendler (2008a, 2008b) introduced the notion of “alief” in accounting for the mismatches between what people believe and how they behave. An alief is, according to Gendler, “a mental state with associatively linked content that is representational, affective and behavioral”. It is a sui generis mental state. It cannot be reduced to the familiar mental states such as belief or desire. Rather, it is more basic, developmentally and conceptually, than the familiar states.

Gendler’s claims about aliefs are controversial. Roughly, two kinds of objections have been raised (e.g., Bayne & Hattiangadi 2013; Currie & Ichino 2012). First, it turns out that we do not have to introduce aliefs in order to accounting for the irrational mismatches between beliefs and behaviors. We can explain them in terms of the familiar mental states such as beliefs, desires, imaginations, perceptions or emotions. This suggests that what Gendler called “alief” is, at best, the hodgepodge of the familiar mental states. (hodgepodge objection) Second, Gendler discussed wide range of cases in which beliefs are incoherent with behaviors and argued that aliefs play the key role in those cases. But, it is psychologically unrealistic to expect that those cases have such a unified explanation. For example, it is implausible to expect that the experience of vertigo and the racial implicit biases (Gendler’s own examples) share the same psychological explanation. (disunity objection)

These objections are serious. But, even if we accept the objections, it is still possible to defend most of Gendler’s claims about aliefs. In this paper, I will defend an alternative account of the mismatches between beliefs and behaviors. The account is compatible with most of Gendler’s claims and, at the same time, it avoids the objections to Gendler’s account. In particular, I will argue that the mismatches between beliefs and behaviors are very often explained in terms of what Ruth Millikan (2004, 2005) called “pushmi-pullyu representations”. According to Millikan’s theory of representations, there are three kinds of representations; descriptive representations, directive representations and pushmi-pullyu representations. The job of descriptive representations is to describe states of affairs. The job of directive representations is to direct behaviors. And, the job of pushmi-pullyu representations is to describe states of affairs and direct behaviors at the same time.

Gendler discusses a variety of cases, but my focus in this paper is on implicit biases. The pushmi-pullyu account of implicit biases shares many features with the alief account because pushmi-pullyu representations share many features with aliefs. Unlike the alief account, however, the pushmi-pullyu account avoids hodgepodge objection and disunity objection.
Truth-maker Maximalism and a Boolean Algebra of States of Affairs

NAKAYAMA, Yasuo
Osaka University (Japan)

YUKIMOTO, Taishi
Osaka University (Japan)

A truth-maker maximalism demands that every truth has a truth-maker. Armstrong (2004) proposes the following condition (Necessitation-T): A truth-maker is a thing that necessitates something’s being true. In this presentation, we propose a version of truth-maker maximalism that accepts (Necessitation-T). We construct a Boolean algebra of states of affairs (abbreviated as \(sa\)) and consider not only simple \(sa\) but also composed \(sa\) such as \(e_1 \times e_2\), \(e_1 + e_2\), and \(e^C\). Furthermore, we define a (possible) world as a maximal \(sa\), which can be defined as follows: \(e_1\) is maximal iff (if and only if) \[1 \leq e_1 \] and for every \(e_2\) [if not \(e_1 \leq e_2\), then \(e_1 \times e_2 = 0\]]. Here, \(e_1 \leq e_2\) is defined as \(e_1 \times e_2 = e_1\). We introduce a consistent presupposition set \(S\) that includes all analytic true \(L\)-sentences.

We define a truth-maker as follows: A \(sa\) \(e\) is a truth-maker of \(p\) iff for every world \(w\) in \(Es\), [if \(e\) exists in \(w\), then \(p\) is true in \(w\)]. Here, we assume: \(e\) exists in \(w\) iff \(w \leq e\). We assume a Boolean algebra \((Es, \times, +, C)\) with the following property: For every \(n\)-ary relation \(R\) and all objects \(a_1, \ldots, a_n\) in the universe \(U\), \(R(a_1, \ldots, a_n)\) has exactly one corresponding \(sa\) in \(Es\). 1 and 0 are called the necessary \(sa\) and the impossibility respectively. The deductive closure is defined as usual: \(dc(T) = \{p : p\) is a FOL-consequence of \(T\}\}. Here, FOL is an abbreviation of First-Order Logic. Now, we define some important notions.

(1) \(nec(1) = dc(S)\) and \(nec(0) = [\)the set of all \(L\)-sentences].
(2) Let \(e\) be the \(sa\) in \(Es\) that corresponds to \(R(a_1, \ldots, a_n)\). If \(R(e_1, \ldots, e_n)\) represents \(R(a_1, \ldots, a_n)\), then \(nec(e) = dc(S \cup \{R(e_1, \ldots, e_n)\})\). If \(R(a_1, \ldots, a_n)\) has no representation in \(L\), then \(nec(e) = dc(S)\).
(3) \(nec(e_1 \times e_2) = dc(nec(e_1) \cap nec(e_2))\).
(4) \(nec(e_1 + e_2) = dc(nec(e_1) \cup nec(e_2))\).
(5) \(p\) is necessary in \(e\) iff \(p\) is a member of necessity set \(nec(e)\).
(6) \(p\) is possible in \(e\) iff \(nec(e) \cup \{p\}\) is consistent.
(7) \(p\) is true in world \(w\) iff \(p\) is necessary in \(w\).

Now, it is easy to show the following propositions.

(P1) \(dc(nec(e) \cup nec(e^C)) = nec(0)\) and \(dc(nec(e) \cap nec(e^C)) = nec(1)\).
(P2) If \(e_1 \leq e_2\), then \(nec(e_2) \subseteq nec(e_1)\).
(P3) If \(p\) is necessary in \(e\), then \(e\) is a truth-maker of \(p\).
(P4) If \(e_1 \leq e_2\) and \(p\) is necessary in \(e_2\), then \(e_1\) is a truth-maker of \(p\).
(P5) If \(p\) is necessary in \(e_1\) and \(q\) is necessary in \(e_2\), then \(e_1 \times e_2\) is a truth-maker of \(p \land q\).
(P6) If \(p\) is necessary in \(e\) and \(q\) is a FOL-consequence of \(S \cup \{p\}\), then \(e\) is a truth-maker of \(q\).
(P7) If \(\neg(p \land q)\) and \(p\) are necessary in \(e\), then \(e\) is a truth-maker of \(\neg q\).

In our presentation, we investigate some characteristics of the proposed version of truth-maker maximalism.
Mental File Framework and Pretence Theory

NARUSE, Sho
Nagoya University (Japan)

In this presentation, I will consider Pretence Theory in Mental File Framework that François Recanati advocated in Recanati 2012. Mental file is a bundle of information that a subject stores an individual object. For example, a bundle of information obtained through the perception or hearsay (such as “the present prime minister of Japan”) of Shinzo Abe is a mental file that has a labeling of “Shinzo Abe”. In general, mental files are individualized by the token of the cause relationship that the flow path of the information to the subject from the referent of singular terms. Thus Recanati is characterizing mental files by focusing on relationships, and mental files can be differing numerically while related to the same object.

However, Mental File Framework is face to problem of empty singular terms such as ‘Santa Claus’ and ‘Sherlock Holmes’. These empty singular terms are expressions that referent does not exist in the real world. Recanati is to tolerate the existence of a mental file with these headings, since the subject is able to store information about Santa Claus and Sherlock Holmes. However, these mental files, unlike Shinzo Abe-File, are unloaded files that do not have referents. Therefore, Recanati is necessary to explain the difference of the function of these files and regular files.

Recanati adapt Pretence Tehory, but rejects Meinongian strategy that empty names refer to fictional entities. In other words, Recanati is regarded as a kind of playing act or game of make believe that the speaker is to use an empty name. For example, when a speaker states ‘He is a detective’ about Sherlock Holmes, she is doing the interpretation game of make-believe in which Holmes exists, and is a detective, but not believe Holmes to exist actually. Namely, Recanati’s approach to the empty name of the problem of Recanati focuses on the scene of the pragmatic discourse and how we are using empty names.

For this purpose, Recanati introduces indexed files in which derived, metarepresentational function: they serve to represent how other subjects think about objects in the world. Recanati explain the understanding of discourse and context. However, I criticize that Recanati’s approach explains process of discourse and mutual understanding of speaker and hearer, but failures to resolve the problem of empty names. Because, I point out that the conditions of the using conventionality of empty names as well as understanding of discourse or context are necessary for success of intentional use of empty names. I discuss that Recanati’s Mental File Framework does not meet such condition, and show that it is insufficient as theory of empty names. And I advocate the alternative framework of social network.
Shannon quantifies the amount of information transferred in communication by the receiver’s freedom in selecting a message according to the given signal. Shannon shows that in linguistic communication the probabilistic space of a receiver’s freedom is statistically biased: about 50% of information in the use of linguistic signals is redundant. Such structural aspects of a signal are considered as less important than semantic aspects in theories of intentionality. Dretske argues that informational content of a signal must be anchored to the things in the world prior to the use of the signal because signals exist independently of agents. However cases in animal signaling-communication show that the informational content (or the understanding of it) ontologically and epistemologically depends on the structural aspects of a signal. This sort of primitive forms of communication shows how natural selection gives a rise to structural aspects (i.e. statistical biases in the probabilistic space) that are embedded in the use of a biological signal. In Central America, the dorsal coloration of poison frogs is the signal of alarm to birds. Given the traditional view on the meaning of a signal, the minimal condition for the frog coloration-signal communication can be put as follows: a bird interprets the signal of coloration of a frog (i.e. s) as the alarm (e.g. the frog, f, is toxic, T) only if s reliably correlates with the state of affairs that f is T. Godfrey-Smith, in terms of the signal detection theory, shows that the reliability of a signal not only underlies the correlation but also the epistemic space of the consumer (or receiver). When a bird learns to use the coloration-signal, for instance, the naïve bird’s mortality after attacking a potentially dangerous prey influences the decision-making. These sorts of principles of generalization and discrimination of the learning mechanism have been built into the system by natural selection: i.e. a bird has been evolved to be epistemologically-intrinsically biased in learning to use the coloration-signal. Moreover in virtue of such biases in its epistemic space, a bird can learn to use the coloration-signal regardless to the statistical frequency of the correlation--given that some conspicuous frogs are highly toxic, a bird avoids all conspicuous frogs including mimics. Recent studies in biology show that the correlation requires phenotypic, not genotypic, explanation like predator selection (e.g. the correlation accords only with the tetrachromatic visual system, namely avian predators). This implies that the coloration-signal is the result of coevolutionary history between the producer and consumer. The coevolutionary thesis has been announced by teleosemantics. Millikan argues that a biological sign can only contingently correlate with the signed because the coevolution between the producer and consumer must be prior to whatever states of affairs that are denoted by the sign. The probabilistic correlation is determined by the coevolutionary history: e.g. like the case of batesian mimicry, the way that consumers appropriate the sign influences the way that producers produce the sign. By combining structural aspects embedded in the epistemic space of the consumer (e.g. the statistical probability of the intrinsic epistemic biases of avian predators in hunting conspicuous preys) with structural aspects of the producer (e.g. the statistical probability that a conspicuous frog is toxic) we can in principle get the biases in the statistical probabilistic space of the use of the coloration-signal. Given coevolutionary thesis, the correlation (or a bird’s understanding of the correlation) cannot be prior to structural aspects of the signal in both the epistemological and ontological senses. Ontologically the correlation depends on the phylogenetic traits of the producer and consumer, which are the result of coevolutionary history. Epistemologically a bird’s ontogenetic learning of the use of the signal requires statistical probabilistic biases in the
use of the signal (e.g. a bird can interpret the coloration-signal as the alarm only if it’s internal epistemic space is adequately biased towards the purported message). Therefore the animal signaling demonstrates the case of which the informational process in communication is primarily grounded in terms of the structural aspect rather than the semantic aspect of the signal.
The Role of Plato in Modern Japanese Philosophy

NOTOMI, Noburu
The University of Tokyo (Japan)

Since contemporary philosophy in East Asia is based on modern Western, especially Anglo-American, French and German, philosophies, we have to go back to their origin, i.e. Ancient Greek Philosophy, in order to examine the basis of contemporary philosophy. In Japan, after the mid-19th century when Western ideas and translations flooded the newly opened Japan and spread over East Asia, thinkers and teachers emphasized the importance of Greek Philosophy for development of original Japanese philosophy. While a few specialists in Ancient Greek Philosophy were active at main Japanese universities, notably Ide Takashi (出隆, 1892-1980) and Tanaka Michitaro (田中美知太郎, 1902-1985), many original philosophers, above all, Onishi Hajime (大西祝, 1864-1900), Nishida Kitaro (西田幾多郎, 1870-1945), Watsuji Tetsuro (和辻哲郎, 1889-1960), Tanabe Hajime (田邊元, 1885-1962) and Izutsu Toshihiko (井筒俊彦, 1914-93), studied and used Greek philosophical ideas for their own thinking.

In this paper, I’ll examine the role played by Greek Philosophy, focusing on Plato, and its impact on Japanese philosophies. I’ll discuss how the theory of Ideas (Forms) has been interpreted and used by modern Japanese philosophers from the beginning to the end of the 20th century. There are four main questions.

(1) How and why has Plato been very popular in modern Japan? What aspect was most emphasized?
(2) How do Ancient Philosophy specialists and other Japanese philosophers understand Plato’s philosophy, in particular the theory of Forms?
(3) What was the influence of the translation of the Form (Idea) as “riso” (理想)?
(4) While Platonism has been a main target of contemporary Western philosophers (i.e. the so-called “overturning of Platonism” in Nietzsche and post-modernism), was Plato severely treated in modern Japan?

I’ll discuss these points and thereby illuminate the characteristics of contemporary thinking in East Asia, in relation, and in contrast, to Western Philosophy. I hope to demonstrate that Japanese philosophers show more general sympathies with Plato’s philosophy without fully appreciating the potentiality and danger of his idea of transcendent Forms. They may hardly take Plato’s challenge as seriously as contemporary Western philosophers.
Towards a Unification of Paraconsistent Logics

OMORI, Hitoshi
Kyoto University (Japan)

Paraconsistent logics are characterized by the failure of *ex contradictione quodlibet* (ECQ hereafter). Since the modern birth of paraconsistency, infinitely many systems of paraconsistent logic have been devised and studied based on various motivations. After all, it seems that paraconsistent logics are only loosely connected to each other by a rather general requirement that ECQ should be invalid. But is it really impossible to unify paraconsistent logics? The purpose of the paper is to explore that possibility.

The paper aims at the following claim: paraconsistent negations of the four-valued logic of Nuel Belnap and Michael Dunn and the three-valued logic known as the Logic of Paradox, developed by Graham Priest, are at the core of paraconsistency. Different systems of paraconsistent logic can then be classified by the additional connectives and their semantics. The first half of the paper discusses the classification. In the second half of the paper, we address the question as to whether we can include Jaskowski’s discussive logic in this picture. We show that there is an affirmative answer to this question.
The Grand Pessimistic Induction

PARK, Seungbae
Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology (Korea)

After the decades of the intense debate over the old pessimistic induction (Poincaré, 1905/1952), it has become clear that it has at least the following three problems. First, it commits the fallacy of biased statistics. Second, it erroneously groups together past theories of different fields of science in which scientific revolutions occurred in different frequencies. Third, it overlooks the fact that some components of past theories were preserved. I argue that these three problems entitle us to construct what I call the grand pessimistic induction that since the old pessimistic induction has infinitely many hitherto hidden problems, the new pessimistic induction (Stanford, 2006) also has infinitely many hitherto hidden problems.
The objective of this paper is to clarify Heidegger’s interpretation of Cézanne’s late works. In his *From the Experience of Thought* (*Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*, GA13) and *Things Thought* (*Gedachtes*, GA81), Heidegger refers to the meaning of Cézanne’s late works. Although the reference is quite short, it is very important because its clarification can possibly shed light on the characteristics of Cézanne’s late works and of Heidegger’s philosophical thought. In his “Cézanne’s Doubt” (“Le doute de Cézanne”), which was published in 1945, French philosopher Merleau-Ponty already tried to analyze Cézanne’s paintings using the methodology of phenomenology. And “Cézanne’s Doubt” has had a tremendous influence on philosophical approaches to Cézanne’s paintings. East Asian philosophy, including that of South Korea, is not an exception. Yet, researchers have paid little attention to Heidegger’s interpretation of Cézanne’s works. For these reasons, this paper first examines Merleau-Ponty and other researchers’ analyses of Cézanne’s paintings and then shows the singularity of Heidegger’s interpretation of Cézanne. By doing so, this paper proves that Heidegger, along with Cézanne, wanted to advance toward “strong realism” and thus was a strong realist.
Why is Wittgenstein Not a Quase-realist Non-cognitivist?

PERUZZO Jr., Léo
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná (Brazil)

This conference analyzes how, from Wittgenstein’s position in relation to ethics, it is not possible to derive a non-cognitivist posture as intended, for example, by Simon Blackburn’s quasi-realism. Firstly the consequences of the interpretation in relation to the existence of moral propositions are rebuilt; then we argue that there is a misconception in how the dichotomy between facts and values is understood. Lastly we point out that on the one hand the Viennese philosopher refuses a Platonic perspective on the rules, and on the other hand the thesis that there are no objective rules. The rules consist of an intersubjective expression shared by the human form of life, a diametrically opposite argument to the quasi-realist non-cognitivism of Blackburn.
Imagination has played a major role in theories of numerous aesthetic phenomena: it figures in accounts of the interpretation of art, of our emotional responses to art, and even of what art is, to name but a few topics. But imagination seemingly has a role to play also in aesthetic theorising itself, in particular in aesthetic thought experiments. Thought experiments in general (in science and philosophy) pose an epistemic puzzle: how can a merely imagined scenario yield knowledge? In the paper, I have a look at a special version of this puzzle that some thought experiments in aesthetics occasion. Many thought experiments in aesthetics—e.g. Kendall Walton’s *guernica*-experiment, or Arthur Danto’s (merely) imagined eight-hour long film of the title page of Tolstoy’s *War and Peace*—involve making judgements regarding the aesthetic properties of merely imagined works of art. But according to a widely accepted principle in aesthetics (“the acquaintance principle”), one has to be acquainted with a work—seen it, heard it, and so on—in order to be able to judge its aesthetic qualities. But no one has ever seen Danto’s merely imagined film of Tolstoy’s book. So how are we (if we are) in a position to judge its aesthetic properties? I propose a solution to the puzzle by elaborating on Tamar Gendler’s notion of “quasi-observation,” (or, what seems to be the same thing, imagined observation,) which she holds to be a common element of thought experimenting. As a coda, I also give a sketch of how aesthetic thought experiments are not only a tool for theorising about art, but often also figure in the production of art.
On Wisdom:
Revisiting Chandogya Upanishad, Cusanus’ Visio Intellectualis,
and Heidegger’s Aletheia

PURINO, Maria Majorie
University of San Carlos (Philippines)

The paper aims to present three waves of philosophical thinking from the East and West and how each concept stakes a claim on wisdom. It proposes that the Chandogya Upanishad, Cusanus’s Visio Intellectualis, and Heidegger’s Aletheia all involve a kind of seeing that points directly to the heart of wisdom. This research argues that these three traditions are worth revisiting to remind us of the meaning of life and the wisdom that lies in the seeming everyday experience of the world.

It begins with an exposition of the Chandogya Upanishad and how this involves the attentive sitting-down of the disciple who listens to his teacher’s instructions on the highest reality that dispels ignorance. This ceaseless searching for the truth is the key to wisdom.

Nicolas Cusanus, speaks of the visio intellectualis as not merely a syllogistic product of pure intellectualization or abstraction but as a direct seeing or intuition that closes the gap between the finite and the infinite. Such is wisdom.

And, finally, the paper will recall Martin Heidegger’s view of aletheia as the unconcealment of truth. Wisdom is beyond the intellectualist principle of non-contradiction, beyond mere rationalization, but one that comes from a deeper existential source that allows one just to see. Ultimately, this paper argues that wisdom is reverence. Such is seen in the Chandogya Upanishad and its seeing that reality is an absolute unity, Cusanus’ intellectual vision albeit pointed to an absolute maximum and Heidegger’s unconcealment of the clearing of Being.
Rereading Derrida’s *La Voix et le phenomene*

RYU, Eui Geun  
Silla University (Korea)

This paper starts by recalling the philosophical importance and significance of Derrida’s criticism of Husserl. We reconstructed and reviewed under the subtitle of strategies of deconstruction how Derrida unfolded Husserl's phenomenology in *La Voix et le phénomène*. We examined critically Husserl’s phenomenological concept of sign focused on indication, expression, and temporality. His reflection is so much centered on presence that sign results in nothing. This result is not what his phenomenology of sign was intended to do. But it happens. With this, his linguistic reduction is revealed to neither make complete nor be accomplished with self-evidence. Derrida explains this phenomenological limit is drawn from some kind of structure which is referred to as the complicity between ideality and voice. By relying on this we recognize the original insights of Derrida’s reading of Husserl. It lies in the fact that the naïveté immanent in Husserl’s presence is supported originally by non-presence, that is, *différence*. While we classify and reply to objections raised against Derrida, it is shown that he is defendable. After this is successful, we suggest what we were able to learn from Derrida’s confrontation with Husserl.
On Different Concepts of Experiential Memory

SAKURAGI, Shin
Shibaura Institute of Technology (Japan)

What is the concept of ‘memory’? Although a great number of researchers in a wide variety of fields have been trying to answer this question, not too many have shown interest in what is meant by ‘memory’ and other linguistic expressions of memory. Despite seeming obviousness of the concept, linguistic studies have shown that folk concepts of memory—which we mean by using ordinary memory expressions—are much more diverse and complex than they appear.

In this presentation, I inquire varieties of English memory expressions, and examine its philosophical implications. The main topic of this presentation is a particular usage of the most commonly used memory verb in English, ‘remember.’ When this verb takes a gerund (or gerund phrase)—‘remember V-ing’—as its object, a unique concept of experiential memory is expressed. I illuminate the concept by comparing several usages of ‘remember’ which express experiential memories, and show that not every language, if any, has an expression sharing important features of ‘remember V-ing’ by illustrating how experiential memory is expressed in Japanese.

A philosophical interest of my argument lies in a crucial role played by ‘remember V-ing’ in the Lockean memory theory of personal identity, and the circularity problem, which the expression directly entails. I argue that the Lockean memory theory has been formulated by appeal to ‘remember V-ing’ because of its three important features: qualitative content, appropriate causal history, and grammatical ellipsis. Shoemaker’s approach simply assumes that the circularity problem is merely contingent upon the third feature, grammatical ellipsis, of ‘remember V-ing.’ Hence, he tries to solve the problem by formulating his theory by appeal to a different concept of experiential memory which only shows the first two features, and famously calls that concept quasi-memory.

I argue that there is a deeper issue concerning the second feature, appropriate causal history, of ‘remember V-ing’ in Shoemaker’s approach. If an appeal to quasi-memory is to formulate the Lockean memory theory of a tenable sort without facing it with the circularity problem, we have to ask what type of experiential memory is quasi-memory. For, as I discuss, there are a variety of experiential memories, and unlike ‘remember V-ing,’ some of them do not guarantee personal identity between a rememberer and the original doer/experiencer of what is remembered. I argue that such call for specification ultimately leads us to a new circularity problem, since an appeal to ‘M-type causal chains,’ in terms of which Shoemaker characterizes the concept of quasi-memory, takes us back to an appeal to ‘remember V-ing.’
A Social-Epistemic Approach to Creativity

SATO, Kunimasa
Keiai University (Japan)

Until recently, creativity has long been exclusively the object of empirical studies except for sporadic consideration by a few philosophers, such as Briskman (1980). In recent years, however, by drawing more attention to the outcomes of psychology and cognitive science, philosophers have increasingly begun to consider creativity. As may implicitly be assumed, the notion of creativity arguably varies in different disciplines, such as art and science (cf. Gaut, 2010). For example, artists and scientists may qualify as creative in distinct senses. In what follows, I will confine the argument regarding creativity to an epistemic context, that is, the context in which new knowledge is attained; “knowledge” will not strictly be analyzed, but will in essence refer to ideas and theories that are confirmed to be true through inquiry, including scientific inquiry. It is reasonable, at least at the initial stage of consideration, to restrict our focus to creativity that concerns only knowledge in the above sense.

This study will argue for a social-epistemic approach to creativity. Specifically, I will first expound two constitutive features of this approach, which will be briefly described below. I will then argue that the social-epistemic approach is more beneficial to comprehending the nature of creativity than a virtue-based account, such as Kieran (2014), whether “virtue” means cognitive faculties, skills, motivation, or character traits.

The first feature of the social-epistemic approach is that it regards products as the primary object of creativity, rather than persons. As Goldman (1986, Chapter 6) observes, the objects of epistemic evaluation include products of inquiry, such as published papers and books; in appraising knowledge perceived as the products of inquiry, the quality of that knowledge must be considered. I will first expound novelty and originality as criteria of knowledge as creative products of inquiry. I will then argue that, in considering creativity, personal qualities are derivative in that people who generate new and original works, rather than those endowed with innate genius, are entitled to be considered creative.

The second feature is that social evaluation is necessary for a product to be creative. For example, in order to discover new knowledge, it may be crucial for inquirers to allow critics to understand the connections between existent literature and their accomplishments. At this first stage, the quality of a product must be evaluated against the background of an existing relevant field. It seems, however, that on gaining epistemic credibility, inquirers are socially granted the right to challenge the criterion of novelty in a certain field. At this second stage, a personal quality, such as the epistemic trustworthiness of a person seems to be crucial. For example, a work produced by a noted scholar can be creative because it first establishes a novel field within their discipline, not because the work contributes to an existing field. This will form a distinct stage in that, unlike the first stage, a product can be regarded as a pioneering work even without being considered against the existent background.
Susan Wolf has argued that “meaning arises when subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness.” As several critics have pointed out, Wolf’s theory is strangely quiet about the temporality of human existence. It overlooks the way in which meaning is bound up with the stories of our lives. Different writers have attempted to correct this omission by drawing on the notion of narrative. It has been argued that the meaningfulness of a person’s life is determined, at least in part, by the narrative “shape” her life assumes (Kauppinnen). Even more strongly put, it has been argued that meaning resides in the “narrative values” expressed by a life, such as the devotion exhibited in a life (May). In this paper, I will take up the question of the relationship between meaning in life and narrative. I will criticize the approaches taken by May and Kauppinnen for offering too narrow and limited accounts of the way narrative informs meaning in life. Following this critique, I will advance my own account of how narrative is related to meaningfulness in life centering on the way in which agents relate differently to their past than they do to their future.
Freedom, Irony and Truth: 
Rorty’s Pragmatist Conception of a Liberal Utopia

SEKULOVSKI, Jordanco
Kobe University (Japan)

This presentation introduces Richard Rorty’s vision of a “Liberal Utopia”, and explores the possibility of transformation of democratic institutions and practices, as well as their potential to bring about desired social change and innovation. Rorty’s attempt to conceptualize a socio-political model in the form of a Liberal Utopia is considered. His assertions on the contingency of language, society, and selfhood are explored. Under the contingency of language, the figure of the ironist is defined, and Rorty’s conception of vocabulary is discussed. Under the contingency of society, Rorty’s definition of liberalism, his opposition to metaphysical culture, and his notions concerning utopian politics are defined. The importance of a historicist turn and the use of irony in opposition to theology and metaphysics will be examined, as well as the necessity to substitute Freedom for Truth as the goal of thinking and social progress. Other important themes discussed are Rorty’s theory on the separation of the private and public spheres of life as well as that of cruelty and human solidarity. In this manner, a critical analysis of the distinction between private doubt and public social hope is presented by assessing the possibility of a post-religious and post-metaphysical liberal culture.
A Study of the ‘Self’ in Nietzsche and Zen Buddhism

SEO, Kwang Yul
Kyung Hee University (Korea)

Nietzsche is the 19th German philosopher. In his time, the sutra of the Buddhism was begun to translate into German. Nietzsche knew about the Buddhism relatively well. He mentioned “Buddhism” in his own texts 173 times. But his understanding was not so experienced, because the studies about Buddhism was still in its infancy at that time. However, his free intuition was analogous to the Buddhism in many respects. Especially his aphoristic style and the idea about the ‘self’ were similar to Zen Buddhism. Nietzsche’s intention to think differently made himself non-European thinker in Europe. He would become an outsider of European culture, and his inclination of escaping from tradition and convention resembled Zen Buddhism closely.

This paper aims to discuss about: 1) the affinities of Nietzsche and Zen Buddhism, 2) comparison of ‘the self’ in Nietzsche and Zen Buddhism 3) psychological features immanent in Both thought. To interpret Nietzsche and Zen Buddhism psychologically is helpful to understand Nietzsche as a physiologist and the therapist of life. Nietzsche used the ‘self’ in order to indicate a ‘doer’ without ‘ego’. He thought, the ‘ego’ or ‘Ich’ was the illusion that our reason created. In the philosophy of Nietzsche and Buddhist, the enlightenment was emancipation from an obsession with ‘I’(atman). The negation of ‘I’ resulted ironically in an affirmation of everything, the world as it is.

The comparison between Nietzsche and Zen Buddhism is the familiar thema to us, because Korea is one of the representative regions where Zen Buddhism developed philosophically. But domestic studies about Nietzsche and Zen is not so many. Especially, 13th Century Japan Zen Buddhist Dogen(1200-1253) is very similar with Nietzsche in ‘self-overcoming’. Both Nietzsche and Dogen negated the unchanged ‘I’ and any system in thinking. Nietzsche wrote, “I distrusted all systems and systematizers and avoid them”(KSA 12, 9[188]) Also Zen Master like Dogen had rejected any attempts to fix their teachings into a system. They preferred the koan collections to the systematic sutra canon. The style of koan is similar to the Nietzsche’s aphoristic style.

Although their timely distance, Nietzsche and Zen Buddhists had the character of critics in common. They criticized the culture and resisted the tradition. Nietzsche spoke the necessity of new culture creation incessantly. Zen Buddhists like Dogen blamed other Buddhist schools for being too metaphysical. They accepted the world as it is, and rejected the otherworld. Their ‘self’ would not be in isolation from ‘body’. Their common horizon in philosophizing about the ‘self’ was the living and acting body. But they wouldn’t settle for the status quo. Their changeable ‘body’ encompassed the concept of ‘self-overcoming’. The ‘self’ lives only as the ‘body’ and communicate with the outside world. The ‘self’ would expand its own dominance ceaselessly.

This Study is meaningful in reifying the relevance of Nietzsche and Zen Buddhism and the influence of Buddhism to Nietzsche. And It is helpful to understand the image of Nietzsche as culture-creator and the thinker of ‘self-overcoming’.
Precautionary principle (PP) is a well-known but controversial idea. In a recent book *Philosophy and the precautionary principle* (2014), a philosopher of science Daniel Steel addressed the controversies, and proposed a new concept of PP as a decision approach, which involves three types of interpretation of PP (decision rule, procedural requirement, and epistemic rule). Although Steel's idea seems promising for defending PP, there are some defects in his arguments. I will point out two major disadvantages and propose alternative arguments in order to improve Steel’s approach.

We have several candidates of decision approaches other than PP. Risk trade-off analysis (RTA) is one of the most promising rival approaches. So, the key question is, why should we adopt PP instead RTA? To answer this question, it is necessary to argue that only PP can offer a rationale and other approaches like RTA cannot offer it. Steel discuss the corrective role against the historical inaction bias in environmental policies: (1) while the 'proportionality' component of PP offers guides which limit the considerations of possible harms and these guides serve to correct the inaction bias, RTA doesn't have such guides. (2) While RTA has the inaction bias because it doesn't focus on the beneficial side effects of a policy, PP doesn't have such a bias. I will point out careful reading for relevant works makes his arguments invalid. Actually the advocates of RTA offer a guiding concept about which harm we should consider. And because the decision rule of Steel's PP seems to consider only three factors (harm, knowledge, and recommended action), it is difficult to understand why a decision by PP take care of the possible benefits.

There might be alternative arguments for the rationale of Steel’s PP. PP often has been associated with public engagement for decision making. I will suggest that public engagement can become a key difference between Steel's PP and RTA. Some researchers claim particular types of participation process can avoid deadlock situations and lead to timely solutions, that is, can be a useful tool to correct the inaction bias. They argue that adversarial conflict resolutions often lead to irresolvable situations because the evidences under scientific uncertainty tend to be given different interpretations and the confronting people disagree with each other's analysis. As an alternative, they have tried to establish a new collaborative resolution approach in which opposing people are empowered to get an equal footing and encouraged to negotiate which research they need, how to interpret data, when the research deadline is, and so on. Although Steel's PP would be consistent with such participation process, there are reasons why RTA would not. The epistemic interpretation of Steel's PP can accommodate ethical, political, and social values within science, therefore admit the participation and negotiation within the risk assessment. The advocates of RTA don't seem to agree with such an epistemic idea.
The Failure of the Bottom-up Approach of Doing and Allowing

SONG, Fei
University of Hong Kong (Hong Kong)

Commonsense morality endorses a distinction between harming and allowing harm. Very roughly, it claims that everything being equal, it is impermissible for an agent to harm someone, but it is typically permissible for an agent to allow someone to suffer harm. The defence of the moral distinction between harming and allowing harm normally aims at completing two tasks. First, it usually aims at providing a non-moral-conceptual analysis of the distinction between doing and allowing. For harming is an instance of doing, while allowing harm is an instance of allowing an event to occur. Second, it works on a normative justification for the morally significance of the distinction, namely, why we ought to draw a clear-cut between harming and allowing harm. Two alternative approaches, therefore, are available for being adopted. The first approach is which I shall call the bottom-up approach; the second is which I shall call the top-down approach. Philosophers, who undertake the bottom-up approach, primarily find a formulation of the distinction, and derive a theory of the moral significance of the distinction. For philosophers who undertake the top-down approach, in contrast, the conceptual distinction becomes derivative and secondary, whereas the second task becomes primary. The aim of this paper is to argue that the bottom-up approach is doomed to fail. For, the arguments under this approach are either bounded with inadequacy or being subjected to circularity. At the bottom level (i.e. conceptual level), when philosophers refer to the nature of the distinction between doing and allowing, they often associate the term “positive” and “negative” with “doing” and “allowing” respectively. Generally speaking, an agent does harm if she is positively relevant to the adverse upshot, whereas the agent does allowing harm if she is negatively relevant to the adverse upshot. Works, then, have been concerned on the analysis of “positive relevance” and “negative relevance”. I argue that so far no account of such analysis has been proved as being match with our ordinary use of the concepts in a wide range of cases. Each account of the distinction between doing and allowing is subjected to the challenges from certain counterexamples. At the top level, the works have been concerned on the justification of asymmetrical normativity between negative rights and positive right: why everything being equal, negative rights should have more moral significance than positive rights. Any attempt at an explanation has been either inadequate or has presupposed the moral significant of the distinction of doing and allowing, the very point we are supposed to argue for.
In my paper I wish to apply Stephen Geisz’s understanding of Mencius’ strategic-pragmatic use of language, to Daoist thought particularly as found in the Daodejing and Zhuangzi. According to Geisz, Mencius had a strategic-pragmatic view of language in that the latter did not see the function of language primarily as representing truth. Rather, Mencius viewed language as mainly an instrument to regulate behavior. Because of this, Mencius used language in such a way as to have the consequence of promoting the Confucian Dao, and more specifically, promoting the Confucian virtues of benevolence (ren 仁) and rightness (yi 義).

Now, what I aim to show is that the view of language that the Daoist thinkers had can be understood as an extension of this Mencian strategic-pragmatic view of language. However, unlike Mencius, Laozi and Zhuangzi can be said to have pushed the strategic-pragmatic view of language to its inevitably paradoxical conclusion. That is to say, Laozi and Zhuangzi considered that the best way of regulating behavior is to ultimately not use language. This can be seen for example in Wang Bi’s reading the Daodejing where he shows that Laozi’s plan is to lead people towards virtue, but by precisely refusing to promote the public articulation of such virtues as benevolence and rightness. I conclude by noting how this paradox of behavior-regulating language has parallels with how contemporary moral theories are criticized for being “esoteric” and “self-effacing.”
Improved understandings of both physics and computing have challenged notions of free will and increasingly subverted the view that free will comes from some physical property of the brain. This paper proposes a model of free will that is not based on the physical human brain, but is constructed to fit the practical use of the term; to assess responsibility and blameworthiness. This notion of free will is robust to models of physics, and can be used as a sound basis for a law and morality that spans humans and intelligent automata, including robots and software.

The contemporary free will debate typically separates compatibilist and incompatibilist conceptions, with compatibilism lacking tension with science. The debate tends to look at nondeterministic and deterministic scientific theories differently, with some arguing that randomness creates free will. This is tenuous because it is difficult to see how an act by coin toss is free will, under any conception of that term. The current debate makes two mistakes. Firstly, it approaches free will at the wrong level of abstraction, like trying to explain money from subatomic particles. Higher-level patterns are needed. Secondly, the debate tends to conflate free will with consciousness, a separate unconnected phenomenon. In fact, these mistakes are not new, but have consistently coloured the debate all the way back to Descartes.

I start from the perspective that free will is a moral and political concept. Morality decides if an action is good, bad, or neither, and then assigns blame. Blame is feedback designed to influence present and future actions. The prospect of blame will not influence a falling rock, but it will influence a person driving a car. However, blame can be costly, and must be assigned selectively where it works. Free will helps us decide when blame is worth assigning.

For agent A, act phi will have free will if, given n reasons r_1 … r_n, the process A(r_1 … r_i … r_n) to act has the following two properties.

1. There exists some prospect of blame r_i among the n reasons, and
2. There exist two distinct feasible values for r_i, a and b, such that phi = A(r_1 … a ... r_i ... r_n) and ~phi = A(r_1 ... b ... r_n), where ~phi is not phi.

This conception of free will as sensitivity to blame may not overlap perfectly with uses of the term in common language. However, it is true to the underlying concept, and consistent with use of the term in law, ethics, and political philosophy. This conception also provides explanatory power. For example, it explains why we do not assign free will to actions taken in a person's sleep. It also explains how insane people can lack free will despite being conscious. Furthermore, this conception is measurable and quantifiable, and extends naturally beyond human biology to automata, and possibly even collective actions. It has greater applicability, while not disrupting current dependants.
Ricoeur once said that in his philosophizing, he never asked such question as What is philosophy? Instead, he deals with particular problems. He has conceived of his reflections as a form of involvement with the City. His kind of philosophizing is a form of critical pedagogy which aims to bring about a democratic economy, just society, and good life. The intention of this paper is twofold. First, it will present Paul Ricoeur’s practical solution, by way of culture as a practical and concrete mediator, to the problem that the antinomy of values created. Since values do not come from a vacuum, the only way to carry out any interest in emancipation possible is to incarnate values within culture. Ricoeur argues about the antinomous nature of value as either embedded in nature; thus it precedes man or as a product of man’s creative freedom. To escape the antinomy of values, Ricoeur made it into a living circle. He does it by situating the discussion within the framework of the debate between Hermeneutic philosophy and critique of ideologies. He sees in the debate the possibility of outlining the concrete mediation which the theory of values demands. Second, the paper will duplicate Ricoeur’s practical solution to the problem of the antinomy of values to the problem of the Philippines’ contradictory dual-value system in order to engage discursively in the finding of a philosophical solution to the problem. The two incongruous value systems are derived from the traditional (suppressed) culture and the modern (dominant), western-imbibed culture. They simultaneously make demands on how the Filipinos react to life’s realities. As a result, incompatible legal and cultural norms marked the Philippines which oftentimes force the loob (inner self) into conflict situations leading to the breakdown of its social institutions. Broken social institutions mean that they do not respond to the life-needs of the people.
In my paper, I partially defend Philippa Foot’s view in answer to the question “why be moral?”. In her *Natural Goodness* (2001) and “Rationality and Goodness” (2004), Foot proposes two ideas: Ethical Naturalism and what I call the “Anti-Humean Theory of Practical Rationality”. I argue that we should abandon the former and adopt the latter in answering the question “why be moral?”.

In Section 1, I discuss Foot's Anti-Humean Theory of Practical Rationality. Foot divides the Humean Theory of Practical Rationality into the self-interest theory and the desire-fulfilment theory (Foot [2001] 10). To answer the question “why should I be moral?”, however, Foot argues that this ‘should’ is neither the self-interested ‘should’ nor the ‘should’ of desire-fulfillment. Foot borrows Warren Quinn’s idea to “try it the other way round” (Ibid. 63). Quinn argues that morality is “a necessary condition of practical rationality” and that the strategy of trying to fit morality into an independent conception of practical rationality is misguided. Foot responds to the question “why be moral?” by saying that “we can no more make sense of the question “Why should I be moral?” than we can make sense of the question “Why should I act self-interestedly?”” (Foot [2004] 8). Someone might ask, “How, if at all, is a 'should' backed up by considerations of desire-fulfillment linked conceptually with a 'should' backed up by prudential considerations or a 'should' backed up by moral considerations?” (Ibid. 9). Foot argues that the conceptual link is provided by Natural Goodness. “It is … by reference to facts about the way things of different species live their lives that we can see the unity of the three rationalizing categories that we set side by side for human beings.” (Ibid. 9). In this way, Foot's view becomes a form of Ethical Naturalism. It should be noted that if there are other ways of uniting these three categories, then we need not accept Ethical Naturalism.

In Section 2, I examine Foot's Ethical Naturalism. In her *Natural Goodness*, Foot emphasizes that "evaluations of human will and action share a conceptual structure with evaluations of characteristics and operations of other living things, and can only be understood in these terms" (Foot [2001] 5). In order to describe the conceptual structure of these evaluations, Foot utilises Michael Thompson's notion of an 'Aristotelian categorical' (Ibid. 27-30). However, this idea has been sharply criticized (Chrisoula [2006], Millum [2006], Woodcock[2006]). I argue that it is no longer defensible.

In Section 3, I examine other possible ways to integrate the categories of practical rationality. One possibility is to take a Kantian approach. Julia Markovits argues that Kant’s conception of happiness as an “umbrella-end” explains the relation among inclination-based ends, the prudential imperative and the moral imperative (Markovits [2014] 123-129). Another possibility is utilitarian. Katarzyna de Lazarri-Radek and Peter Singer argue that the dualism of practical reason can be resolved in favor of impartiality (de Lazarri-Radek & Singer [2014] 197). I argue that the former approach harmonises with Foot’s Theory of Practical Rationality.
Moral Realism and the Wide-Spread Directed Change in Moral Judgments

SUZUKI, Makoto
Kansai University of Welfare Sciences (Japan)

It is often argued that the existence of wide-spread disagreement in moral judgments undermine moral realism, the view that there are objective moral truths. Simply put, the argument goes like this; moral disagreements are abundant all over the world and through human history, and do not cease to exist. The best explanation of this phenomenon is that there is no objective fact of the matter in morality. So moral realism is false. Realists assume the defensive, pointing out that the extents of moral disagreements are exaggerated, and arguing that such a disagreement is consistent with the objectivity of morality (Sayre-McCord, Geoff, "Moral Realism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/moral-realism).

The meta-ethical tables might be turned. While the existence of moral disagreement is undeniable, Peter Singer has pointed out that there is also a certain trend in moral judgments in long-term human history (The Expanding Circle (Princeton UP, 1981)). With the help of reason, our moral concern has extended from our fellow men through people from different genders, social ranks, tribes and races, and even to non-human animals. That is, while the interests of ‘outsiders’ were often ignored in the past, they have become taken into account in moral judgments. This phenomenon of the “expanding circle” has again come under the spotlight recently, especially with the publication of Steven Pinker’s The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (Viking, 2011). Using various statistics and referring to Singer’s work, he argues that there is a general tendency of decrease in violence, and this is partly brought about by the change of moral attitudes through the humanitarian revolution of the Enlightenment. Pinker suggests the possibility that the existence of this trend supports moral realism.

If moral disagreements can undermine moral realism, then can convergence in moral judgments support moral realism? If the answer is affirmative, is the current status of evidence for the directed trend provides support for moral realism? This presentation examines these questions. If the directed change in moral judgments has been produced through cognitive means and based on empirical evidence, it is plausible that the change involves the discovery of certain objective facts and the accumulation of knowledge. The current status of evidence for the directed change suggests that the antecedent is satisfied. However, the discovery might not be that of moral facts, and the knowledge might not be moral one. Perhaps human beings have discovered the facts that only causally influence their moral judgments, and the accumulated knowledge of these non-moral facts fully explain the unifying trend in these judgments. Then the crucial question is if moral judgments are about those facts that have been discovered. If so, we can defend moral realism, as the fact that moral judgments are about are presumably moral ones.

This presentation argues that the most plausible realist strategy is arguing that moral judgments are partly about the promotion of individual well-being, of which human beings have become more informed through empirical discovery.
In this paper I will argue that an individual can, in one and the same mental act, have both conceptual and perceptual data in consciousness. Specifically, I will argue that in perception we can be conscious of objectual data given us by the senses, and at the same time certain abstract entities – what I will call ‘type-concepts’. By type-concept I am referring to a general concept that captures the essential features of an object in the world and allows a perceiver to form beliefs about it. By objectual data I am referring sense perceptual information that has as its content non-conceptualised objects (as opposed to, say, syntactical propositions or states of affairs). In discussing the union of concept and percept in perception, I want to suggest that in mental acts like perception consciousness is undivided.
This paper concerns so-called *Identity Thesis* (named by Rabern (2012)) about the content of a sentence, according to which the compositional semantic value (content) of a sentence in a context is identical to its assertoric content (or if you wish, “what is said” in a context). Identity Thesis was explicitly supported by Kaplan (1989) and is still the orthodox view in contemporary philosophy of language since it provides us a great simplicity for the job of theorizing our linguistic communication in the sense that theory of *what sentences mean* naturally coheres with theory of *what we say*, and furthermore, by accepting the thesis we seem to come closer to the exact nature of proposition. However, this tide has recently shifted. Some theorists (e.g. Ninan (2010), Rabern (2012)) inspired by Lewis (1980) have claimed that there are potential difficulties in the identification and we should carefully distinguish compositional semantic value from assertoric content. For example, Rabern points out that Kaplanian theory of demonstratives contains assignment shifters (*monsters*) operating on some assignment-neutral content, so contrary to Kaplan, what is said cannot be seen as compositional value. In this paper, I will take a close look at the relationship between these two theoretical notions, and then, following the theorists stated above, argue that we need not adhere to Identity Thesis. My claim is that some of the controversial questions on (indexical) contextualism-relativism debate can be clarified or dissolved without abandoning the advantages of both sides if two distinct contents can be expressed by a single sentence. I also want to indicate that the view endorsed in this paper has an influence on the broader issue, that is, the boundary between semantics and pragmatics.
There are various discussions on the role of desires in the Xunzi and how transformation of nature (hau xing 化性), while some scholars maintain that desires are impotent to motivate actions and it is essentially the heart-mind that initiates actions, others maintain that desires are important motivating elements. This paper aims to provide an interpretation of the Xunzi that supports the latter view. In this paper, I will show that desires in the Xunzi are essentially motivating because of its “direction of fit.” Besides, I will show that desires in the Xunzi are also composed of an evaluative element on top of the common interpretation that desires are merely urges. By analyzing desires in these two components, I suggest that actions of the petty man are mainly influenced by desires as urges, or falsehoods in the evaluative element, while that of the gentleman are influenced by the evaluative element of desires. Under this interpretation of the Xunzi, the function of the heart-mind is to acquire knowledge and to make correct judgment on what is allowed that provides the connection, or reason in Humean picture of motivation, between desires and the objects of desires.
"Singularity" as a Philosophical Problem

TODAYAMA, Kazuhisa
Nagoya University (Japan)

"Singularity" is defined very roughly as the near future state of affaires in which speed of technological advancement will eventually make a super-human artificial intelligence come true. This usage of the term “singularity” was coined by a science fiction writer Vernor Vinge, in 1983. Then it was popularized by a futurist Ray Kurzweil in his bestselling book The Singularity is Near in 2005.

No matter how you understand what the singularity is, I agree with David Chalmers in that the idea of singularity is should be taken seriously. For it seems to raise a series of questions concerning our future survival as human being. For example, are coming super-human machines friendly or hostile to us? If hostile, what will they do to us? Can we coexist with something that are far more intelligent than we? If super-human machines put us in a servile position, won’t we lose sight of the meaning of life? Is it good thing for us to advance development of such super AI’s at all? And so on....

Sci-fi people, scientists and philosophers have started to discuss these questions. I think these concerns are understandable and not groundless. However, I am discontent with the present situation of the controversy over singularity. There are two major disadvantages in how the controversy is being conducted.

First, there are still a lot of ambiguities in the key concepts used to formulate the singularity problems. The most typical is the word "intelligent". What does "more intelligent than human" mean? Unless we have a clear answer to this question, the concept of "singularity" will remain unclear and consequently so-called singularity problems will also remain ill-posed. So, we have to do philosophical analysis of key concepts first. My position is that intelligence is a multi-dimensional complex, therefore there will be as many kinds of "super-intelligence" as the number of dimensions intelligence has.

Secondly, scenarios leading to the singularity the authors use in their arguments are simplistic and unrealistic. They seem to imagine the scenario this way: someday in the near future (mad) scientists will succeed in development of a super AI, but until then we humans will remain as intelligent as we are now. Then, the AI smarter than we will take control over human beings....

However, this scenario is all-too-simple. Before a super-AI appears, we have to go through many stages of research and development each of which produces a machine intelligence that is not smarter than human but smarter than any existing machines. At each stage, we will have some experience to coexist with such "half-way intelligent" machines. We will think and lead "our" lives with intelligent machines. If so, a thinking agent will become something like a man-machine symbiosis or a cyborg long before the advent of the "super-intelligence". Humans as we are will have already been wiped out long before the singularity comes.

In my presentation, I will analyze basic notions included in "the singularity problems" and propose a more realistic scenario to start with.
Does Emergence Transform Traditional Metaphysics?

TU, Chialin
Chang Jung Christian University (Taiwan)

It is undeniable that one of the possible solutions to the mind-brain problem in the philosophy is the so-called emergentism. It is characterized as a middle way between positions: substance dualism and reductive physicalism. There is a general agreement that emergent properties are entities which are based on lower physical particles, but they have properties which go beyond of their physical parts. The most important question among philosophers is whether all the non-physical properties of worldly phenomena are determined their physical properties, even if they cannot be explained in terms of them. It is commonly believed that the properties of many phenomena are somehow grounded in other phenomena despite having properties significantly different from them. The intuitive idea is that somehow ‘the whole is more than the sum of its parts’. That concept of emergence is what I want to study here. Since there are many possible metaphysical theories which fit to this characterization, it seems to me that philosophers have the responsibility to provide a better understanding of “emergence”.

Currently although many phenomena of different kinds are said to be ‘emergent’, whether emergence in any metaphysically significant sense occurs is also a topic of intense philosophical debate. More recently, what is so controversial is the metaphysical status of these allegedly ‘emergent’ phenomena. When these debates are viewed from the perspective of the alternative metaphysics being articulated here, it becomes clear that much of the discussion is vitiated by assumptions which belong to the traditional entity-based metaphysics we have found to be so deficient. It is urgent that the entire topic needs to be rethought.

Does “emergence” mean the same in all the different contexts in which it is used? What is it that emerges: entities, or properties, or behavior, or laws, or all or some of these categories? It is often said that emergence means that something has properties, or behavior, which are novel in the sense that its parts are not able to manifest this novel behavior. But what does it mean to speak of ‘novel’ properties here: that their description requires new concepts, or that they would not exist unless they had emerged?

Various philosophers claim that emergence means that the properties of the whole cannot be reduced to the properties of its parts. But again, what does “reduced” mean? Are they claiming that what has emerged is not identical to anything more basic? If so, does emergence necessarily imply a hierarchy of ontological ‘levels”? Or does reduction mean that emergent properties and behavior can be explained in terms of the properties or behavior of something more basic? It shows that the concept of emergence is unclear. In this project, I will seek to clarify the various conceptions articulated by this word and will access objections brought against its coherence.
In this paper, I will defend an account of environmental virtue ethics that avoids the criticism, usually directed against a eudaimonistic version of environmental virtue ethics, that it is anthropocentric. Christine Swanton defines virtue as “a good quality of character, more specifically a disposition to respond to, or acknowledge, items within its field or fields in an excellent or good enough way”. The items within a virtue's field or fields are those which make a demand on us. Swanton describes these items as the “demands of the world” which include those “which are in a position to make claim on us”, the inanimate objects which do not make a claim on us, and those pertaining to ourselves for our self-improvement. In other words, these items to which a virtuous person is expected to respond well are either “people, objects, situations, inner states, or actions”. In the kind of environmental virtue ethics that I will develop, I will employ Swanton's pluralistic account of virtue together with Iris Murdoch's notion of virtue as “selfless attention to nature”.

Virtue does not necessarily lead to the flourishing or the good life of its possessor. For some ancient Greek philosophers, this is not so. They think that virtue is necessary and even sufficient for happiness. I will not contend with this issue although I reckon that one of the motivations for being virtuous is the desire to be happy. But this desire for happiness can be subsumed under a more general aim of attaining the good. Although virtue is a good or an excellent quality of a human being, it does not always benefit the person who exhibits this quality. The reason for this incongruence between virtue and the good life is not only bad luck or the misfortunes that may befall a virtuous agent. The virtuous person's motive and reason for his action may also be a significant reason why there is no tight connection between the two. A virtuous person, for example, may decide not to pursue a career in medicine or law that may provide him security and comfort in life in order to serve as a volunteer in an organization that does aid-work in many poor countries. Some virtuous people are willing to do something for the sake of the good even if there is no assurance that they will benefit, either in terms of human flourishing or attainment of personal goods, from their good deeds.
Attachment, Discord and Politicization:  
The Problem of Engaged Buddhism in the Era of Popular Politics  

VERVILLE, Jacob  
Kyung Hee University (Korea)  

Throughout the modern era we have witnessed the politicization of the masses and the growth of ideologies and the idea of democratic rule coming to the forefront. The Dalai Lama stated that Buddhism “recognizes that human beings are entitled to dignity, that all members of the human family have an equal and inalienable right to liberty, not just in terms of political freedom, but also at the fundamental level of freedom from fear and want.”

Another prominent figure in engaged Buddhism, Thich Nhat Hanh, proposed a series of precepts for engaged Buddhism in his book Interbeing. The first precept states that we should not become overly attached to any particular view or ideology, and that “all systems of thought are guiding means: they’re not absolute truths.”

Similarly, the eighth precept states that “one should not create discord and cause the community to break,” and the tenth precept states “do not use the Buddhist community for personal gain or profit, or transform your community into a political party.” Thich Nhat Hanh’s precepts could easily be brought forward as criticisms to the Dalai Lama’s position which could be seen as fostering attachment to political ‘absolute truths.’ The eighth and tenth principles suggest that certain aspects of political participation from ‘engaged Buddhists’ may be problematic and that through active participation in the political world as a Buddhist we run the risk of ‘politicizing the community’ and likewise enable people to ‘use the Buddhist community for personal gain or profit.’

Another important consideration for all of us is whether or not democracy actually functions in the way that the Dalai Lama and other activists imply and whether all societies benefit unconditionally from democratization. There are significant swathes of the globe that still have far too fundamental problems to transition to fully democratic communities. Some scholars such as Bai Tongdong even question the way in which democracy is applied today and advocate for more limited democratic institutions, and there are even those like Ernest Gellner who point out that all governments, even democratic ones, often control and manipulate the political culture. This brings up very serious issues concerning whether or not a politicized Buddhist community could become an agent for the state like how many Buddhist organizations functioned in Imperial Japan.

This paper seeks to address issues concerning the idea of whether or not Buddhism has to attach itself fully to the concept of modern, liberal democracy and seeks to provide divergent opinions on government. It will thus argue that because democratic institutions are not best suited for every situation and perhaps require some limitation and because government is entirely capable of hijacking Buddhist institutions we should be weary of overt political engagement. It will argue that the Dalai Lama has gone too far in his political advocacy by overly committing to ideology and sets a bad precedent for engaged Buddhism.
Socrates as a Seer. Plato-Xenophon's Image of Socrates in the Ancient Greeks Religious Ideas Context

VOROBYEV, Dmitry Nikolaevich
I. Yakovlev Chuvash State Pedagogical University (Russia)

Research made a revision of the traditional image of Socrates-philosopher. The author changes research context of the legendary figure, being repelled from an idea that the philosophy in Ancient Greece did not yet separated from religion. Change of a context allows interpreting in a new way the principal lines of an image of Socrates drawn with Plato and Xenophon (Socrates’ daimonion or Divine Signs, Socrates’ piety and trance, future prediction). Research shows that Socrates in the eyes of his contemporaries looked like a “religious expert”, perhaps a craftsman of divination (“seer” or “mantis”) or like an inspired person who recognizes and realizes own special religious mission.

F.M. Cornford and P. Kingsley wrote about the mystical (or Orphic-Pythagorean) tradition of ancient Greek philosophy. Cornford attributes to it the Pythagoras, Parmenides, Empedocles, Plato. These sages were not «pure» philosophers, but were perceived as inspired person. Greek folk religion had own «theory of knowledge»: anyone who has access to absolute knowledge is the mediator between the world of people on the one hand and the world of gods and spirits on the other. Such a person has received access to absolute knowledge through the inspiration of the gods. Greek prophets and soothsayers, playing poets, healers, sages, and even the gods of the archaic period, for example, Apollo or Hermes, seen as inspired person.

An alternative theory of knowledge offered so-called Sophists. They denied privileged access to Knowledge, which makes it an epistemic. According to the Sophists, all knowledge is doxic. From the standpoint of the Sophists, the truth is a doxa that shared by most of the people. Plato opposes Socrates and the sophists. Plato’s Socrates is an absolute philosopher, receiving the god’s signs directly. He is a man that does not depend on the opinions of most people.
Crafting the Self through Losing the Self: Exploring Xunzi’s Ideal Self

WANG, Ellie Hua
National Chenchi University (Taiwan)

The aim of this paper is to explore Xunzi’s account of the ideal self and self-transformation, and the roles others play in this account. Different from Mencius who puts strong emphasis on the heaven endowment in human nature and cultivation, Xunzi takes the ideal state of the self, the sagehood, to be an artifice resulting from having artificial and inventive work done on the originally crude (if not bad) human nature. The crucial part of such work involves learning and practicing Confucian li (rituals and rites). It is through such intentional effort one gradually crafts oneself into an ideal self. Tang 2012 has argued convincingly that Confucian rituals instantiate a normative framework which contains norms for interpersonal relationships and personal behavior, and it is through adopting this normative framework one achieves an unified and other-related self. The agent thus gains control over his self and his life, which Tang considers to be an ultimate expression of ‘autonomy’. With some clarification of Xunzi’s views on the heartmind and human nature, I develop from Tang’s line of thought (with attention to some problems I see with his interpretation of Xunzi), and argue that in this self-crafting process, one unavoidably lose oneself in various senses.

I address three senses of such self-lose: 1. One loses one’s naturally formed expression of one’s natural states, which one may identify as part of one’s (old) self. 2. One loses one’s firm control of oneself by going through the trainings of ritual, with no clear prediction of what the transformed self would be. In this section I also analyze different senses of the concept ‘autonomy’, and further argue that, if my argument about self-loss in this sense is correct, the sages enjoy autonomy in a sense that is different from what Tang has in mind. Indeed, as we will see, even though Xunzi emphasizes the reflective capacity of the heartmind, his concern is not so much with the complete control of the self (or the heartmind) or one’s life, but is with the harmonious unification of different aspects of the self. 3. The unified ideal self is also an other-related self: One loses the focus on oneself in one’s consciousness. Specifically, through moral transformation, one’s consciousness is changed in that its focus is expanded: others structurally relate to the self in one’s consciousness as one’s focus, and one’s focus on oneself is reshaped to include an awareness of others. As we will see, Xunzi’s (and to an important extent, Confucians’, in general) transformation of the self is through self-loss and the connectedness to others.
In this paper I aim to develop a universal truth-schema to clarify the meaning of truth, to try to analyze de dicto truth and de re truth and the deflationary truth. The motivation is the philosophical ambiguity of 'truth' has led to its pluralistic uses and translations, for instance, in Chinese there are 「真」 (truth) and 「真理」 (truth). However, I will not claim an only correct translation of ‘truth’, instead, just argue that we are so lucky both having ‘truth’ and ‘truth’, each of them expressing a concept different from the other in Chinese philosophical terms will hopefully come over the chaos led by the philosophical plurality of 'truth'.

In order to make this distinction, I first object to completely separating but also identifying truth and truth. Subsequently, I present that a truth is a restricted 'be-true-talk'. The restriction making a be-true-talk a truth is embodied in the necessity (and perpetuation) assertions, that is:

\[ A \text{ is a truth, iff, } A \text{ is true and necessary (and perpetual).} \]

This truth-schema not only reveals the concept of truth is based on the concept of truth, but also has richer metaphysical and epistemic sense. However, the different scope of necessity operator will lead to different concept of truth. For instance, If necessity is regarded as the restriction of truth-talk, we will obtain:

\[ A \text{ is a truth } \equiv T<A> \land \Box T<A>, \]

which is so-called de dicto truth. If necessity is regarded as the restriction of be-true-talk itself, we will obtain:

\[ A \text{ is a truth } \equiv T<A> \land \Box A, \]

which is so-called de re truth. I suppose the above mentioned two types of truth will be helpful for understanding existing theories of truth such as the correspondence, the coherence, etc.

Finally, I will try to discuss--from a deflationary point of view--the transparency of truth predicate will bring what consequence for concept of truth characterized by truth-schema.
The Existential Confucianism of Post Neo Confucianism

WANG, Lei
Tongji University (China)

This paper mainly deals with the ontology of Post Neo Confucianism, which is the inheritance and also criticism of the ontology of Neo Confucianism.

The ontology of Neo Confucianism mostly comes from Mou Zongsan, the representative of Neo Confucianism, who constructs a system of the metaphysics of morals by interpreting Kant’s philosophy and Song Ming Neo Confucianism in order to make a response to the criticism of Chinese traditional culture, which hold the opinion that Chinese culture has no scientific thought, no democratic thought and no theoretical system. Nevertheless, the Post Neo Confucianism points out that the system of metaphysics of morals is still in the whole framework of the western metaphysics, which is not harmonious with the Chinese tradition.

Therefore, the development of Post Neo Confucianism on Neo Confucianism in the dimensions are changing from distinction between Chinese and Western to the distinction between ancient and modern, and in the standards from values of western to universal values. On this account, Post Neo Confucianism develops practical Existential Confucianism which roots in Confucianism and faces the modernity problems. The Moral Subjects Metaphysics of Mou Zongsan is still in the shade of western metaphysics, accordingly Existential Confucianism is independent from ontology and theology of western metaphysics. Existential Confucianism consists of the ontology of Confucianism and the hermeneutics of Confucianism.

The ontology of Confucianism can be divided into Living World and Three States Ontology. The Living World is the foundation of Living Confucianism and Political Confucianism of Post Neo Confucianism, and the Three States Ontology connects the Ontology of Confucianism and the Hermeneutics of Confucianism.

The theory of Three States Ontology is proposed by Lin Anwu who is a successor of Mou Zongsan, as a response to the Dualistic Ontology by Mou Zongsan. The Three States Ontology expands into such a process that the origin of the Tao, the manifestation of the Tao and the manifestation of the Tao. Li Zehou makes feeling as noumenon which contains the philosophy of human nature and the philosophy of life, and the former is the foundation of the later. Chen Lai makes benevolence (ren) as noumenon in one of his recent works the ontology of benevolence, which makes an organic connection of ren as one and ren as reproductive source in traditional Confucianism. Both making feeling as noumenon and making benevolence (ren) as noumenon can be interpreting in the perspective of Three States Ontology.

The Hermeneutics of Confucianism can be divided into two parts, one is proposed by Lin Anwu, that is, there are five hierarchies of Chinese philosophy hermeneutics, which should be Tao, Intention, Idea, Form, Sentence; the other is proposed by Cheng Zhongying, that is ontological hermeneutics rooted in the books of changes.

At the interchange of ancient and modern society, the Existential Confucianism of Post Neo Confucianism will inevitably develop its own theories and methods.
DeRose (2001) proposes, based on his observation on various examples, what I shall call the dependency thesis given the specific sense of deliberational usefulness.

(Dependency Thesis) One's knowledge of a conditional is deliberationally useless if his knowledge depends on backtracking grounds. (DeRose 2010: 30)

(Deliberational Usefulness) One's knowledge of a conditional is deliberationally useful just in case that ``the agent involved should make use of in deliberating over whether to (try to) make the antecedent true as a way of promoting (or resisting) the consequent being made true." (DeRose 2010: 25)

Though examples in DeRose (2010) give good evidence for the dependency thesis, two issues are still worth pursuing.

(Issue 1) Is the dependency thesis correct? (Or, does every case of dependency on backtracking grounds render the knowledge of a conditional deliberationally useless?)

(Issue 2) If the dependency thesis is correct, what explains its correctness?

The issue 1 cannot be conclusively answered by many positive cases. A satisfactory answer for the issue 2, though not given in DeRose (2010), should come back to justify a positive answer to the issue 1.

In this paper, I will first recap DeRose's dependency thesis and its significance for a theory of rational decision making. Second, by using two conditional relations defined on top of the causal modeling semantics, the dependency thesis will be further elaborated especially focusing on the notion of backtracking grounds and dependency on backtracking grounds. Third, I will present cases and arguments to argue for a negative answer to the issue 1, so that the issue 2 is made inapplicable. Finally, some implications from the incorrectness of the dependency thesis on a theory of rational decision making will be presented.
Lionel M. Jensen once told us that Western understandings of “Confucianism” differ significantly from the original Chinese ideas they claim to represent. Jensen then took this a rather shocking step further, claiming that even Kongzi’s 孔子 additional Chinese designation of “Kong Fuzi” 孔夫子 on which the Latinization “Confucius” is based scarcely existed prior to Matteo Ricci’s (1552–1610) arrival in China. These terms, Jensen says, were entirely “manufactured” by Ricci and other Western Jesuit missionaries.

This paper will not delve into the entirety of the views put forth in Jensen’s work. My aim is limited in asserting a simple historical fact that long before the arrival of Jesuit missionaries in the late Ming dynasty, Chinese texts from historical records to literature—and even the Confucian classics that Jensen claims to have checked exhaustively—include numerous instances of the use of the appellation Kong Fuzi. From my own preliminary gathering and examination of resources, the earliest records in Chinese of the term “Kong Fuzi” can be traced at least back to the early Tang dynasty, over 700 years before Ricci came to China. All on its own, this is more than enough to prove Jensen’s claim that the Jesuits “created” and “manufactured” the term to be overly hasty, contestable or even fundamentally flawed.
Tale on the Buddhist Temple Integrated with City and Nature: Discussion on Temple Management Based on a Philosophical Perspective

WON, Haeyoung
Dongguk University (Korea)

Buddhist temple management should seek development and change based simultaneously on fundamental policy, reserving history and tradition. Any community that rejects these changes has gone backward; however, timely change allows a community to keep morality inside; moreover, it makes society, outside of temple, able to return to the temple. Historically, buddhism in Korea not only led the spirit of the age, but also demanded morality from it. Therefore, Korean buddhism can be characterized by those attributes and should be kept in such way in the future.

A temple is a place far away from troubles and the complicated secular world, which allows one to discover purification. Also, it is a complete steppingstone to lead one back to the secular world. The experience of a temple stay can heal one's wounded soul, mangled with competition, disorder, and selfishness as well as allow that individual a serene atmosphere in which to find inner peace, calm down and become purified. In this way, one can recover from an unperturbed mind and rediscover their way in a troubled society.

The idea of 'leaving a space blank' is closely related with Korean culture and this idea is congruent with the location and philosophy of the temple. As such, it is necessary to create a system that can make people, while staying at temple, feel relaxed in a natural way as they are at home, rather than make them educated or coaxed religiously. In addition, more effort should be made to encourage people outside of temple to be familiar with the idea of 'leaving a space blank'. Given this, people outside of the temple can enjoy approachable access to temple by means of experience and traditional temple attitude. To sum up, the buddhist community should be ready to share the attractiveness and aesthetic pleasure of the temple experience to more people.
Chisholm’s Paradox Revisited
: Contrary-To-Duty Obligations and Ordering Semantics

WON, Yuna
Cornell University (USA)

Chisholm’s Paradox is one of the most famous puzzles in the deontic logic literature (Chisholm, 1963). It is commonly believed that the Chisholm’s Paradox arises only in Standard Deontic Logic (SDL), but not in ordering semantics, which is now the orthodox semantics for conditionals and modals. Although ordering semantics is free from this classic puzzle, I argue that ordering semantics fails to meet the real challenge raised by Chisholm’s example, which is about the nature of contrary-to-duty (CTD) obligations—a type of obligations that takes effect when a corresponding primary obligation is violated. To show that ordering semantics cannot provide an adequate formal representation of CTD obligations, I put forward a new puzzle, the CTD trilemma, extending the familiar example from Chisholm’s Paradox. The source of their limitation will be identified, and possible resistance to the CTD trilemma will be carefully examined. To solve this new puzzle and adequately capture the notion of CTD obligations in a formal system, I maintain that we need to acknowledge two different normative uses of deontic modal sentences: axiological use of ‘ought’-statements and deontological use of ‘ought’-statements. Finally, I propose a dynamic approach which accounts for these two meanings of ‘ought’s based on Kratzer semantics and show how it solves the CTD trilemma.
Frankfurt and the Normativity of Equality

WU, Feng-Wei
Chinese Culture University (Taiwan)

It is often assumed that equality is an important political value, even a duty that should be pursued. However, the normativity of equality is not self-evident and is challenged from time to time. Frankfurt (1987, 1997, 2015) famously argues that: 1) equality is a comparative concept driven by resentment or envy and is therefore not desirable; 2) equality has no intrinsic value, or put another way, having an adherent value at best; 3) the concern of equality is formal rather than substantial; and 4) by implementing equality in public policies, it inevitably contradicts and compromises people’s freedom. I argue that it is not the case. The political liberal view of equality argues that equality must coexist with the value of freedom and fraternity in order to sustain a robust and well-ordered political community, which in turn justifies the normativity of equality.
For the past 20 years, care ethicists, to some extent, have been involved in the debate regarding the relation between care and Jen. For Confucian care ethicists, Li (1994, 2015) in particular, the voice of care has always been part and parcel of the conception of Jen, and the full development of such integration in the contemporary world would lead to the privileged moral form of life for both East and West, above all, the integration of care and Jen is believed to be particularly good for gender equality. However, for care ethicists who hold that Confucianism, Daoism as well, not only has always been consolidating patriarchal ideology but also has been subordinating women through gendered hierarchy of Ying and Yang, the project of integrating care and Jen, to their critique, either is misleading at its best, or is a detriment to the progress of care ethics as a distinctive moral voice at its worst.

This paper aims at exploring the current debate between Confucian care ethicists and their opponents, Held (2006) and Noddings (2010) to be exact, so as to have a good grasp of the issue regarding whether or not care and Jen is compatible to begin with. It is followed by critically examining the limits of each view, and upon thus doing, making explicit the conception of care as both caring and epistemic virtue, which could be conducive to go beyond the current either/or debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists.

As I argue, the current debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists has problem at both sides. The view of Confucian Care Ethics that has been attentive to the conception of Jen (仁) as the virtue of Gentleman (君子), to my critique, is ignorant to the epistemic injustice incurred upon women, caretakers in particular, and, as a result, it becomes part of the problem of gender inequality the compatibilists set out to eliminate. As to the view of incompatibilists, Held (2006) and Noddings (2010) to be exact, that draws upon the moral distinction of caring voice without alluding to the femininity of women, to my understanding, the moral distinction of care is yet to be fully developed to be a convincing project, otherwise, the moral distinction has been constantly under the enduring threat of becoming part of either Aristotelian or Neo-Aristotelian framework of virtue ethics.

Insofar as the conception of care as the hybridity of both caring and epistemic virtue is fully developed, as I will argue, there is an alternative to the current either/or choice between compatibilism and incompatibilism. The hybridity of caring virtue would reclaim the gestalt switch of caring voices articulated by both Held (2006) and Noddings (2010), that is, a moral voice inspired by the excellence of maternal practices in everydayness, which, in turn, would be valuable resources to reinterpret Confucianism’s way of Jen that has been ignorant to both the moral and epistemic privilege of caretakers.

The hybridity of caring virtue, as I conclude, suggests the feasibility of taking hold of both compatibilism and incompatibilism, as along as the gestalt switch of caring voices is fully exercised by turning upside down Confucian Care Ethicists, that is, the conception of Jen has to be subsumed under the conception of care, not vice versa.
My aim in this paper is to investigate the connections between logical pluralism and truth pluralism. I'll focus on the most influential variety of logical pluralism, defended by Jc Beall and Greg Restall. Two significant issues here are:

(i) If one endorses truth pluralism, does one thereby commit to Beall-Restall (B-R) logical pluralism?

(ii) If one endorses B-R logical pluralism, does one thereby commit to truth pluralism?

Michael Lynch and Nikolaj Pedersen address the former issue, arguing that Lynch-style truth pluralists should be B-R logical pluralists. Beall and Restall offer the sole discussion of the latter issue, arguing that B-R logical pluralism doesn't deliver an interestingly pluralist conception of truth.

The latter issue, it seems to me, merits further scrutiny. What I aim to show is that given plausible assumptions about truth predicates that are motivated by Beall himself, B-R logical pluralism does actually generate an interesting kind of truth pluralism that militates against a popular deflationary conception of truth.

Beall advances the co-entailment conception of truth predicates, according to which:

(CE*) 'F' is a truth predicate for language $L$ iff for any $L$ sentence 'S,' 'F('S')' has 'S' as a logical consequence and vice versa.

The B-R logical pluralist should insist firstly that (CE*) needs to be revised. For the B-R logical pluralist, logical consequence is parametrized, so that strictly, no sentence is a logical consequence simpliciter of any other sentence. Hence to be adequate by the B-R logical pluralist's lights, (CE*) must involve a parametrized notion of logical consequence.

What's interesting is that given this revision, we should also parametrize the key notion that (CE*) aims to elucidate—that of being a truth predicate. The reason, put briefly, is that if there's more than one sense in which 'F('S')' and 'S' might be logical consequences of one another, then there's more than one sense in which 'F' might be a truth predicate for $L$. So for the B-R logical pluralist, the co-entailment conception should read:

(CE) 'F' is a truth predicate for $L$ iff for any $L$ sentence 'S,' 'F('S')' has 'S' as a logical consequence and vice versa.

It's here that truth pluralism enters the picture. B-R logical pluralism entails that there are at least three logical consequence relations for English, corresponding to classical, intuitionistic, and relevant logics. When we plug these relations into (CE), we get out three kinds of truth predicate for English, each associated with one of the consequence relations. So from B-R logical pluralism and (CE), we get truth predicate pluralism for English. Moreover, using a pervasive distinction between deflationary and substantial truth predicates made precise by Beall, we can show that these are all substantial truth predicates.

The main results, then, are:

(a) B-R logical pluralism, together with (CE), pushes us towards an interesting kind of truth pluralism and

(b) B-R logical pluralism and (CE) together motivate rejection of the deflationary view that any truth predicate for English is a deflationary truth predicate.
Some philosophers and religionists in east and west have mentioned ineffability, such as negative theology, Mahāyāna Buddhism, and even contemporary philosophers like Heidegger and Wittgenstein. It is, however, well known that a paradox arises from the predicate "x is ineffable", since it seems that "x is ineffable" implies "x is effable". Some scholars tried to avoid this paradox in various ways, but these attempts involve obvious problems. In our view, the problem of previous researches is that there have been few studies of the logical mechanism of the paradox.

In this paper, we will offer a formal analysis of ineffability paradox and its solution. Intuitively, "x is ineffable" means impossibility of predication, namely, for any predicate \( P \), it is not the case that \( x \) is \( P \). We therefore formulate the ineffability predicate \( \neg E(x) \) as below by using second-order logic:

\[
\neg E(x) \leftrightarrow \forall X (\neg X(x)).
\]

It can be easily shown that a paradox \( \neg E(x) \land E(x) \) is derived if we assume \( \exists x \neg E(x) \), by this definition. One may think that this fact shows the variable \( X \) cannot ranges over all properties, since the paradox does not occur if the second-order quantification has to do with the set of some basic or intrinsic properties. Let us call this position non-maximalism. On the other hand, maximalism thinks that \( X \) ranges over all properties. The problem is that non-maximalism has two difficulties: First, there is no definite criterion of intrinsic property. Second, some of scholars who mention ineffability may not satisfy non-maximalism. Hence, we try to explore solution from the perspective of maximalism.

To make matters worse, maximalism causes triviality without the paradox when we instantiate \( \varphi(x) \lor \neg \psi \). This implies an approach that uses non-classical logic, such as paracomplete or paraconsistent logic, does not work by itself. To handle all the problems we have seen above, we proposes a modified version of ineffability predicate \( \neg EF(x) \) defined as below:

\[
\neg EF(x) \leftrightarrow \forall X (\neg \Box X(x)).
\]

Moreover, we have to give some conditions on worlds and accessibility relation. Let us call \( w \) an empty world if for any \( A \), it is not the case that \( w \models A \). Let \( @ \) be the actual world. Then the frame \( \langle W, R \rangle \) must satisfy the following condition:

(CE) If \( @Rx \), then \( x \) is an empty world.

We will also offer a natural interpretation of empty world and accessibility relation, and consider consequences from this result.
This paper addresses two kinds of binary relational semantics, which we shall call algebraic
and set-theoretic relational semantics, for substructural logics based on residuated
latticed-ordered unital groupoids with closure. First, we discuss some non-associative and non-
commutative substructural logics with closure formulae, their corresponding algebraic
structures, and algebraic completeness results. Next, we introduce various types of binary
relational semantics, which will be called algebraic and set-theoretic Kripke-style semantics.
Non-holistic Anatomism and the No-Principled-Basis Consideration

YEN, Chun-Ping
The Graduate Center, City University of New York (USA)

Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore (*Holism: A Shopper’s Guide*) believe that the renouncement of atomism, the doctrine that the meaning of an expression \( E \) to be determined by some “outward” relation (OR) between \( E \) and some extra-linguistic entity, inevitably leads to holism, the doctrine that the meaning of \( E \) is determined by its “inward” relations (IRs) with every other expression in the very language. Their strategy to argue for atomism is to claim that since holism is untenable and non-holistic anatomism collapses into holism, atomism is the only option left. Once we allow IRs of \( E \) to take part in determining the meaning of \( E \) and follow Quine to deny the analytic/synthetic distinction, as they think we should, it is unlikely that there is principled distinction to tell meaning-constitutive IRs from not meaning-constitutive ones. Consequently, we get holism.

John Perry (“Fodor and Lepore on Holism”) and Michael Devitt (*Coming to Our Senses*) have challenged Fodor and Lepore’s take on the relation between anatomism and holism from different directions. Paul A. Boghossian (“Analyticity Reconsidered”) has also urged that it does not follow from the claim that it is indeterminate what the meaning-constitutive IRs for \( E \) are that all IRs are meaning-constitutive. While Boghossian’s point is well taken, I think that Fodor and Lepore are indeed onto an important question here. That is, what does it make non-holistic anatomism if without a principled basis for the distinction among IRs? The answer I shall be suggesting in this presentation is the following. Firstly, non-holistic anatomism is not well-motivated without a principled basis for the distinction among IRs. It is not enough for the non-holistic anatomist to simply claim that only some, but not all, IRs of \( E \) are determinative of the meaning of \( E \) without providing a principled demarcation of the determinative IRs of \( E \). Furthermore, even if non-holistic anatomism is well-motivated without such a principled demarcation, it does not get us very far in understanding the nature of meaning.
Music and Emotion: Towards an Aesthetics of Horror Film Music

YEUNG, Ka Chung Lorraine
Hong Kong Baptist University (Hong Kong)

The film sound theorist K. J. Donnelly’s essay ‘Demonic possession: horror film music’ (2005) famously remarks that some horror film music attempts at a “direct engagement with the physical” in that they trigger bodily effects “bypassed culture’s learned structures”. Donnelly notes that his ‘direct-access thesis’ of (horror) film music is subject to challenge from the “culturalist” view of film music, which contends that musical meaning is a mere matter of convention, and thus it is via learning the conventional meaning that film viewers come to be emotionally affected by the music and sound. This culturalist view of film music is supported by a position on musical meaning favoured by many philosophers —the cognitive theories of music and emotion, like the one defended by Peter Kivy. It argues that musical meaning is grasped primarily via intellectually or cognitively processing the music’s formal properties and/or the properties’ conventional meaning.

This paper aims at advancing an aesthetics of horror film music. I do so mainly by defending Donnelly’s “direct access thesis”, and from which I develop an embodied theory of musical meaning.

To do so, however, I have to meet the challenges from the cognitivist theory of music and emotion. I first examine the extent to which knowledge of music and musical conventions are required for music appreciation. I confront Kivy’s major arguments to the effect that knowledge of music and musical convention is necessary for music appreciation. I show that Kivy’s cognitivist theory leave some phenomena related to music experience unexplained.

Then I present reasons in favour of Donnelly’s “direct access thesis” that pure music can evoke emotion by physically incite the listener’s body, bypassing the cognitive, intellectual route pictured by Kivy. I show how this view betters at explaining the phenomena that remain unexplained in Kivy’s theory, and at the same time it still manages to give knowledge of music and musical conventions a proper role in music appreciation.

Then I incorporate this view of music and emotion into the view that musical meaning is primarily embodied, a contention put forward by M. Johnson in The Meaning of the Body (2007) and S. Larson in Musical Force (2012). There I demonstrate how seeing musical meaning as embodied meaning can enhance our understanding of the effectiveness of some horror film music, for example, the music in Stanley Kubrick’s The Shining. I wish to show how reflecting on horror film music provides interesting objections to a long-standing philosophical position of music and emotion, and enhance understanding of musical meaning.
The Priority of Power of Imagination in Aesthetics and Politics: 
by Arendt’s Interpretation of Kant’s Political Philosophy

YEUNG, Tak-lap
Free University of Berlin (Germany)

This paper aims at, first, arguing the priority of power of imagination (Einbildungskraft) in Kant’s aesthetics and political philosophy by Arendt’s interpretation. In order to meet this aim, I have to summarize Arendt’s interpretation of Kant’s theory of judgment, through which we can not only know the characters of aesthetic and political judgment in Arendt’s mind, but also understand the necessary presuppositions in Kant’s aesthetics and political philosophy. For Arendt, power of imagination and community sense (sensus communis) are two essential mental operations for judgment. On the one hand, the power of imagination provides the representation of an object which is absent for judgment and, on the other hand, the community sense provides the pre-established criteria for the judging agent. By these mental operations, we can judge things remotely, reflectively, critically and impartially. Through the elaboration of the relation among judgment, imagination and community sense, I will also give an account of the logical and structural priority of power of imagination among them.

The second aim of this paper is to shed light on the meaning of the priority of power of imagination in judgment. I will show that Arendt’s interpretation is deeply affected by Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s philosophy, especially by his idea of throwness (Geworfenheit), of being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sein), and of the structural priority of transcendental power of imagination (transzendental Einbildungskraft). Furthermore, I will show that her reading of the theme of Critique of Judgment, which concerns mainly the particular, leads her to consider the tension between the particularity and the generality of judgment for human being as the combination of vita activa and vita contemplative. An individual is always subjected to the conflicts between the real case and the general rules (e.g. ethical rules, moral rules, laws...etc.), and we have no meta-rule or principle that able to tell us how to subsume the particular under universal – judgment cannot be taught, Kant said. Arendt argue that, by the exemplar and power of imagination, we can finally gain right orientation for judgments: “to see in the particular what is valid for more than once case.” That is why the power of imagination is necessary for aesthetics and politics, or generally speaking, for human existence.

Through this paper, I want to bring the topic about power of imagination in aesthetics and politics into light. By Arendt’s interpretation, we are compelled to reconsider the role and significance of this unique faculty in value judgment, in particular, in the age of value conflict and fusion. The meaning of Kant’s aesthetics and political philosophy can be modernized and readdressed into the bargain.

6 Arendt, Hannah, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, p.85.
Typically, egoistic concern involves sentiments or attitudes one has about oneself. It may not be true, however, that personal identity is necessary to justify egoistic concern. Imagine that one’s body is scanned and continues to exist, while a numerically distinct person, bearing exactly the same psychological content and capacities as the original subject, is generated elsewhere based on the scanned information. This is a typical case of psychological fission, where the two distinct post-fission offshoots stand in a special sort of relation to each other. In Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit argues that, practically speaking, this relation is little different from the relation one bears with oneself. One offshoot bears egoistic concern for—or, to use Parfit’s favorite jargon, preserves “what matters in survival” to—the other. This implies an interesting result: the survival of one’s psychological twin is as good as one’s own survival.

To defend the claim that one has egoistic concern with one’s psychological replica, Parfit considers two analogous cases: an actual case where one takes a sleeping pill, a side-effect of which is retrograde amnesia, and an imaginary case where one’s mind is divided into two, mutually inaccessible streams of consciousness. I argue that Parfit’s arguments involving these cases are inadequate.

It is sometimes argued that the concern one has for one’s psychological twin is like one’s concern for one’s loved ones. This observation may raise an interesting question: is our concern for our loved ones essentially different from egoistic concern? One possible argument in regards to this question is that one’s loved ones are one’s extended selves insofar as one identifies the interests of one’s loved ones with one’s own interests. This may explain why the post-fission offshoots, taking each other as extended selves, bear egoistic concern towards each other. I reject this argument, on two grounds. First, our natural inclinations toward sacrificial acts indicate that self-concern is different from our concern for loved ones. Second, the picture of our loved ones as extended selves is at odds with the widely held view that we are morally required to do certain things for our loved ones.

Perhaps it may be argued that since the relation representing egoistic concern is transitive, the two offshoots in the earlier fission case should bear egoistic concern towards each other: one offshoot bears egoistic concern towards the pre-fission subject, who in turn bears egoistic concern towards the other offshoot; therefore, one offshoot bears egoistic concern towards the other. I maintain that this argument is illegitimate because it is doubtful that the relation representing egoistic concern can hold backwards in time. In particular, the deeply ingrained, asymmetrical attitudes we have toward past and future pain and pleasure seem to suggest that we are not concerned about our past selves in the same way as we are concerned about our future selves.
The Theories of Buddhist Atomism and the Debates on Realism, Representationalism, and Phenomenalism in the Buddhist Philosophies

YI, Kyoowan
Seoul National University (Korea)

The tripods of the Buddhist philosophical system root in the impermanence, non-existence of the self, and the suffering of all beings, among which the first two are the primary cause of the last, and at the same time the crucial condition for the liberation from the suffering. Therefore, it has been the most important task to investigate into the nature of impermanence and non-existence of the self. Here comes the question, what are the objects of the impermanence and non-existence. Early Buddhist approaches were more focused on the inner subjectivity, the self as an empirical subject who experiences the unnecessary sufferings, for the sake of the urgent demands for liberation, while recognizing the object outside the subject are also impermanent and non-existent.

As time goes on, however, the Buddhist scholars moved on to establish a self-complete system of sectarian philosophies, resulted in at least 28 or up to about 50 schools even before the common era. Sarvāstivādin was one of the leading schools that left us a tremendous amount of literatures, such as the encyclopedic treatise, Mahāvibhāṣa, where the objects of their investigation are described as ‘all thing (sarvam)’ including the five aggregates (5 skandhas), 12 sense bases (āyatana), and 18 basic elements (dhātu), which had been developed in the different theoretical contexts. The theories of atom (paramāṇu) came into the Buddhist scholastic system in order to provide a common ground to combine those three concepts of ‘all inclusive things.’ It is the concept of atom, however, that becomes the touchstone to distinguish the unique characteristics of major players in the development of the Buddhist philosophies from Sarvāstivādin the realists, Sautrāntika the representationalists, and to Yogācārin the phenomenalists.

I will discuss in this paper that the atomic theories of each school elucidate the differences in the interpretation of the notions of above mentioned five aggregates, 12 sense bases, 18 basic elements, and also other concepts in their philosophical systems, loosely corresponding to realism, representationalism, and phenomenalism. The Sarvāstivādin accused the other two schools of building their philosophies on the vanity that does not exist, while the Yogācārin criticized the Sarvāstivādin and the Sautrāntika as the realists who deviate from the fundamental teachings of impermanence and non-existence of the self. The Sautrāntika, the radical innovators, argue that the basic elements, that is, the atoms, are the only real, but transcending our perceptive ability, and the world that emerged through the six sense organs and sense objects is the only world we can experience by our perception, which is, however, not real. Vasubandhu, the author of Abhidharmakośa, took an eclectic approach to suggest that the 12 sense bases, which are composed of a certain amount of atoms, and their basic elements (18 dhātu) are both real, but the aggregates (skandha) that can be divided into smaller pieces are not real and therefore impermanent. It is interesting, though, that Vaiśeṣika the Indian adamant realists judged that all of those Buddhist schools are phenomenalists or representationalists because the objects of cognition in the Buddhism were considered momentary and mereologically reductive, and no Buddhist school acknowledged the reality of an ordinary object.

In order to illustrate the points they contended, I will survey here on various issues related to the atomic theories: metaphysical atom and basic unit of matter, combination or
accumulation of atoms, the object of cognition and the emergent image as an object, etc. that were heavily discussed by the Buddhist schools.
This presentation purports to discuss about how to compare many kinds of different mind understandings in a framework. The differences in mind understanding are inevitable because of different languages or cultures even different approaches to mind understanding. In that sense, every mind understanding is dependent on its language or culture, even academic perspective. Kinds of dependency lying in every mind understanding is counted as a substantial or fundamental difficulty that makes it especially hard to objectively compare with others. Even it has not been tried to compare in an objective framework. That’s because of lack of the objective framework.

The focal point of this presentation is how to make an effective framework or criteria of comparison among each different understanding of mind, in fact, comparison of all the understandings in a framework. This work requires a new approach that makes many different understandings of mind compared at once and the comparison is covering many academic fields and many different languages. Because each academic field or language has developed its own network of concepts, therefore a comprehensive set of criteria is required for the comparison. It looks like coordinates installation in an untouched astro-space that consists of many different networks of mind concepts.

This presentation not only includes some criticism on the established comparisons of mind understandings in order to indicate the limit of comparison without such a framework of a set of criteria. But also it shows an approach to how to establish the set of criteria. This establishment will be a discussion about how to construct the set of criteria, beyond the kinds of dependence, that enables us compare many different mind understandings at once in a framework. In other words, existence of the kinds of dependence means that there is a kind of incommensurability between each different mind understanding or among many different understandings. Until recent time, the incommensurability has been counted as one of the tantalizing problems in mind understandings. But this presentation shows how to get over the hard problem and how to get to a kind of commensurability among many different mind understandings. The commensurability is in fact the comprehensive set of criteria that enables us to compare many different mind understandings in a framework.

This presentation provides, as the set of criteria, six categories, i.e., ‘Structure and Function’, ‘Field of Existence’, ‘Change and Growth’, ‘Observation, Estimation, and Diagnosis’, ‘Effect of Mind’s Activity’, and ‘Metaphor’. Those categories have been developed as a result of three year collective research that has been supported by National Research Foundation of Korea and are supposed to be used for explanation of features of each mind understanding and for comparison of different mind understandings. In this presentation, how the criteria were created and where the availability of the criteria lies in will be discussed.
What’s Wrong with the Subjective Constraint on Empirical Rationality?

YOON, Bosuk
Ewha Woman’s University (Korea)

Do experiences make rational contribution to thinking? If they do, what is the character of the rational influence? The internalist intuition demands that these questions must be addressed from the subject’s point of view. Thus, it is widely acknowledged that as long as two experiences are subjectively alike, they can’t differ in their rational contribution. For instance, if your experience of seeing a table justifies your belief that there is a table in front and the hallucinating subject’s experience is exactly like yours, then he is equally justified in believing that there is a table in front. In this presentation, I address two worries about the subjective constraint: (i) it forces the subjective given; (ii) it does not allow immediate justification of ordinary perceptual beliefs. I will argue that when the subjective constraint is properly understood, it can be seen to be free from these allegedly negative consequences.
Learning from Fiction:
Cognitive Value and Artistic Value of Fictional Narrative Art

YOON, Juhan
Seoul National University (Korea)

Is it possible to learn from fictional narrative art, such as stories, novels, plays, or films? If so, is the ‘learning’ supposed to be the part of the practice of art? This paper deals with these two questions. The former has been dealt with by philosophers who have interest in the issue of cognitive value of fictional narrative art, but the latter has been relatively overlooked.

It seems that there is a strong intuition that we can have cognitive gains such as knowledge, beliefs, or skills somehow when (or while) we appreciate a fictional narrative artwork. On the other hand, some philosophers, influenced by the traditional epistemology, have been raising questions whether ‘fiction’ really could provide us with cognitively valuable outcomes. To put it roughly, the ones who argue that fictional narrative art has cognitive value could be labeled as ‘(artistic) cognitivists’, while the others who are against them could be named as ‘(artistic) noncognitivists’, or ‘anti-cognitivists’. However, some of anti-cognitivists, such as Peter Lamarque, insist that fictional narrative art can provide knowledge, skills, and so on for its audience in some sense, and also it might have cognitive value for that reason, but still that is not a part of its artistic value.

Lamarque’s view is based on the ‘institutionalist ontological argument’, which suggests that art has its specific practice, and the practice constitutes the essence of art. Applying it to this issue in favor of anti-cognitivists, Lamarque holds that cognitive value which art can potentially have does not constitute the practice of art qua art, and thereby does not constitute the essence of art. To wit, cognitive value that somehow can attribute to literary works is not a part of the practice of literature qua art.

I agree in principle with Lamarque’s view which distinguishes the practice of art from other practices in a human community, and thereby discerns the artistic value from among all kinds of value that art can potentially have. However, apart from my favor to the institutionalist ontology of art, it is deeply doubtful whether artistic practice truly does not include considerations on a cognitive quality which is unique to art, especially regarding the practice of art-evaluating.

To clarify this problem and suggest my own argument on this issue, first of all I formulate a position of ‘genuine’ cognitivism, reorganizing the debate between cognitivists and anti-cognitivists. Second, based on the formulation, I argue that the quality of ‘profundity’, as a cognitive and aesthetic quality of a literary work, can contribute to not only cognitive value of a fictional narrative artwork, but also artistic value of it, and therefore it is logically and practically legitimate to say that at least some cognitive value that fictional narrative art would have affects intrinsically its artistic value.
The “Feminine” Supplement to the Just War Theory Today

ZHANG, Ellen Y.
Hong Kong Baptist University (Hong Kong)

The purpose of just war theory (JWC) lies in its ability not to describe the world as it is, but to provide an ethical framework for debating the justice of particular wars. This paper will focus on a particular challenge to traditional JWT in the West from contemporary feminist scholars who do not reject JWT altogether but think that the theory needs to be revised and revitalized through a lens of feminist or feminine vantage points. The paper will first discuss major feminist critiques the JWT framework from three aspects: (1) its lack of conceptual clarity in the debate of the rights and wrongs of the conflict of war; (2) its blindness to the gender subordination inherent in its theoretical assumption; and (3) its failure to address “a bodied individual” and the subject qua “subject-in-relation” in war. Then the paper will show how feminists who support the JWT as an ethical framework maintain that the theory cannot be discarded – it is a “necessary evil” due to both its popularity in political discourse today and the necessity of having a framework for ethical analysis of war. As such, the “feminist” or “feminine” reinterpretation of the JWC aims at revitalization of the traditional understanding of the theory, pointing to a position that is different from pacifism and realism. Finally, the paper will evaluate the feminist critique of the JWC from the Daoist philosophy of the Laozi which is more interested in how to deal with war instead of defining a truly good or just war.
The Thoughts of Dummett on the Justification of Deduction

ZHAO, Xian
Hebei University (China)

ZHANG, Yan-jing
Hebei University (China)

According to Dummett, the question of justification of deduction has three levels: the first is the justification of the validity of an argument, the second is the justification of the correctness of a whole system of logic, and the third is the justification of how deductive inference is possible. A molecular view of language is the basis of justification of deduction, from a theory of meaning which based on it, we can provide the justification of the correctness of a whole system of logic, by constructing a proof of soundness or completeness. The third is mainly on the justification of the useness of deductive inference, and it can be tracked with a theory of meaning which admits of the gap between truth and the recognition of truth. This correct theory can be neither unreservedly idealist nor unreservedly realist; it must allow more of a gap between truth and the recognition of truth than a classically idealist theory, but less than a classically realist theory.

Dummett reveals that justification of deduction is based on theory of meaning, providing the basic ideas and concrete ways of solving the question of justification of deduction, namely taking deductive inference as a part of language practice, and solving the question of justification of deduction from the point of the general theory of meaning. The thoughts of Dummett on the justification of deduction show us the influence of theory of meaning on modern logic. Theory of meaning provides the philosophical justification for the modern logic and the basis of the semantics, and becomes the basic premise of the construction of modern logical system.
On Correlation between the Universe of Sets and “the Universe of Sets”

ZHU, Min
Macau University of Technology and Science (China)

Is the totality of all sets (the universe of sets or \( V \)) definite? Can the totality \( V \) be used to define an even larger such totality? These questions have brought about the debates over whether or not \( V \) is indefinitely extensible. Kai Hauser (2010, 2013) as an absolutist thought that \( V \) is absolutely maximal. It consists in two aspects. One aspect is that only set can be a possible application of the operation ‘set of’. From this point \( V \) is a maximal entity which is different from set. Another aspect is that \( V \) as a comprehensible mathematical symbol represents the absolute which includes ontologically every possibility, so \( V \) is absolute. But the opponents have not only refused to accept the existence of the absolute, but also claimed that any prior set can be used to generate new sets through the operation ‘set of’, which shows that the totality of all sets is indefinitely extensible. However, if we admit that there is the relation of representation between principles of generating sets epistemologically and the operation ‘set of’ in an ontological sense, then it can only be confirmed that semantic “\( V \)” representing \( V \) is indefinitely extensible. This point should be the consensus among the absolutists and their opponents.

Furthermore, if we suspend the absolute in ontology and admit the inexhaustibility of the operation ‘set of”, the latter will play a key role in correlating \( V \) with various linguistic representations of \( V \). As a result, on the one hand, Linnebo & Rayo (2012) only claimed that any definite totality of set-theoretic language can be used to define a larger such totality when they proved the indefinite extensibility of set-theoretic hierarchy through a truth-preserved translation. On the other hand, the inexhaustibility of the operation ‘set of” shows absolute maximality of \( V \) with respect to a set.

However, as we know, some technical approaches recently developed by some authors, such as Linnebo (2013) and Uzquiano (2015), made \( V \) act on its own, independent of human action. They obviously neglected the existing connection between the universe of sets and set-theoretic vocabulary which is used to express it in set-theoretic practice. Thus we intend to examine how ontological set theory is correlated with semantic “the universe of sets” \( V \) through reflecting set-theoretic practice. And then we want to support the construction of the modal predicate set theory system which connects \( V \) and “\( V \)”, based on the work developed by Uzquiano (2015). We propose a naturalistic amendment based on the works of Maddy (2007, 2011) and Simmon Hewitt (2015). Its content includes three parts. One shows that sets and the “sets” which used to express them have been united into set-theoretic practice, and therefore sets can be regard as “sets”, vice visa. Another is that \( V \) not only satisfies set-theoretic purpose, but also has appeared in set-theoretic practice. The last shows that we should expect to find stronger and stronger sets implied in \( V \), even though some of them, such as measurable cardinals, still are extrinsically justified. To sum up, all of them indicate that, to describe indefinite extensibility technically we should consider how to include correlation between \( V \) and “\( V \)” in any set-theoretic system.
ORGANIZED BY
SNU Institute of Philosophy

SUPPORTED BY
Seoul National University
National Research Foundation of Korea
Moha Fund for Analytic Philosophy

Website: www.ccpea2016.kr
E-mail: ccpea2016@snu.ac.kr